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INTRODUCTION

Hospital mergers, once rare in the United States, have grown
commonplace in the current decade. During the early 1980's, acquisitions or
consolidations occurred at the rate of roughly two hundred per year,
dramatically higher than the yearly rates of fifty in 1972 and five in 1961. I
Although no more than 3 percent of all U.S. hospitals are involved in such
transactions each year,'2 many, if not most, urban areas have already seen a
3
hospital merger or consolidation.
The growing frequency of hospital mergers is but one aspect of a much
broader structural transformation of the U.S. hospital industry in the 1980's.
New institutions have become part of the fabric of health care, and thus of the
environment in which hospitals operate. Formerly peripheral institutions
have grown in significance. These new or growing institutions include free
standing surgical and ambulatory outpatient clinics, health maintenance
organizations ("HMO's") and preferred provider organizations ("PPO's"),
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1. Finkler & Horowitz, Merger and Consolidation: An Overview of Activily in Health Care
Organizations, 39 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Jan. 1985, at 19.
2. The United States had 6,872 hospitals in 1984. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1987, at 94 [hereinafter 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

The merger rate is similar when expressed in terms of hospital beds. The early 1980's
acquisitions encompassed roughly 20,000 beds per year. Finkler & Horowitz, supra note 1, at 25. See
generally Mullner & Andersen, A Descriptive and Financial Ratio Analysis of Merged and Consolidated
Hospitals: United States, 1980-1985, 7 ADVANCES

RESEARCH 41 (1987).
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Roughly 1,360,000 beds were available in the U.S. hospital industry in the

early 1 80's, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 94, so nearly 1.5% of hospital beds were involved

in such transactions each year.
3. In the first three months of 1986, significant combinations occurred or were discussed in the
San Francisco, Rochester, Minnesota, Chicago, Baltimore, and Brookline, Massachusetts areas.
Mullner & Andersen, supra note 2, at 41-42.
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for-profit hospitals, multi-hospital systems, and hospital management
contracts. 4 Furthermore, the direct regulatory supervision of hospitals has
changed in the past two decades. In virtually all states, hospital capital
investments require a certificate of need ("CON") from a state regulatory
body, or else a CON requirement has recently been abolished.5 Third party
reimbursement for hospital expenses has shifted from a cost-based system to
a prospective payment system ("PPS"), primarily for patients with Medicare
6
but also for other patients in some states.
Another important regulatory change is indirect. The application of
antitrust law to the health field differs in the 1980's from the patterns
characteristic of earlier decades. Today, unlike past decades, it is generally
understood that most activities of the health professions and hospitals are
governed by the antitrust laws. Hospital mergers are now reviewed under the
same antitrust framework as applies to any acquisition. 7 Furthermore,
antitrust law of the 1980's differs markedly from the antitrust law of the
1960's, including differences in its merger analysis.
Because antitrust law, the hospital industry structure, and the regulatory
framework applied to hospital activities have each changed dramatically from
their appearance in previous decades, the present antitrust constraints on
hospital mergers may seem novel to hospitals, lawyers, and courts. This
article shows how the antitrust analysis of hospital mergers depends upon the
features of the regulatory scheme applied to the hospital industry, both
directly and through the influence of regulation on industry structure and
conduct. It concludes that for the provision of many hospital services,
demand substitutes are limited, supply substitutes also may be limited,
geographic markets are often no larger than a single metropolitan area, entry
is time consuming, and market concentration is high. Under the current
antitrust law and enforcement policy, these structural characteristics of the
hospital industry will call for close scrutiny of hospital mergers.
II
THE REGULATION OF HEALTH CARE PROVISION:

RESPONSE

TO MARKET FAILURE

The antitrust analysis of hospital mergers depends importantly upon
certain features of the health care regulatory scheme. Moreover, recent
changes in the regulatory environment may be responsible for the rise in
hospital industry acquisitions in the early 1980's. Important aspects of the
regulatory framework and its historical evolution will be outlined below.
4. See infra notes 32-34, 137, 207 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 16-17, 22-23, 292-97 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 20-21, 24 and accompanying text.
7. The Federal Trade Commission has taken a leadership role in showing how antitrust law
applies to hospital mergers. See American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984); Hospital Corp. ofAm.,
106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), afftd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). In this
area, the FTC is ably exploiting its unique ability as a specialized antitrust court to shape the law
where it was once unclear.
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Most people are risk-averse and are uncertain about the nature, cost, and
timing of future health care requirements. Prepaid health insurance, the
obvious market response, is therefore extremely desirable.8 In its most
common historical forms, however, the insurance mechanism reduces the
elasticity of the demand for health care. Once health care is paid for entirely
or in large part, consumers have little incentive to economize on cost. 9
Furthermore, insurance schemes have historically incorporated retrospective
cost-based or charge-based reimbursement for health care providers, giving
hospitals little incentive to minimize costs or compete on price.' 0 As a result,
prepaid health insurance has led to the overprovision of health care and to
high health care prices.''
The bias created by prepaid health insurance toward inefficiently high
health care prices and usage is further exacerbated by information problems
associated with the health care market. Patients often have little knowledge
about their illnesses and how to treat them. Doctors act as agents for patients,
in many cases deciding on the amount of care and the hospital at which it will
be provided, and often simultaneously supplying that care. When physician
compensation is tied to the level of care and doctors are patient agents in
selecting the care level, the price and quantity of medical care will tend to rise
2
to inefficiently high levels. '

8. See generally Crandall, The Impossibility of Finding a Mechanism to Ration Health Care Resources
Efficiently, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 29 (M. Olson ed. 198 1);Joskow,
Alternative Regulatory AMechanismsfor Controlling Hospital Costs, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS
OF HEALTH CARE, supra, at 219, 220-26; Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 457-58.
Health markets with prepaid health insurance are not free of other forms of market failure,
however. The necessary insurance contracts may be too complex, and insurance raises well-known
adverse selection and moral hazard difficulties. See generally Crandall, supra, at 31, 34 (complex
contracts); Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection, 88 QJ. ECON. 44 (1974).
9. From 80% to 90% of the U.S. population has fairly extensive hospital insurance coverage,
and the typical insured patient pays about 5% of hospital charges incurred. P.JosKow, CONTROLLING
HOSPITAL COSTS 11 (1981).
To the extent insurance schemes have large deductibles and no
copayments, patients likely pay less than 5% of marginal hospital charges.
10. See generally id. at 27-31; cf. Danzon, Hospital "Profits" The Effects of Reimbursement Policies, I J.
HEALTH ECON. 29 (1982) (hospitals have an incentive to maximize the difference between
reimbursable accounting costs and true economic costs for insured patients, creating a bias toward
high patient charges for insured patients).
11. Many schemes have been proposed for preserving the consumer's benefits of prepaid health
insurance while reducing the systemic tendency for inefficiently high prices and output of the health
care sector. See generally Pauly, Overinsurance: The Conceptual Issues, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
WHAT Now, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? 201 (M. Pauly ed. 1980); Crandall, supra note 8, at 34;
Zeckhauser & Zook, Failures to Control Health Costs: Departuresfrom First Principles, in A NEW APPROACH
TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 8, at 87,
109-10 (effects of cost-based
reimbursement); cf Introduction to A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE, supra note
8, at 1, 24-25 (vertical integration among insurers and hospitals would give hospitals an incentive to
minimize costs and patients an incentive to prefer less costly hospitals). Despite the bias toward
overprovision of health care in the economy as a whole, the distribution of access to health care is
uneven: Poor and rural consumers may be underprovided with health care. See id. at 7.
12. This incentive is present even assuming that all physicians act ethically in making decisions
for the provision of care. For a discussion of the agency relationship between doctor and patient,
and the possibility that physicians induce a demand for medical care, see, for example, M. PAULY,
DOCTORS AND THEIR WORKSHOPS: ECONOMIC MODELS OF PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR (1980).
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The regulatory scheme put into place in the United States in the 1960's
exacerbated these biases in favor of high health care prices and high levels of
health care provision. Medicare and Medicaid, landmark federal insurance
programs for the elderly and poor enacted in 1965, relied upon retrospective
cost-based reimbursement of health care providers, physicians, and
hospitals. I3 Not surprisingly, a health care explosion occurred. Health care
prices continued to rise at a substantially higher rate than prices generally,' 4
and the health care share of the Gross National Product increased from 4.4
percent in 1950 and 5.3 percent in 1960 to 7.4 percent in 1970 and 9.1
percent in 1980.15
Congress addressed these skyrocketing health care costs in the 1970's and
early 1980's when it enacted the main elements of the regulatory scheme
shaping the provision of health care today. In 1974, Congress placed
limitations on the quantity of health care provided consumers in order to
control the health care explosion. Large hospital capital expenditures became
subject to the supervision of state regulatory boards, through the requirement
for a CON. 16 Virtually all states enacted CON programs by 1979, while only
five had required CON approvals before 1970.17 Furthermore, applying a
13. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1814(b), sec. 12 1(a),
§ 1905(a), 79 Stat. 286, 296, 351 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(b), 1396(d) (1982)).
Under cost reimbursement, the only marginal costs borne by patients, and thus the only source of
limits on their health care purchases, come from the opportunity cost of obtaining care, including
costs of time away from work or leisure and costs of travel.
14. Even before the creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 1960's, health care
prices were increasing more rapidly than the prices of most other goods and services. From 1953 to
1962, the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") for medical care rose 36.0%, while the aggregate CPI rose
13.1%. Since that time, above average health care inflation rates have continued. From 1963 to
1972, the medical CPI rose by 54.8% while the aggregate CPI rose by 36.6%. From 1973 to 1981,
when the CPI for energy rose by 232.0%, the medical CPI increase of 113.9% continued to outpace
the aggregate CPI increase of 104.7%. From 1982 to 1986, the medical CPI rose by 31.9% while the
aggregate CPI rose by only 13.6%. During this time, the aggregate CPI was likely aided more than
the medical CPI by the decline of 11.0% in the energy CPI. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
307 (1987).
15.
1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 84 (figures for 1970 and 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1984, at 102 (figures for 1950 and 1960). The health

care share of Gross National Product has continued to rise, reaching 10.7% in 1985.

1987

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 84. Some of these price increases may reflect improvements

in the quality and scope of services provided. P. JOSKOw, supra note 9, at 15.
16. National Health Planning & Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, sec. 3,
§ 1523(a)(4), 88 Stat. 2225, 2246 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300m-2 (1982) (repealed 1986)).
The typical CON board reviewed all expenditures above $100,000 to $150,000. Joskow, supra note 8,
at 219, 234. Similar review of capital expenditures was encouraged by § 1122 of the Social Security
Act. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 221, § 1122, 86 Stat. 1329, 1386
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1982 & Supp. 1988)). See generally Frech, The Long-Lost
Free Market in Health Care: Government and ProfessionalRegulation of Medicine, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE
ECONOMICS

OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 8, at 44, 61-66; Joskow, supra note 8, at 219, 234-43;

Steinwald & Sloan, Regulato , Approaches to Hospital Cost Containment: A Synthesis of the Empirical Evidence,
in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE, supra note 8, at 274. Federal
Communications Commission regulation of broadcasting provides another example of the use of
entry restrictions rather than the price mechanism to ration access to resources. See T. MORGAN, J.
HARRISON & P. VERKUIL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS CASES AND MATERIALS 136-37 (2d ed.
1985).
17.

P. JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS 92-93 (1981).

However, 21 states enacted CON

requirements between 1970 and 1974, before such programs were federally mandated.
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similar regulatory approach to other aspects of health care provision,
Congress required that outside experts monitor and limit physician choice of
care through peer review. 8
Congress's 1974 mechanism for taming the health care explosion, based
on monitoring and policing capital expenditures and care decisions, was
replaced in the 1980's by a new incentive mechanism to attack high health
care prices. Building on the experience of several states with all-payer
prospective payment systems,' 9 Congress introduced in 1983 a prospective
payment

system

("PPS"),2 °

covering

a substantial

fraction

of hospital

revenues, 2 1

to replace cost-based Medicare reimbursement. By 1986, CON's
were no longer required,2 2 and in consequence have been abolished by over
23
one quarter of the states.
Under the PPS, Medicare provides for a standardized payment to every
hospital nationwide for each patient with a given diagnosis. These payments
are based primarily on 1981 average nationwide costs associated with the
treatment of the patient's diagnostic related group ("DRG"). 2 4 The cap on
payments guarantees that each hospital will recover the average costs
associated with the typical treatment and experience of patients with each
18. Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F, 86 Stat. 1329, 1429
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c to1320c-13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988)) (Professional
Standards Review Organizations ("PSRO")). By the end of the 1970's, most areas of the United
States had some type of PSRO program in operation. Steinwald & Sloan, supra note 16, at 282-84.
19. See generally Hellinger, Recent Evidence on Case-Based Systems for Setting Hospital Rates, 22 INQUIRY
78 (1985); but cf Cone & Dranove, Why Did States Enact Hospital Rate-Setting Laws?, 29 J. L. & EcoN.
287 (1986) (state rate-setting laws were enacted to correct monitoring problems created by Medicaid
law, rather than as a response to increasing medical expenses generally).
20. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-607, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. See Iv. OF NAT'L COST ESTIMATES, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMIN., Vational Health E.xpenditures, 1986-2000, 8 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1987, at 1,
30 (Medicare accounts for nearly 30% of hospital care expenditures).
22. See supra note 16. Most studies conclude that neither CON nor PSRO programs were
successful at achieving health care cost reductions. See generally Sloan, Government and the Regulation of
Hospital Care, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 196 (Papers & Proceedings 1982);Joskow, supra note 8, at 219, 23443; Steinwald & Sloan, supia note 16, at 274, 285-96; but see Howell, Evaluatingthe Impact of Certificateof-A'eed Regulation Using Ieasures of Ultimate Outcome: Some Cautionsfrom Experience in Massachusetts, 19
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 587 (1984) (CON success increases over time, as state boards develop
experience); Ashby, The Impact of Hospital Regulatoy Programson Per Capita Costs, Utilization, and Capital
Investment, 21 INQUIRY 45 (1984) (CON effect on cost containment is ambiguous, but PSRO's reduced
the rate of growth in hospital costs since 1977). Empirical evidence on the entry deterring effects of
CON laws is discussed infra note 296.
23. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE FACILITIES:
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION
EXPENDITURES BY STATE, app. I (1986). In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services
no longer undertakes capital reviews pursuant to § 1122 of the Social Security Act, although that
statute has not been repealed. Another Upset for Health Planning,41 MED. & HEALTH PERSP. (Oct. 5,
1987).
24. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., iST SESS.,
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS 221-36 (Comm. Print 4, 1987). The program incorporated a four year phase-in
period, during which hospitals were reimbursed a declining percentage of their own historical costs,
and during which reimbursement was based in part on regional costs. Future reimbursements will be
adjusted for inflation.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 2

diagnosis, but will not recover more. In consequence, hospitals must cut
treatment costs in order to increase profits.
Although it may be too early to evaluate the effect of the Medicare
prospective payment system on hospital costs, 25 the industry appears to have

grown more competitive in consequence. The preliminary evidence suggests
that both hospital admissions and hospital stays, measures of industry output,
have declined as a result of the program2 6 and as a result, hospital occupancy
rates have fallen dramatically.2 7 Because it is unlikely that the program
25. See generally Hellinger, supra note 19, at 85. Preliminary evidence suggests that the rate of
hospital cost increases declined in 1984 and 1985, following the imposition of the Medicare PPS. See
Guterman & Dobson, Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System for Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 97, 111 (1986) (increase in real Medicare benefit payments for inpatient and
outpatient hospital care slowed in 1984); 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 85, Table No.

127 (expenditures on hospital care fell from 41.1% of total health expenditures in 1983 to 39.2% in
1985, and expenditures on medical facilities construction fell from 2.6% of the total in 1983 to 1.9%
in 1985); id. at 86, Table No. 128, 88, Table No. 134 (rate of growth of per capita health care
expenditures and hospital room charges both slowed in 1984 and 1985).
The continued (albeit slowed) growth in Medicare reimbursements despite the cost-cutting
pressures of the PPS may reflect hospital manipulation of the PPS program. Hospitals can increase
reimbursements through more conservative diagnoses. For example, if colds and pneumonia were
diagnostic categories, and the reimbursement level were greater for the latter diagnosis, then
hospitals could increase revenues by diagnosing likely colds as possible pneumonia. See Guterman &
Dobson, supra, at 104; but cf Vertrees & Manton, The Complexity of Chronic Disease at Later Ages: Practical
Implications for Prospective Payment and Data Collection, 23 INQUIRY 154 (1986) (constructing DRG's
based on five dimensions of diagnosis may limit ability of hospitals to manipulate categories). The
continued growth in reimbursements might also reflect increases in the demand for medical care
engendered by the growth of medical science and the resulting increase in the quality and variety of
health care services offered. Cf. P. JosKow, supra note 9, at 11-19 (dramatic health care quality
improvements in the 1970's).
Evidence from states with rate reimbursement schemes antedating the Medicare PPS suggests
that the prospective payment approach reduces health care expenses. Morrisey, Conrad, Shortell &
Cook, Hospital Rate Review: .4 Theory and An Empirical Review, 3 J. HEALTH ECON. 25, 37-41 (1984);
Dranove & Cone, Do State Rate Setting Regulations Really Lower Hospital Expenses?, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 159
(1985); M. NOETHER, COMPETITION AMONG HOSPITALS 74 (Bureau of Economics, FTC 1987).

26. Hellinger, supra note 19, at 85; Guterman & Dobson, supra note 25, at 103-04, 109; but cf
Newhouse & Byrne, Did ,1edicare's Prospective Payment System Cause Length of Stay to Fall?, 7 J. HEALTH
ECON. 413 (1988) (Medicare led long-term patients to shift from short-term acute care hospitals to
other hospitals.). The reduction in hospital admissions may derive from hospital incentives under
the Medicare PPS to drop services that they cannot provide more cheaply than average. Cf
Newhouse, Two Prospective Difficulties with Prospective Payment of Hospitals, or, It's Better to Be a Resident than
a Patient with a Complex Problem, 2 J. HEALTH ECON. 269, 272 (1983) (quality of care provided to
severely ill patients and profits of teaching hospitals providing tertiary care may suffer from PPS);
Sheingold & Buchberger, Implications of Medicare's Prospective Payment System for the Provision of
Uncompensated Hospital Care, 23 INQUIRY 371, 372 (1986) (hospitals with PPS deficits may be forced to
provide less uncompensated care).
Although treatment quality declines when patients substitute outpatient, nursing, and home
health care for inpatient hospital care, this substitution may reflect a more efficient use of social
resources. See generally Ellis & McGuire, Provide? Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing
and Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129 (1986). However, the PPS program will likely generate
inefficiently low innovation in the provision of medical care by hospitals, other than cost-reducing
innovation. See Sloan & Valvona, Prospective Paymentfor Hospital Capital by Medicare: Issues and Options,
II HCM REV. 25, 32 (1986); Lee & Waldman, The Diffusion of Innovations in Hospitals, 4 J. HEALTH
ECON. 373, 379 (1985).

27. The average annual U.S. hospital occupancy rate for short-term hospitals was between 73%
and 76% during every year from 1972 to 1983, but fell to 68.9% in 1984. 1987 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 95. The occupancy rate among for-profit hospitals fell from 65.5% in
1982 to 57.0% in 1984. Id. at 94. In 1986, 31 states reported 50% occupancy and 35 states reported
63% occupancy. Bean, Latest Survey Shows Hospital Charges IncreasingFar More Quickly Than CPI, Wall
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increased the costs of providing inpatient care, the best explanation for the
reduction in industry output is that the PPS scheme led to a substantial
reduction in the demand for hospital care. 2 8 This decline in demand could
reduce the equilibrium number of hospitals 2 9 and increase the intensity of
hospital competition, unless the marginal cost reduction induced by hospital
response to the Medicare prospective payment system is equally dramatic.
Furthermore, price ceilings on insurance reimbursements 30 will likely push
3
hospitals to substitute price competition for quality competition. '
Increased competition among health care providers has led to a variety of
3
changes in industry structure. 32 The rapid growth of multihospital systems, 3
whether created through new construction, acquisition, or management
St.J.,Jan. 6, 1988, at 17, col. 4. The average number of hospital of beds used per day fell by 9.5% in
1984, more than treble the 2.8% decline in 1983 and the 2.7% decline in 1982. In contrast, the
average number beds used per day held constant between 1978 and 1981. 1987 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 97.
28. The new reimbursement program caps physician reimbursement in much the same way as it
limits hospital revenues. To the extent physicans act as patients' agents in demanding hospital
services, and to the extent doctors are able to induce patient demand for medical care, the new
reimbursement program gives doctors incentives to reduce the medical care they demand on behalf
of their patients, thus reducing hospital admissions rates. Similarly, hospitals can be expected to
encourage staff physicians to reduce the hospital services employed per patient, thus reducing the
average length of hospital stays.
29. The number of hospitals in the United States fell by 37 between 1982 and 1984. This
reduction continued a long-term trend involving the exit of small hospitals from the industry. 1987
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 93, Table No. 147. See generally Mullner, Byre & Kubal,
Hospital Closure in the United States 1976-1980. A Descriptive Overview, 18 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 437

(1983); Kennedy & Dumas, Hospital Closures and Survivals: An Analysis of Operating Characteristicsand
Regulatory Mechanisms in Three States, 18 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 489 (1983); Bean, Small Rural Hospitals
Strugglefor Survival Under Aledicare Setup, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 1; cf Sager, Why Urban
Ioluntav Hospitals Close, 18 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 451 (1983) (small hospitals serving minority or
Medicaid-funded patients are more likely to close). The low rate of hospital closings suggests that
the distress sale of assets is unlikely to account for a large fraction of hospital merger statistics.
30. As with the Medicare PPS, Blue Cross and other insurers are similarly moving toward
prospective payments, so that ceilings on reimbursement levels may soon apply to most hospital
services. See M. NOETHER, supra note 25, at 87-88.
31. See id.at 84-88; Zwanziger & Melnick, The Effects of Hospital Competition and the Medicare PPS
Programon Hospital Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301 (1988); United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp., No. 88-C-20186, slip. op. at 81-84 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23, 1989) (order granting
injunction), appealfiled. In the past, hospitals would compete for patients primarily by offering them
(or their doctors) amenities. Hospital Corp. ofAm., 106 F.T.C. 361, 478-79 (1985); cf White, Quality,
Competition and Regulation: Evidence fom the Airline Industry, in REGULATING THE PRODUCT 17 (R. Caves
& M. Roberts eds. 1975) (quality competition among airlines subject to price regulation); G.
DOUGLAS

&J.

MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT:

THEORY AND POLICY

(1984) (same).
32. In addition to the structural changes discussed in the text, a growing number of affiliations
among hospitals, doctors, and private health insurers may result from cost-cutting pressures. See
generally Baker, Vertical RestraintsAmong Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers that Raise Rivals' Costs: A
Case Study of Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. and Ocean State Physicians' Health
Plans, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 14 AM.J. L. & MED. 147 (1988).
33. In 1985, 35% of U.S. hospitals and 38% of U.S. community hospital beds were owned,
leased, or managed by a multihospital system. Alexander, Lewis & Morrisey, Acquisition Strategies of
MultihospitalSystems, 4 HEALTH AFFS., Fall 1985, at 49, 50. Only 24% of hospitals and 30% of hospital
beds had been incorporated in multihospital systems in 1979. Mullner, Byre & Kubal, Multihospital
Systems in the United States: A GeographicalOverview, 15 Soc. SCI. & MED. 353, 353 (1981). The number
of hosptial beds incorporated in multihospital systems rose at an annual rate of 3.0% from 1975 to
1982. Ermann & Gabel, 1lultihospital Systems: Issues and Empirical Findings, 3 HEALTH AFFS., Spring
1984, at 50, 52. From 1970 to 1981, the number of hospitals under management contract rose from
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contracts, may be a response to cost-cutting pressures derived from recent
regulatory changes. 3 4 Through this mechanism, the changing regulatory
environment may have induced the recent wave of hospital acquisitions
requiring antitrust analysis.
III
THE CHANGING ROLE OF ANTITRUST LAW

A.

The Antitrust Revolution of the 1970's

As the regulatory framework governing the provision of health care has
altered over the last two decades, so too has antitrust law changed. Antitrust
of the 1980's is built around a different paradigm from the antitrust law of the
1960's as a result of the widespread adoption of the Chicago School critique
of the earlier approach. Economic efficiency has become the lodestar of
antitrust, and the populist goals important in the past are now treated merely
as historical curiosities. 3 5 In addition to their normative focus on economic
efficiency, Chicago School critiques of 1960's antitrust law are characterized
by a presumption that most markets work well because entry is easy 3 6 and
collusion is difficult to coordinate and enforce. In consequence, Chicago
14 to 497, and the number grew by 20% from 1979 to 1980. Alexander & Lewis, Hospital Contract
Mfanagement: A Descriptive Profile, 19 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 461, 461 (1984).
34. It is plausible that multihospital systems provide economies relative to free standing
facilities. The rapid growth of investor-owned hospital chains has been attributed to scale economies
in production, superior management, and lower capital costs, although the capital cost advantage of
hospital chains over single hospitals appears small. See generally Sloan, Morrisey & Valvona, Capital
Markets and the Growth of Multihospital Systems, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH
SERVICES RESEARCH 83, 84, 103 (1987); Ermann & Gabel, supra note 33, at 50, 54-58; cf Alexander &
Lewis, The Financial Characteristics of Hospitals under For-Profit and Nonprofit Contract-Management, 21
INQUIRY 230, 240 (1984) (increased profits of contract managed hospitals may reflect efficiency in use
of plant and total organizational investment). Further, acquired hospitals are likely to obtain a
substantial fraction of revenues from Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements; acquired and
managed hospitals are likely located in areas where HMO's are growing rapidly; and multihospital
systems are unlikely to take on the ownership or management of high labor cost facilities. Morrisey &
Alexander, Hospital Participation in Multihospital Systems, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 59, 75 (1987). These observations are consistent with the view that

hospital systems constitute a response to regulator- or insurer-created cost-cutting pressures.
Other studies fail to document economies from multihospital systems. Renn, Schramm, Watt &
Derzon, The Effects of Ownership and System Affiliation on the Economic Performance of Hospitals, 22 INQUIRY
219 (1985) (no differences in productive efficiency can be attributed to system affiliation); Levitz &
Brooke, Independent versus System-Affiliated Hospitals: A Comparative Analysis of FinancialPerformance, Cost,
and Productivity, 20 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 315 (1985)

(system hospital profitability results from

higher markups, lower capital costs, and superior management, but not from more productive use of
plant and equipment). Similarly, one study has found that contract management increases hospital
profitability by raising prices rather than improving productive efficiency. Kralewski, Dowd, Pitt &
Biggs, Effects of Contract Alanagement on Hospital Performance, 19 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 479 (1984).
Further, some hospital acquisitions appear to be a mechanism for circumventing state certificate-ofneed requirements rather than a way of reducing costs. In some locations, in order to obtain the
right to open a new hospital in a suburban market with favorable demographics, a hospital may
purchase and close a nearby urban facility with declining occupancy. Alexander, Lewis & Morrisey,
Acquisition Strategies of Multihospital Systems, 4 HEALTH AFFS., Fall 1985, at 49, 56.
35. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS: LAW AND
POLICY 5-26 (1986) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGERS]; K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS 103-28 (1985).
36. However, Chicago School antitrust practitioners accept that entry may be difficult when the
government is the source of the entry barrier.
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explanations

rather

than

anticompetitive explanations for business practices and market concentration,
and recommend antitrust enforcement less frequently than was common in
37
the 1960's.
The antitrust revolution of the 1970's is particularly evident in two
doctrinal areas. 38 First, in 1977 the Supreme Court reversed its hostility to
vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on distributors, such as exclusive
distribution territories.3 9 The Court accepted the Chicago School position
that these practices typically benefit consumers by facilitating interbrand
competition among manufacturers. 40 Second, in the 1970's, the courts of
appeals commenced a revolution in product market definition by
incorporating supply substitutability into their analysis. Remarkably, the
federal appellate courts undertook this initiative with no direction from the
Supreme Court. 4 1 These courts recognized that firms could not act
37.

See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:

A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978);

R.

(1976).
38. For a discussion of other aspects of the antitrust revolution, see generally T. Calvani & M.
Sibarium. Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline (Feb. 21, 1989) (unpublished manuscript); Barnett,
Halverson, Scher & Whiting, Inter-view with James C. Miller, III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 5-I1 (1984). The change in perspective has led to the relaxation of doctrines of per
se illegality predicated on pre-Chicago economic analyses. See Millstein & Kessler, The Antitrust Legacy
of the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 513-14 (1988).
39. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.. 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
40. GTE Syvania, 433 U.S. at 56 (relying on Bork and Posner); but see infra note 45 (vertical
practices can reduce economic efficiency).
41. The Supreme Court expressly employed supply substitutability to define a product market in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948). The Court also acknowledged the
principle in a footnote in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962) ("The
cross elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in defining a product market
.')(dictum).
Nevertheless, antitrust product market definition in the Supreme Court has been based almost
exclusively on demand substitutability. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 404 (1956) [hereinafter Cellophane] (defining product market as goods with "reasonable
interchangeability" in demand); see, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 127 (Cellophane formulation of
market dcfinition is deficient because it ignores production substitutes). For example, two years after
Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court majority ignored production flexibility in defining a product market,
despite the district court's finding of extensive supply substitutability. Compare United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276-77 (1964) [hereinafter Rome Cable] (insulated copper
conductor and insulated aluminum conductor placed in separate markets because of insufficient
demand substitutability), with Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 285 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (district court's
broad market definition should be upheld based on both demand and supply substitutability).
Further, in a case decided shortly after Rome Cable, the Court claimed to follow the demand
substitutability "teaching" of the Cellophane decision although it expressly recognized that the
services incorporated in its product market did not statisfy the reasonable interchangeablity test.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-73 (1966) (placing central station burglar alarm
and fire alarm services in the same product market). While Grinnell can be understood as
incorporating supply substitutability in product market definition, see infra note 159, the Court did
not acknowledge this interpretation.
Given the Court's emphasis on demand substitutability, the federal circuits were understandably
reluctant to accept supply substitutablity as a basis for product market definition for two decades
following the Cellophane decision, even when confronted by the economic logic which later carried the
argument. See, e.g., L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971); Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v.FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 81215 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
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anticompetitively, successfully raising price above competitive levels, if other
42
firms could readily alter production processes to make a competing product.
More recently, courts have extended the supply substitution principle to
incorporate another form of potential competition, entry, into the market
power analysis. The new cases recognize that no firm can have market power,
regardless of its market share, if prospective competitors can readily enter its
43
market.
The most important emerging critique of Chicago School antitrust
doctrines is an economic one, accepting economic efficiency as the goal of
antitrust while disagreeing with Chicago School practitioners over the likely
economic consequences of various business practices and the plausibility of
anticompetitive conduct. 4 4 For example, economists writing on topics of
antitrust relevance have identified situations in which vertical practices can

42. The leading decisions were issued in separate circuits less than one month apart in 1975.
Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir.) (recognizing the
Cellophane standard as the law while justifying its result by Grinnell), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271-74 (9th Cir. 1975)
(relying on Columbia Steel and the Brown Shoe footnote, although terming the Cellophane standard the
"point of departure" for product market definition), aff'd after remand, 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982). After these decisions, supply substitutability analysis was rapidly
incorporated into product market definition by other circuits and the Federal Trade Commission.
Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1094 (1977); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303-04 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 569-72 (1975); but see Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330-32 (7th Cir. 1981) (reluctance to incorporate supply
substitutability into market definition). Further, the supply substitutability approach was rapidly
endorsed in commentary. R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 127-28; Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability
in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 VA. L. REV. 129 (1979); Note, Potential Production: A Supply
Side Approach for Relevant Product Market Definitions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199 (1980); but cf
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 74-75 (collecting cases questioning "whether production
flexibility alone is adequate to support a broad market definition").
43. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1301, 1305-07 (D.N.J. 1985); Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410
(1985); cf. ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.3, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823,
26,832 (1984) (Dep't unlikely to challenge mergers in markets in which entry is easy); HORIZONTAL
MERGERS, supra note 35, at 205 (entry not treated as a significant consideration in merger analysis
until recently). Entry is often considered at a later stage of merger analysis than supply
substitutability, however. See infra note 184.
44. An alternative strand of recent critical commentary would reemphasize the populist goals
important in the 1960's. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988); Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where are We Coming
From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982)
(advocating wealth transfer standard rather than economic efficiency standard as criterion for the
application of antitrust rules); see generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 8 n.31, 11 & n.38
(collecting commentary); K. DAVIDSON, supra note 35, at 380 n.66 (same); cf Fisher & Lande, Efficiency
Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983) (comparing efficiency and wealth
transfer standards); Rowe, Antitrust in Transition: A Policy in Search of Itself 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 12-13
(1985) ("[T]he extreme efficiency-based antitrust rollback" is inconsistent with antitrust's role in
U.S. history and culture "to balance enterprise and power by controls of competition mediated by
law" and to provide to the world "a new ideology to supplant old regimes of statism and
cartelization, offering an alternative to the laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism that divided the
industrial world for generations.").
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harm economic efficiency through their horizontal effect, 4 5 offered a new
explanation for predatory pricing and an empirical example of its successful
use, 46 called into question the plausibility of the presumptions that entry is
easy and market power rare, 4 7 revived the theory that multimarket contact
reduces the incentive of conglomerates to compete, 4 8 and demonstrated that
45. This new literature on "raising rivals' costs" challenges the Chicago School conclusion that
vertical restraints are typically beneficial from within the economic efficiency paradigm.
Kratenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209, 277-82 (1986); Salop & Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36J. INDUS. EcoN. 19 (1987); cf
Salop, Practices that (Credibly) FacilitateOligopoly Coordination,in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 265 (J. Stiglitz & G. Mathewson eds. 1986) (the widespread use of certain
vertical arrangements may facilitate horizontal collusion). The possibility that vertical hospital
mergers might be anticompetive because they raise rivals' costs is discussed infra notes 136-38 and
accompanying text.
A recent legislative initiative to preserve antitrust law's prohibition of resale price maintenance
against the challenges of Chicago School commentators is similarly defended by its supporters on
economic efficiency grounds. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FREEDOM FROM
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 421, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1987).
46. Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1987); Burns,
Predatory Pricingand the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986); Milgrom & Roberts,
Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Kreps & Wilson, Reputation
and Imperfect Information. 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982). The Chicago School view that predatory
pricing is irrational has recently been accepted by the Supreme Court. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (noting with approval the "consensus among
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful").
47. See Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.) (forthcoming) (survey of recent empirical analyses
demonstrates that a great deal of market power exists in some concentrated industries).
The entry analysis of pioneering industrial organization economistJoe S. Bain is gaining renewed
currency as economists are again taking seriously the possibilities that scale economies and
advertising can create entry barriers. Compare Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551,
563-65 (1986) (scale economies may create entry barriers), with Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410,
488-89 (1985) (Chicago School view that scale economies are not entry barriers); compare Salop,
Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (Papers & Proceedings 1979) (advertising may create
entry barrier), with Telser, Some Aspects of the Economics of Advertising, 41 J. Bus. 166, 169-70 (1968)
(Chicago School view that advertising has procompetitive effects); see generally J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION (1956).

48. The view that conglomerates were likely to forebear from competition with those rivals they
faced across multiple markets, for fear that price cutting in one market would lead to retaliation in
another market, was commonplace among industrial organization economists in the 1960's. See
generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 340-42 (2d ed.
1980). However, the hostility of antitrust law to conglomerate mergers in that decade was based
largely on other theories-reflecting concerns with the opportunity for reciprocal dealing, the
elimination of potential competition, an increase in entry barriers, and the ability of large firms to
predate against small rivals-that are considered implausible by Chicago School commentators and
are not reflected in the current Department of justice Merger Guidelines. See R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 246-62 (1978) (Chicago School critique of
theories underlying challenges to conglomerate mergers); Bauer, Government Enforcement Poliy of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348 (1983)
(treatment of conglomerate merger theories in D.O.J. Guidelines); but cf 5 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW T 1114 (1980) (conglomerate mergers may harm competition by extending the area
of oligopolistic interdependence). The recent revival of interest in theories of conglomerate
forebearance includes both theoretical treatments, P. Woodward, Conglomerate Mergers with Tacit
Collusion (Nov. 6, 1988) (unpublished manuscript); B. BERNHEIM & M. WHINSTON, MULTIMARKET
CONTACT AND COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR, Harvard Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper No.
1317 (1987), and empirical studies, P. Woodward, An Empirical Analysis of Multimarket Contact:
Do These Connections Affect Price Behavior? (Nov. 9, 1988) (unpublished manuscript); Scott,
Purposive Diversification as a Mlotive for Merger, INT'L J. INDUS. ORGANIZATION (1989) (forthcoming);
Scott, Multimarket Contact and Economic Performance, 64 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 368 (1982).
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price wars, usually considered strong evidence of competition, may in fact
reflect tacit collusion. 4 9 Even if this critical economic scholarship grows in
importance in legal commentary and judicial opinions, it will reinforce rather
than replace the now orthodox efficiency orientation of antitrust law.
The present antitrust approach to mergers reflects the new emphasis of
the courts on economic efficiency. 50 The most important document
expressing the new view of antitrust is the 1982 Merger Guidelines of the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ Guidelines") (which were revised slightly in
1984). 5 1 The new DOJ Guidelines differ from the prior practice in analyzing
mergers under the antitrust laws in several respects. Most importantly, the
DOJ Guidelines adopt an approach to market definition that takes into
account both supply and demand substitutability: a market is defined as the
smallest group of products within a geographic area such that sellers would be
capable of raising price significantly were the group of firms to act
cooperatively, as a "hypothetical monopolist.- 52 Goods sold at more distant
geographic locations and goods less perfectly substitutable (whether demand
substitutes or supply substitutes) 53 are added to a proposed market definition
until a hypothetical cartel is created which could in principle raise price a
"small but significant and nontransitory" amount. 54 The Department of
Justice then examines whether a merger increases the risk of collusion in such
a market, through measuring the increase in seller concentration 5 5 and
considering other factors facilitating or frustrating collusion, including
entry. 5" In further agreement with the new efficiency-oriented attitude of the
courts in preference to the prior populist view, the DOJ Guidelines have
49. Green & Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87
(1984); Rotemberg & Saloner, . Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price W1ars During Booms, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 390 (1986).
50. See generally Leddy, Recent .1erger Cases Reflect Revolution in Antitrust Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
3, 1986, at 17, col. 1.
51. ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES]; 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 MERGER
GUIDELINES]. The Department of Justice issued these Guidelines to clarify its enforcement policy
concerning acquisitions and mergers subject to antitrust laws.
52. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, §§ 2.0, 2.11, 2.2, 2.31.
53. The Department of Justice incorporates supply substitutability into market definition in
several ways. Most importantly, it broadens product markets when required by production flexibility.
1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.21. However, the entire current sales of firms with
production flexibility are not included in computing market shares when that amount overstates the
potential additional supply that would be forthcoming from those firms if current producers were to
raise price above the competitive level. Id. § 2.4. Similarly, geographic markets are broadened to
include firms not directly competing with defendant producers, but selling in nearby areas, when a
small price rise by defendants would induce these potential competitors to divert sales into the area
presently served by defendants (a supply substitutability effect), as well as when the price rise would
induce buyers to seek goods at more distant locations (a demand substitutability effect). See id.
§§ 2.32(2), (6) (1984). Finally, the Department of Justice expressly recognizes the potential for
foreign competitors to divert production into the United States in response to an anticompetitive
domestic price increase. Id. §§ 2.4, 3.23.
54. Id. §§ 2.11, 2.31 (defining product market and geographic market).
55. The DOJ Guidelines rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") to measure market
concentration. This index is computed as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the
individual firms in the relevant market. Id. § 3.1.
56. Id. §§ 3.3, 3.4.
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backed off from the rigid reliance on market shares characteristic of both
Department of Justice enforcement policy and judicial decisions of the
1960's,5 7 have given new emphasis to the role of entry in deterring the
exercise of market power, 5 s and have raised the concentration threshold
5
above which horizontal mergers merit antitrust concern. 9
Not surprisingly, many horizontal mergers that would likely have been
challenged under the enforcement standards of the 1960's have been cleared
by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in the 1980's.60
57.

Compare 1968

MERGER GUIDELINES

§ 2, reprinted in

HORIZONTAL MERGERS,

supra note 35, at

app. A (analysis of market structure, principally the number of substantial sellers and the relative

sizes of their market shares, is conclusive determinant of antitrust liability in all but "certain
exceptional circumstances"), with 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, §§ III(B), (C) (greater

weight to ease of entry and other factors facilitating collusion); compare United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (concentration creates presumption of anticompetitive effect),
with United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-02 (1974) (market shares are
"relevant as a prediction of future competitive strength" but may be misleading); see generally
HORIZONTAL MERGERS,

58.

supra note 35, at 28-50, 165-75.

The DOJ Guidelines incorporated ease of entry into the market power calculus before the

courts. 1982

MERGER GUIDELINES,

supra note 51, § III(B); 1984

MERGER GUIDELINES,

supra note 51,

§ 3.3; see supra note 43 (leading court decisions postdate Guidelines).
59. Compare United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (holding illegal a grocery
chain merger among firms with a combined market share of 7.5%), and 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 57, §§ 5-6 (indicating intent to challenge acquisitions of firms with market shares under
5%), with 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § III.A. I (raising concentration thresholds) (1984
MERGER GUIDELINES,

supra note 51, § 3.11); see generally HORIZONTAL

MERGERS,

supra note 35, at 195-

98 (practical effect of General Dynamics and the 1982 DOJ Guidelines was to raise concentration
thresholds required for intervention); but see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1385-86
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (lion's Grocery arguably remains authoritative, according to a leading
proponent of Chicago School antitrust views), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987). The connection
between concentration and likelihood of collusion has been challenged by economists who argue that
highly concentrated industries could be more profitable because they reflect the achievement of
superior product design, lower costs, or other economic efficiencies. See generally F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 288-92 (2d ed. 1980).
60. Leddy, Recent Merger Cases Reflect Revolution in Antitrust Policy, Legal Times, Nov. 3, 1986, at
17, col. I ("Even the casual observer of the antitrust scene knows that [enforcement agencies] both
are filing fewer and fewer merger cases, and that the cases they do file generally involve very highly
concentrated markets with five or fewer firms."); see Sims & Lande, New Forces Chip Away at Agencies'
Policy of Antitrust Abandonment, Legal Times, Apr. 20, 1987, at 14, col. I ("Merger enforcement is
undeniably looser today than a decade ago."). Chicago School scholars first led both enforcement
agencies in the early 1980's, when President Reagan named William F. Baxter to head the Antitrust
Division and appointed James C. Miller as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. More recent
agency heads have similarly been sympathetic to Chicago School positions.
Chicago School ideas have led to a liberalization of merger enforcement standards and are the
primary reason for the recent permissiveness of the enforcement agencies. Yet, some decline in
enforcement activity would likely have occurred had standards not been relaxed and had the number
of mergers not increased. See K. DAVIDSON, supra note 35, at 143-45 (documenting merger wave
beginning in late 1970's). The 1970's and 1980's saw the broadening of many economic markets
from nationwide, where they were concentrated, to worldwide, where they were unconcentrated. In
consequence, some transactions which would not have been permitted two decades ago are allowed
today. Compare United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,133 (D.D.C. 1984)
(impact of foreign steel imports on domestic steel prices supports consent judgment allowing merger
of second and sixth largest domestic steel producers), with United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (prohibiting merger of second and sixth largest domestic steel
producers because of concentration in regional and national markets). In future decades, world
markets are likely to grow more concentrated. Then broadening geographic markets will no longer
reduce market concentration figures to less troubling levels, and more mergers will receive close
scrutiny even if current standards of antitrust review are not changed. In such cases, limitations on
the ability of U.S. enforcers to obtain pre-merger notification, jurisdiction, discovery, and relief when
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In addition, the enforcement agencies now exhibit substantially less concern
with vertical and conglomerate mergers than did their counterparts in the
1960's, 6 1 consistent with Chicago School interpretations of these acquisitions
as efficient rather than anticompetitive.
B.

Antitrust and Health Care

1. Interstate Commerce. In the past two decades, the number of antitrust
cases involving the health care industry has grown dramatically. This
explosion followed on the heels of two Supreme Court decisions in the mid1970's: the 1975 decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 6 2 and the 1976
decision, Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital.6 3 Goldfarb applied the
Sherman Act to the "learned professions," 64 and Rex Hospital applied it to
hospitals operating in small market areas. 6 5 Taken together, these decisions
confirmed that the Sherman Act section 166 requirement that a restraint of
trade lie in or affect interstate commerce does not bar application of that law
to the health care industry. 67 Furthermore, in 1980 Congress removed
some defendants are foreign are likely to raise enforcement difficulties that can be solved only by
international cooperation.
61. See generally Halverson, An Overview of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical
Merger Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 76-81 (1983).

62.
63.

421 U.S. 773 (1975).
425 U.S. 738 (1976).

64. 421 U.S. at 785-88; accord Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49
(1982) (price-fixing agreements among doctors "are not premised on public service or ethical
norms," so merit no special antitrust treatment); cf. Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc., 703 F.2d
942, 949 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1983) (although the medical profession is not exempt from the antitrust laws,
some professional practices might survive antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason even though
they are illegal in other contexts).
65. 425 U.S. at 743 (interstate commerce requirement satisfied if activity is in or "substantially
and adversely affects interstate commerce") (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186, 195 (1974)); accord McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). Some circuits read
.M1cLain as requiring that plaintiff prove a nexus between the challenged restraint on competition and
interstate commerce, although that hurdle is readily satisfied. See, e.g., Crane v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 721-22, 724 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp.,
782 F.2d 609, 617-20 (6th Cir. 1986) (Holschuh, J., concurring); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338,
1343 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984). Other circuits interpret MVIcLain less restrictively, as holding that plaintiff
need not demonstrate that the alleged violation affects interstate commerce so long as defendant's
activity has an effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 640 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1011 (1982); cf Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1280-82
(7th Cir. 1983) (interstate commerce requirement is easily satisfied regardless of the interpretation of

McLain); P.

AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP,

ANTITRUST LAW

232.1a (Supp. 1987) (same).

66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
67. Perhaps the recent application of antitrust law to the health care industry should not have
been surprising. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943) (practice
of medicine regulated by the Sherman Act). It has long been established that the Sherman Act
covers all practices that Congress is permitted to regulate pursuant to the commerce clause of the
Constitution. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 557-59 (1944).
Furthermore, even before Goldfarb, the Federal Trade Commission "was starting to organize its
health care program and had already begun an investigation into the issue of physician control over
prepaid health care organizations." T. CALVANI, REMARKS BEFORE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
JOINT PROGRAM ON ANTITRUST ISSUES IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY (Feb. 20, 1986), reprinted in 1986
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,479, at 56,276 (1986).
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interstate commerce limitations on the reach of Clayton Act section 7 to
permit the prospective antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions in or
"affecting" interstate commerce. 6 8 Today, these jurisdictional requirements
of the antitrust laws do not present a significant hurdle to the application of
69
antitrust to hospital mergers.
2. Implied Repeal. The application of antitrust to the health industry has
also been aided by the 1981 Supreme Court decision 70 that Congress's health
planning regulatory scheme, instituted in 1974 under the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act ("NHPRDA"), 7 1 did not impliedly
repeal the application of the antitrust laws to the health care field. 72 Thus, a
state requirement that a hospital merger receive state certificate-of-need
approval pursuant to NHPRDA mandates did not immunize the acquisition
73
from judicial review under the antitrust laws.
3. State Action. The state action exemption remains an important limitation
to the scope of antitrust review of many hospital activities, perhaps including
some hospital mergers. The exemption was established by the Supreme
Court in 1943, in Parker v. Brown.7 4 In that decision, the Court held that
Congress, in passing the antitrust laws, never intended to preempt state
economic regulation restraining competition, so long as those restraints
constitute "state action or official action directed by a state." 75 The
68.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
148 n.4 (2d ed. 1984).
69. United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,721, at 77,853
(E.D. La. 1980); cf City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 1977)
(monopolization case), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 435 U.S. 992 (1978); but cf Proger,
Antitrust Developments Affecting the Health Care Sector, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 315, 315 n.3 (1988) (collecting
recent non-merger health care antitrust decisions in which the complaint was dismissed for lack of
interstate commerce).
70. National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
71. Pub. L. No. 93-641, § 3, 88 Stat. 2225, 2227-57 (1975) (some of these provisions were
repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3799 (1986)). The statute established "health systems
agencies" ("HSA's"), advisory boards composed of health care consumers and providers, to develop
health care plans for local areas in order to control health care costs. The statute also created
statewide planning boards and required that each state establish a certificate-of-need process. See
generally National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 383-85.
72. National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 393.
73. State of North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274, 279-85 (4th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 185-90 (1984);
but see American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 188 (refusing to decide whether implied immunity
would have been appropriate had local planning agency expressly advocated "cost-saving
cooperation among providers" pursuant to NHPRDA) (quoting National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 393
n.18); Groner, Hospital Mergers, Health Planning,and the Antitrust Laws: A Principled Approach to Implied
Repeal, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 471 (1986) (suggesting that NHPRDA may shield some activities from
antitrust laws); O'Neill, Antitrust and NVearby Hospital Combinations, 4 HEALTHSPAN, May 1987, at 3, 7.
Today, CON's are no longer required and have been abolished in many states. See supra notes 16-17,
22-23 and accompanying text.
74. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
75. Id. at 351. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
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exemption attempts to harmonize the national policy favoring competition
embodied in the antitrust laws with constitutional principles of federalism. 76
After Parker, the Court gave little attention to the state action doctrine
until the mid-1970's. In 1980, after reviewing a flurry of Supreme Court state
action decisions from the end of the previous decade, the Court concluded
that the state action exemption applies only to restraints on competition that
are (1) "clearly articulated

. . .

as state policy" and (2) "actively supervised" by

the state. 7 7 In two cases decided in the 1980's, the Court added a threshold
requirement to this two part test: a state regulation must be "facially
inconsistent" with the antitrust laws before a court can hold that regulation to
have been preempted by Congress, and thus before it can address whether
the state action exemption will apply. 78 This threshold requirement appears
not to restrict significantly the scope of the exemption. 79
Congress." Id.; c.f Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 62 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state action questions are preemption rather than exemption issues).
76. See id. at 352; cf City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part) (Parker is "grounded on principles of federalism"); see generally P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at
212.If.
In response to recent commentary arguing that the state action exemption should be narrowly
construed in order to allow wide scope to free market principles underlying the antitrust laws, one
author endorses the state action principle as a bulwark against "a return to the era the Court left
behind when it repudiated Lochner v. New York[, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)]." Garland, Antitrust and State
Action. Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 488 (1987). Garland correctly
emphasizes that a reduction in the breadth of state action immunity comes at the price of reduced
deference to the independent regulatory role of the states in a federal system. However, if the
judicial branch sets out to strike down state regulatory legislation in order to expand the scope of
free market contracting, it is unlikely to implement this program through construction of the
antitrust laws, which Congress can readily amend to protect state power. Wiley, Revision and Apology
in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277 (1987) (response to Garland). Rather, this program would be
implemented through the construction of constitutional provisions. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1980); see generally Baker, Has the Contract Clause Counter-Revolution Halted? Rhetoric,
Rights, and llarkets in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 71 (1984).
77. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass~n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980);
accord Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) ("Only if an anticompetitive act of a private
party meets both of these requirements is it fairly attributable to the State."); Southern Motor
Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57, 61 (1985) (state compulsion not required
if state actively supervises regulatory schemes); see Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 ("a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful").
78. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 262, 264-65, 270 (1986); Rice v. Norman Williams
Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659-62 (1982); but cf P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 209.2, at 8485 (Rice threshold and Parker tests viewed as successive steps in a preemption analysis, thus, "[i]f the
state statute appears to be preempted under Rice because it creates serious restraints, it can
nevertheless be saved from preemption by satisfying Parker").
79. Fisher and Rice likely stand for no more than the unremarkable proposition that Congress, in
passing the antitrust laws, did not automatically preempt all state or municipal regulations with
deleterious consequences for economic efficiency. Accord Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (finding "no
suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act's legislative history"); cf Page,
Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown In the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987
DUKE LJ. 618, 620-21 (state action doctrine permits "judicial deference to state economic choices
whose costs and benefits fall primarily on the citizens of the state"). The Court in Fisher held that
landlord actions undertaken pursuant to a municipal rent control ordinance could not be challenged
as antitrust violations even though their effect on competition would be similar to that of other
actions that would clearly violate the antitrust laws (such as a concerted agreement by landlords to
lower rents in order to benefit tenants). Had the rent control ordinance reviewed in Fisher instead
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The state action exemption may be asserted by private parties acting
pursuant to state regulation."0 These regulatory schemes may be created and
supervised by state legislatures, or they may be created and supervised by
state agencies and political subdivisions.8 ' It is not necessary that the state
supervise the regulatory schemes of municipalities or agencies for actions
undertaken pursuant to those regulatory schemes to invoke the state action
exemption.8 2 In those cases, however, the municipality or agency must
"actively supervise" the regulatory scheme for the defense to apply.8 3
Moreover, the state action exemption is predicated on state regulation. State
ownership of the entity engaging in the alleged restraint of trade is
analytically irrelevant to the determination of the application of the
exemption.8 4 State ownership may in practice, however, be associated with
substantial state supervision.

In antitrust litigation concerning hospital mergers, the most plausible
argument for invoking the state action exemption is that a state's CON
process, required in many states for hospital consolidation, allows mergers to
be undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and actively supervised state
required landlords to cooperate to fix prices, or ratified concerted landlord action (recalling Midcal),
the threshold test would have been met and the Court would then have considered whether the state
action exemption applied. See Rice, 458 U.S. at 662, 662 n.9 (state statute is preempted only if it
requires firms to violate antitrust laws; if statute merely authorizes such conduct without compelling
it, firm actions are subject to antitrust review). Cf Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63
(1977) (state bar association disciplinary rule restricting lawyer advertising exempt because
promulgatated by state agency pursuant to clearly articulated policy and supervised actively during
enforcement proceedings). In its most recent state action decision, the Court ignored the threshold
requirement. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
80. Southern MVotor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
81. Fishe, 475 U.S. at 264-65; Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985);
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978).
82. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47 (municipality); Humana of Illinois, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Southern Illinois University, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,127, at 62,804-05 (C.D. Ill.
1986)(agency); cf St. George's School of Med. v. Department of Registration and Educ., 640 F. Supp.
208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (state agency conduct exempt when agency is supervised by legislature,
through ability to amend statutes, and by state courts, through administrative review.)
83. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (Oregon did not actively supervise hospital peer
review committee because no state agency was empowered to review private peer review decisions
and overturn those not in accord with state policy); Humana of Illinois, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
62,806 (hospital may invoke state action immunity because it was actively supervised by state
university); see Htallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 ("where state or municipal regulation by a private party is
involved, however, active state supervision must be shown, even where a clearly articulated state
policy exists"); seegetieialv P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at
212.9 a, b. Under some
circumstances, judicial review will constitute adequate supervision. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical
Center, 851 F.2d 1273 (1 Ith Cir.), vacated and petition for reh g en banc granted, 861 F.2d 1233 (1 Ith Cir.
1988).
84. Cf Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Memorial Hosp., 795 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.
1986) (state ownership of hospital is not a factor in allowing the state action exemption for a county
hospital's decision to limit doctor access to equipment); Jiricko v. Coffeyville Memorial Hosp.
Medical Center, 628 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1985) (state action exemption does not bar antitrust
claims against state owned hospital because Kansas hospital operations do not constitute a public
function); but cf Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 778 F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) (state action
exemption applies to state agency acting as competitor in a commercial activity).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 2

policy. 5 In an en banc opinion addressing this question, the Fourth Circuit
held that a North Carolina CON program instituted pursuant to the
NHPRDA, requiring state regulatory approval of hospital acquisitions, failed
to meet the ongoing state supervision predicate for the state action
exemption.8 6 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the state CON procedure
provided for no regulation of post-acquisition prices and no penalties for
non-compliance with state regulation. 8 7 Thus, a state could create a
regulatory scheme to displace competition when necessary to effectuate other
state policies,8 8 which would exempt from antitrust scrutiny acquisitions made
89
pursuant to regulatory mandates, although North Carolina did not do so.
4. Intra-enterpnseCooperation. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 90
the Supreme Court held that a corporate parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary are a single enterprise under the Sherman Act section 1,9 1
incapable of combining in restraint of trade. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized that both a parent firm and its subsidiary have the identical
goal of maximizing profits for the enterprise as a whole, so never exhibit the
independent and competitive decisionmaking which the antitrust laws
protect.92 Although the narrow holding of Copperweld leaves open the
question of whether two wholly owned affiliates with a common parent are
incapable of conspiring together, the Court's rationale readily encompasses
this case.'93 Thus, the theory of Copperweld appears to exempt corporate
reorganizations involving wholly owned affiliates from review under both the
Sherman Act section 1 and the Clayton Act section 7.94
85. State action limited to state financing (through use of industrial development borrowing
authority) and state ownership of the hospital facility, without state management, is insufficient to
satisfy the requirements for the state action exemption. See City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n,
562 F.2d 280, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1977) (monopolization case), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978).
86. North Carolina v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert denied,
471 U.S. 1003 (1985); cf General Hosp. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical System, 1986-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
66,996, at 62,116-17 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (Arkansas CON procedure satisfies active
supervision requirement so alleged anticompetitive conduct of defendant hospital in causing the
state not to approve plaintiff hospital expansion is sheltered by state action exemption).
87. P.L,4. Asheville, 740 F.2d at 278.
88. For example, a state might wish to allow a hospital merger even though the transaction
raises substantial antitrust questions, if the new entity agrees to keep open a hospital in a poorly
served region that otherwise would close or agrees to serve patients unable to pay.
89. Had North Carolina directly regulated hospital prices and services as well as major capital
investments, the argument for ongoing state supervision of the regulatory scheme would have been
much stronger, and thus the state action exemption may well have insulated the acquistion from
antitrust review. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1980) (state could require resale price maintenance in violation of federal antitrust laws if
state regulated prices).
90. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
92. See Copperveld, 467 U.S. at 768-69, 771.
93. Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1984); HRM, Inc. v.
Tele-Communications, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 645, 647 (D. Colo. 1987); Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 651
F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); but see In re Ray Dobson's Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 604 F. Supp.
203, 205 (W.D. Va. 1984).
94. Cf Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777. ("A corporation's initial acquisition of control will always be
subject to scrutiny under § I of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act .... Thereafter, the
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After Copperweld, it could be argued that the consolidation of two hospitals
owned and managed by differing affiliates of the same religious organization,
such as a merger between hospitals run by different religious orders within
the Catholic Church, would be exempt from antitrust review as the actions of
a single enterprise. Copperweld does not compel this result, however.
Affiliated nonprofit organizations, unlike the for-profit enterprise considered
in Cooperweld, may have competing or multiple interests which can lead them
to act in ways inconsistent with obtaining the maximum pecuniary return to
their umbrella group as a whole.9 5 Thus, a hospital run by the Sisters of
Mercy may compete with a hospital run by the local Catholic diocese, and a
merger between the two hospitals could have anticompetitive consequences,
even though the bodies governing the operations of each hospital owe
ultimate allegiance to the same church.
A sensible policy for vindicating hospital competition in merger analysis,
consistent with the broad thrust of Copperweld, would treat affiliated nonprofit
hospitals as separate entities for the purpose of the antitrust review of their
merger if they are controlled independently, have independent interests, and
make independent competitive decisions on the facts of the case. 96 Such a
policy should be applied consistently: If affiliated nonprofit hospitals would
be considered separate entities if they merged, they should not be aggregated
in computing market shares in connection with the analysis of an unrelated
J7
acquisition in their market.9

enterprise is fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act...
to control dangerous anticompetitive conduct.").
95. Note, Antitrust and Aonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802, 811-12 (1981); cf Marjorie
Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654
(D.C. Cir.) (nonprofit firm may have non-commercial purposes), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970);
67,080, at 62,567-68 (D.D.C.
Sonitrol of Fresno, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1986) (partially owned subsidiaries of a for-profit firm are capable of conspiring with their parent or
each other, despite parent defacto control, because common purpose is absent).
96. In deciding whether affiliated church hospitals are a single entity under Sherman Act § 1, for
example, courts should look to factors such as the presence of overlapping executives or directors,
the degree of supervision of rates, hiring, capital expenditures, and service offerings by common
church superiors, and the historical independence of the relevant church bodies governing hospital
activities. But see Proctor v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 651 F. Supp. 1505, 152425 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (church units held part of single, unified body with unity of purpose; rejecting
evidence on how church operates in practice or theory); Zimmerman v. Board of Publications of the
Christian Reformed Church, 598 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (D. Colo. 1984) (church and its publications
board act as single entity, incapable of conspiring); cf Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d
704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (similar factors proposed for test of intra-enterprise conspiracy among
for-profit firm affiliates), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980), disapproved in Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 772
n.18.
97. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text (market share measures). Furthermore, if
affiliated nonprofit hospitals could be separate entities capable of violating the antitrust laws through
merger, then their merger should be subject to pre-merger notification to allow the enforcement
agencies the opportunity to investigate the issue. The FTC currently interprets the Hart-ScottRodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1381, 1390-94 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1982)), to require pre-merger notification of a transaction between affiliated nonprofit hospitals not
controlled by the same entity, as with a merger of hospitals run by distantly related institutions within
the same church. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.1(a)(1), (a)(3), (b) (FTC definitions of person, ultimate parent
entity, and control).
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5. Nonprofit Institutions. Half of all U.S. hospitals are organized as private
nonprofit institutions,98 and an even larger fraction of hospital beds are
controlled by private nonprofits. 911A nonprofit entity is not subject to Federal
Trade Commission jurisdiction under the FTC Act unless the entity is
organized to carry on business for the profit of its members. 0 0 This
proscription prevents the Commission from bringing an enforcement action
against a merger between nonprofit hospitals under FTC Act section 5.101
However, the FTC may apparently bring enforcement actions against
nonprofits under Clayton Act section 7, as the Clayton Act provides an
02
independent basis for FTC actions.'
The prohibitions of Clayton Act section 7 apply to many nonprofits,
although that statute may not reach some transactions challengable under
Sherman Act section 1. Clayton Act section 7 permits the government and
private plaintiffs to challenge stock acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals.
Section 7 also arguably authorizes enforcement actions against asset
acquisitions among nonprofit firms,' 0 3 although the limited authority on this
98. In 1984, 51% of U.S. hospitals were under nonprofit control, 15% were under proprietary
control, and 34% were under governmental control. See 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at
93; cf Frech, Comments on Antitrust Issues, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH 263, 265 (1987) (historical reasons for domination of nonprofit hospitals no longer apply;
nonprofit form now anachronistic).
99. In 1975, 69.6% of all hospital beds were controlled by private nonprofit hospitals, 22.7% by
government hospitals, and only 7.7% by for-profit hospitals. White, The American Hospital Industry
Since 1900: A4Short History, 3 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 143,
149 (1982).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1982). Thus, the FTC may exercise jurisdiction over the "business aspects"
of the nonprofit American Medical Association's activities on behalf of member physicians "even if
[those aspects] are considered secondary to the charitable and social aspects of their work."
American Medical Ass'n v.FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided
Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
101.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). But see Miles, Hospital Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29
ANTITRUST BULL. 253, 261-62 (1984) (evaluating argument that hospitals are subject to FTC
jursidiction because they are in reality for-profit physician cartels). Furthermore, if either the
acquiring or acquired firm is a for-profit entity, the FTC apparently could seek to halt the merger
under FTC Act § 5 prior to its consumation by suing to enjoin that one party.
102. Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1982), authorizes the FTC to enforce Clayton Act § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1982), directly. In re Adventist Health System/West, File No. 881-0122 (F.T.C. Mar. 15,
1989) (order denying petition to quash subpoena), requestfor full Commission review denied, F.T.C. Apr.
10, 1989; cf United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (Clayton Act
"explicitly enlarged the FTC's jurisdiction").
103. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), proscribes all anticompetitive stock acquisitions and
anticompetitive asset acquisitions by persons subject to FTC jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
held that the limitation on covered asset acquisitions does not prevent a suit under Clayton Act § 7 to
bar asset acquisitions among banks, an industry over which the FTC has no jurisdiction under FTC
Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982), unless the asset acquisition falls short of merger. United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 344 (1963). The Court emphasized that mergers resemble
stock acquisitions in purpose and effect more closely than they resemble a "pure purchase of assets,"
even when they take the contractual form of an asset acquisition. Id. at 345-46. On similar
reasoning, mergers among nonprofits that take the form of an asset acquisition are most likely
included within the scope of Clayton Act § 7 even though the FTC Act does not award the
Commission jurisdiction over nonprofits, and even if the nonprofit is created without the "stock"
form of ownership. See generally Winslow, Analyzing a Hospital .1leige?. 2 AN' iriUs r Ih.A.IX'
i
CA(RE
CHRONICLE 4, 8-9 (1988).
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issue is in conflict.' 0 4 To the extent that nonprofit hospital acquisitions are
exempt from review under that statute the FTC will be unable to challenge
them. Regardless of the reach of Clayton Act section 7, mergers among
nonprofit firms are subject to antitrust review under the Sherman Act, as
nonprofits are not exempt from the antitrust laws merely because of their
0
form of ownership or corporate purpose.'

5

The standard of review for acquisitions challenged under Clayton Act
section 7 is arguably more difficult to satisfy than the standard applied to
mergers under Sherman Act section 1, because section 7 is intended to halt
restraints of trade in their incipiency while section 1 applies only to those
agreements actually restraining trade.' 0 6 Under the current application of
these statutes to acquisitions, however, the practical distinction between them
is small.'0 7 In consequence, the nonprofit status of merging hospitals does
not significantly limit the antitrust review of their actions, although
uncertainty regarding FTC jurisdiction or the reach of section 7 may cause
governmental enforcement against non-profits to take the form of a Justice
Department suit brought under Sherman Act section 1.108
6. Other Exemptions. Two other avenues for obtaining antitrust exemptions
seem unlikely to apply to hospital mergers, although they may immunize some
hospital activities from antitrust review. These are exemptions for the
"business of insurance," 0 9 and for the cooperative solicitation of
104. Compare United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68.462
(section 7 reaches non-stock mergers accomplished by persons not under the jurisdiction of the
FTC), appealfiled, with United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 841 & n.1 (W.D.
Va. 1989) (referring to Sept. 30, 1988, order granting in part defendants' motion to dismiss) (United
States may not seek to enjoin merger of non-profit hospitals under Clayton Act § 7), appealfiled, No.
89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989); cf Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986)
("There is a possible gap in the FTC's jurisdiction over acquisitions involving nonprofit
corporations."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
105. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576 (1982); cf
Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1981) (advocating application of antitrust
laws to nonprofits identically with their application to for-profit firms, regardless of the nonprofit's
goals, except to the extent the nonprofit corrects a market failure); but cf. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of
Doubt:Jettisoningthe Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 266, 278, 348-49 (1986) (doubting
whether Congress intended to address anticompetitive activities by nonprofits in passing the
Sherman Act).
106. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318, 318 n. 33 (1962); see United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
107. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
304 (1978).
108. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. 840, 841, 846-47 (W.D. Va. 1989) (United States may seek to enjoin
merger of nonprofit hospitals under Sherman Act § 1), appealfiled, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989); see
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 671-72 (1964) (merger of for-profit firms
violates § 1). As the FTC enforces Sherman Act § I only through its incorporation into FTC Act § 5,
this approach is not open to it. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 107, at
303, 305c, 307.
Furthermore, mergers involving nonprofit hospitals meeting the size-of-parties or size-oftransactions tests must be reported under the pre-merger notification provisions of the Hart-ScottRodino Act, unless they are transfers to or from a federal, state, or local governmental agency. 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1982); 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(d) (1988). However, certain joint ventures among nonprofits
need not be reported. 16 C.F.R. § 802.40 (1988).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b) (1982) (McCarran-Ferguson Act). To be found exempt, the
activity must also be regulated by state law, and not constitute coercion or a boycott. This exemption
has been construed narrowly in the health care field. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
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governmental action.' 10 Also, defendant hospitals have unsuccessfully taken
the remarkable position that the absence of price competition in the hospital
industry should insulate a hospital acquisition from antitrust scrutiny.'''
IV
THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

OF HOSPITAL MERGERS

The mainstream approach to merger review in the 1980's, as expressed in
the DOJ Guidelines, attempts to determine whether a reduction in the
number of firms in a market substantially increases the likelihood of collusion
or other anticompetitive consequences. 1 12 The standard approach proceeds
in three steps: (1) defining the relevant market(s) in which anticompetitive
consequences from a merger could arise; (2) identifying the firms within each
market and examining their market shares to infer the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects from an acquisition; and (3) adjusting that inference by
considering other factors affecting the ability of the firms to collude, including
ease of entry.' 13 As will be seen, the current hospital regulatory scheme has
important consequences for the antitrust analysis of hospital mergers, both

directly and indirectly, through its influence on industry structure.

440 U.S. 205 (1979) (reimbursement agreement between Blue Shield and pharmacies providing
drugs to insured consumers falls outside the business of insurance); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (holding that insurer's use of peer review process to determine
reasonableness of health care provider reimbursements is subject to antitrust review); cf KlamathLake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 822 (1983) (health insurer's operation of pharmacy held "business of insurance").
110. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine awards immunity to cooperative solicitation of government
action, as an exercise of first amendment freedoms. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
accord Mercy-Peninsula Ambulance, Inc. v. County of San Mateo, 592 F. Supp. 956, 967 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (alleged conspiracy to create paramedic monopoly through influencing county government
protected from antitrust review), affd on other grounds, 791 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1986). This exemption
presents a difficulty for antitrust enforcers attempting to challenge cases involving non-price
predation that employs the political process. See, e.g., General Hosps. of Humana, Inc. v. Baptist
Medical System, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,996, at 62,117-18 (E.D. Ark. 1986); see generally R.
BORK, supra note 37, at 144-60; Calvani, Non-Price Predation: A .Vew Antitrust Horizon, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
409 (1985). For example, this exemption apparently allows hospitals to solicit cooperatively rate
increases under state or federally run prospective reimbursement schemes, even though this limited
cooperation might facilitate collusion over the rates charged for the same procedures to classes of
patients for which hospital rates are unregulated.
11l. American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 179-80 (1984) (even if hospitals did not compete,
although in fact they do, antitrust law would apply absent congressionally mandated exemption).
112. Merger review is prospective under the Clayton Act, and thus is concerned with likely future
conduct rather than past conduct. 15 U.S.C § 18 (1982) (proscribing acquisitions when their effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly"). The historical
development of the antitrust proscriptions governing horizontal mergers is described in HORIZONTAL
MERGERS, supra note 35, at 28-50. The mainstream approach of the DOJ Guidelines may be
understood as an economic efficiency-oriented interpretation of the leading Supreme Court
decisions on merger analysis. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
113. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, §§ 2, 3.
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The Possible Harm to Competition

A reduction in the number of hospitals in a market may allow the
remaining hospitals to cooperate in a price increase for all or most services.' 14
Collusion is the primary harm to competition that could result from
horizontal 115 hospital mergers, and thus the primary concern of their antitrust
review. Cooperation need not take the form of an explicit contract; a tacit
agreement to raise prices among firms aware of each other's marketplace
behavior equally generates antitrust concern.' 16
Joint ventures among horizontal competitors raise anticompetitive
concerns similar to those of horizontal acquisitions and are subject to a similar
antitrust review.' 17 Hospital management contracts' 18 in effect create joint
ventures among the hospitals with affiliated managements. Thus, an
agreement by one hospital to be managed by the same firm that owns or
manages a competitor will be subject to antitrust review because it may
facilitate hospital industry collusion much as could a merger between the
hospitals. ' 19
The DOJ Guidelines treat the number of firms in the industry as an
important indicator of the likelihood of collusion, because it becomes more
difficult to coordinate and police cartels as their membership increases. 12 0 In
114. Cf id. § I ("Where only a few firms account for most of the sales of a product, those firms
can in some circumstances either explicitly or implicitly coordinate their actions in order to
approximate the performance of a monopolist.")
115. Horizontally related firms sell goods or services in direct competition. Firms are vertically
related to their suppliers and customers. Mergers involving unrelated firms are termed
conglomerate mergers. Although many if not most mergers involving hospitals are not horizontal,
this article emphasizes the analysis of horizontal hospital mergers because they are the primary
concern of antitrust enforcers today. Cf Rule, Antitrust Enforcement and Hospital AleVgers: Safeguarding
Emeiging Price Competition, 21 J. HEALTH AND Hosp. L. 125, 125 (1988) (Antitrust Division does not
investigate the acquisition by a multihospital chain of a hospital in a geographic market in which the
system currently does not do business); but see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Co., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966); Esco Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 1965); cf R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 39-77
(antitrust law should reach express and tacit collusion, but not mere oligopolistic interdependence).
117. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); see General Motors Corp., 103
F.T.C. 374 (1984) (approving GM-Toyota joint venture); see generally Bresnahan & Salop, Quantify ng
the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 155 (1986). Research and
development joint ventures are analyzed under a lenient statutory standard. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-05
(West Supp. 1988) (National Cooperative Research Act of 1984).
118. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (multihospital systems); infra notes 273-74 and
accompanying text (concentration measures).
119. Firms entering into hospital management contracts are not subject to pre-merger
notification, however, unless the agreements also involve the acquisition of stock or assets. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (1982) (Hart-Scott-Rodino Amendments to the Clayton Act).
As with mergers, hospital management contracts may create production efficiencies and thereby
lower consumer prices rather than generate anticompetitive price increases. For example, the
managed hospital may take advantage of superior management talent, or scale economies in
purchasing, hiring, and other functions. The antitrust significance of efficiencies from mergers or
joint ventures is discussed infra notes 337-46 and accompanying text.
120. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.1; see generally Elzinga, %VewDevelopments on the
Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1984); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72J. POL. EcON. 44 (1964).
The Department of Justice's choice of concentration index, the HHI, can be interpreted as
measuring the number of equal sized firm equivalents to the current market structure. (The number
of equal sized firm equivalents is determined by dividing 10,000 by the HHI. Thus, an HHI of 2000

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 2

general, the greater the number of colluding firms, the more difficult it is for
them to agree how to allocate among themselves the output reduction
necessary to engineer a desired price rise.' 2 ' Sellers find coordination
particularly difficult because an express agreement to fix prices and reduce
output is unenforceable, as it violates Sherman Act section 1.122
Furthermore, the greater the number of firms involved, the more difficult
it is for firms to enforce a cartel. Every member of a cartel has an incentive to
cheat on the agreement: A firm can profit by secretly undercutting the cartel
price by a small amount, preserving a price well above marginal cost while
dramatically increasing output. This incentive to cheat disappears' however,
when rivals quickly detect a cheater's output expansion and are able to punish
it by expanding output speedily to reduce the market price. If this response
can be anticipated, a potential cheater will recognize that it will be unable to
sell many additional units at the high cartel price. Under such circumstances,
cartel members will find cheating less profitable than cooperating. 123 In
general, the fewer the firms, the easier monitoring and policing cheating from
a collusive agreement becomes, and thus the greater the danger that attempts
to collude will be successful.

124

The regulatory framework presently governing hospitals may affect the
form through which the private benefits from collusion become manifest. To
the extent that prospective payment regulation caps the rates hospitals may
charge,125 colluding hospitals will be unable to obtain higher prices directly
through cooperation. 126 Hospitals subject to binding maximum price
regulation may nevertheless raise price indirectly, through concerted action to
reduce quality of care. 127 For example, hospitals would profit from concerted
action to reduce the frequency of tests given patients with various diagnoses,
or concerted action to reduce amenities for doctors or patients. 28 Similarly,
could have been generated by five equally sized firms, and an HHI of 1000 could have been
generated by ten equally sized producers.) In this way, the Guidelines are concerned with both the
relative size of competitors and their number.
12 1. When sellers as a group reduce output, the market price rises because consumers will bid up
the purchase price along the downward sloping market demand curve.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
123. See generally Salop, supra note 45.
124. For a discussion of other factors that facilitate or hinder collusion, see infra notes 305-35 and
accompanying text.
125. In most states prospective payment caps presently apply only to patients covered by
Medicare. It is also possible that hospitals have set rates below these maximums.
126. However, there are many ways hospitals can collude on price, or, similarly, collude to reduce
advertising and promotional expenses. See generallv Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 496-99
(1985).
127. Such a scheme in effect raises prices when they are expressed in units of constant quality.
Thus, it has the same economic effect as collusion over price. See id. at 497 (examples of how
colluding hospitals might reduce quality competition).
128. If hospital quality would be inefficiently high in the absence of cooperation because of the
market failures discussed previously, a hospital cartel that lowers quality might improve economic
efficiency. However, it would be difficult to tell whether this would occur in any specific case.
Further, Congress has arguably dismissed this possibility by authorizing states to set up CON
procedures and peer-review mechanisms to monitor expenses, without exempting hospital mergers
from the usual antitrust review. Had Congress believed that hospital competition would reduce
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hospitals may coordinate to resist cost containment pressures created by
insurers' 2' or PPO's,130 or to manipulate certificate-of-need processes to
3
reduce entry. ' '

Collusion among the horizontal competitors that sell in a relevant market
is in practice the primary concern of antitrust enforcers and courts in

analyzing

prospective

mergers.

However,

mergers

can

also

lead

to

anticompetitive
consequences
through
other
mechanisms.
These
mechanisms, noted below, are not discussed in detail because they do not yet
appear in the hospital merger case law.
First, a reduction in the number of firms in a market through merger can
cause the price charged by non-cooperating oligopolists to increase even if
the firms do not collude, merely because the competing firms are few enough
to recognize their interdependence. The resulting price increases are likely to

be small if sellers deal in homogeneous products; tacit collusion rather than a
change in the non-cooperative oligopoly equilibrium is properly the central
3 2
focus of merger enforcers when goods are not differentiated.1
If instead producers offer significantly differentiated products or services,
as may be true with hospitals, 13 cooperation between as few as two producers
social welfare, as with natural monopolies, it could have mandated traditional rate of return
regulation. See generallvS. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
If regulatory policy concerning hospitals were to move to utility style rate-of-return regulation,
hospitals could be required to separate regulated and unregulated activities in separate subsidiaries
and avoid mergers that would evade rate regulation. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51,
§ 4.23; United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (denying
defendants' motion to dismiss), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (modified final judgment, approving
proposed decree ordering a regulated utility company, inter alia. to divest local operating companies
and requiring equal access to certain facilities), affd mere. sub nora.
Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983). The concern for evasion of rate regulation is absent when the regulatory scheme
limits entry without regulating prices.
129. See generally Hospital Coip. ofAm., 106 F.T.C. at 496. Concerted boycotts of insurers could
lead to higher prices directly, by removing a competitive force pressuring for price discounts, or
indirectly through reduced quality of service.
130. PPO's may obtain low cost hospital services for those patients who obtain health care
through them by seeking competitive offers of discounts from hospitals. Through coordinated
pricing, hospitals may resist this competitive pressure.
131. Hospital Cop. of Am., 104 F.T.C. at 498. Rival hospitals earning economic profits have an
incentive to agree to protest a certificate-of-need application made by a potential entrant. To the
extent incumbent hospital views are influential to the board awarding certificates of need, or to the
extent a contested certificate of need is expensive for an applicant to pursue, then entry will be
deterred or delayed, and incumbent hospitals will protect their economic profits from new
competition. While the hospitals acting collectively to deter entry may be earning the profits they are
protecting from a collusive agreement to raise price or lower quality of care, these profits are not
necessarily predicated on cooperation outside of the agreement to protest the certificate of need.
For example, if demand grows in a geographic market, incumbent hospitals recognizing their
interdependence but not cooperating may choose prices under which each earns economic profits.
But see infra note 132 and accompanying text (gains from noncooperative interaction may be small).
Economic profits will remain so long as the hospitals deter both new entry and incumbent hospital
expansion, both of which could require a certificate of need.
132. See Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Hepfindahl Concentration, Rivar, and Mleigers, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1857 (1982); HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 179-80; R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 39-77
(antitrust law should reach express and tacit collusion, but not mere oligopolistic interdependence).
133. Quality differences among hospitals in one metropolitan area are extremely large. Hospitals,
6 WASIIN;TON CONSUMERS' CHECKBOOK 13 (1987).
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of similar products can lead to large economic profits even if the other firms
in the relevant market do not participate in the cooperative arrangement.
This will occur if, for a substantial fraction of consumers, the two firms'
products are close substitutes, while no third firm offers another product that
buyers would readily substitute for these goods. 1 34 Although this possibility
is relevant to antitrust merger analysis, 1 35 it has not been raised in the handful
of extant hospital merger opinions.
Mergers or joint ventures between hospitals and non-hospital entities can
have anticompetitive effects through another non-collusive mechanism: A
merger might raise rivals' costs, and thereby enable the merger partners to
raise price. 136 For example, a merger between a hospital and an equipment
supplier could raise costs for rival hospitals if it forecloses their access to low
cost inputs. Alternatively, the merger could raise costs for rival suppliers if it
forecloses their ability to sell to the hospital. In either case, the merger would
have anticompetitive consequences if the lessening of competition from
disfavored rivals enables the merging firms to raise price, either for hospital
services or for hospital supplies. 13 7 As with horizontal mergers, these
134. Suppose, for example, that three neighboring hospitals offer coronary bypass surgery, but
one of the three is substantally disfavored by consumers relative to the others because it has a higher
mortality rate for the operation or lacks a new diagnostic tool (product differentiation), or because it
is in an inconvenient location relative to the others (geographic differentiation). In such a case, a
merger between the first two hospitals could lead to higher rates for this operation. Under current
enforcement agency and judicial practice, it is unlikely that the product market would exclude the
third, disfavored firm. An antitrust analysis would nevertheless take this effect into account by
treating a reduction in direct competition as a potential competitive concern in a broad market. See
infra note 135.
135. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.413; Complaint, Federal Trade
Commission v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-1764
14(a) (D.D.C. filed June 24, 1986) (proposed merger
alleged likely to lessen competition by eliminating direct competition between Coca-Cola and Dr.
Pepper); Baker & Bresnahan, The Gainsfrom Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J.
INDUS. EcON. 427 (1985).

A court concerned about this competitive problem could address it by defining significantly more
narrow product markets in differentiated product industries than are currently employed. However,
it is unlikely that an antitrust enforcer or court in the present environment would group, for example,
Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper in a product market to the exclusion of Pepsi even were cooperation from
Dr. Pepper alone likely to allow Coke to raise prices significantly. Compare Federal Trade
Commission v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.D.C. 1986) (carbonated soft drink
product market), vacated, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987), with M. Reinstadtler, The Economics of
Merger In Product Differentiated Industries: A Framework for Analyzing Merger Activity in the Soft
Drink Industry, (Master's Thesis, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, May 1987) (Coca-Cola would gain market power by merging with Dr. Pepper), and
Complaint, Federal Trade Commission v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-1764
14(a) (D.D.C. filed June 24,
1986) (merger would remove direct competition between Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper).
136. See Complaint, Federal Trade Commission v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 86-1764
14(d) (D.D.C.
filed June 24, 1986) (merger allegedly created market power by raising rival's costs); cf. Christian
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d. 1354 (6th Cir.) (competitor has
standing to challenge merger because acquisition allegedly harms competitor's access to
distribution), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
137. These are vertical mergers with horizontal consequences. In each case, the merging firms in
effect create an "involuntary cartel;" rivals facing an increase in marginal costs are forced to reduce
output much as they would were they party to a collusive agreement with the merging firms. See
generally references cited supra note 45.
Similarly, a joint venture between a hospital and health care providers such as HMO's or PPO's
could raise costs for competing hospitals by foreclosing them from patients or medical staff. See
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possible anticompetitive harms from vertical acquisitions must be weighed
against any efficiency benefits of vertical integration before the merger is

proscribed. '
B.

38

Market Definition

To analyze whether a hospital merger increases the likelihood of collusion
among the firms remaining in a market, the enforcement agencies and courts
first define the markets of interest. 1 39 Market definition is often the
determinative analytic step in antitrust litigation, and thus is strongly
contested.' 40 The primary market definition approach employed today is
expressed in the DOJ Guidelines. 14 The DOJ Guidelines define a relevant
generally Baker, supra note 32. However, the efficiency gains from vertical coordination will generally
overwhelm any competitive harm arising from such an arrangement.
138. See infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text (efficiency defense). Vertical integration may
generate a host of possible efficiencies. Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration. Implications for
Antitrust Policy, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1978); Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and
Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982); Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. EcON. REV. 112 (Papers & Proceedings 1971).
139. This approach is employed regardless of whether firms would seek to cooperate in order to
raise prices or to lower quality of care. See supra note 31 and accompanying text, notes 127-28 and
accompanying text (lowering quality is like raising price).
140. An amusing account of this process appears in Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of
Monopoly, in THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 38, 51 (G. Stigler ed. 1982).
To the extent antitrust enforcers emphasize the economic consequences of a transaction rather
than identifying its legal categories, market definition is less determinative of the judicial outcome.
For example, an industry with one group of firms selling close substitutes and another group selling
more distant substitutes could be viewed in antitrust terms alternatively as two narrowly defined
markets where each group of firms offers significant potential competition for the other, or as one
broadly defined market in which some firms sell goods differentiated from the output of others. It is
difficult to see why the legal consequences of a merger among two firms selling close substitutes in
this industry should turn on the arbitrary choice between these two views of the market, even though
the increase in market concentration is likely to appear much larger if the narrower market definition
is adopted.
141. 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51. This approach was preserved with minor
modifications in the 1984 revisions to the DOJ Guidelines. So long as economic efficiency remains
an important goal of antitrust enforcement, the DOJ Guidelines market-definition algorithm is likely
to remain the leading market-definition methodology, as it defines markets with express reference to
interdicting the exercise of market power in the economist's sense of the term. 1984 MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 51, §§ 1, 2. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 105-110
(description of "hypothetical monopolist" market definition paradigm).
Two alternative paradigms continue to have advocates, though each has been criticized by
adherents of the DOJ Guidelines approach. The first defines market boundaries based on the
absence of product flows. Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of GeographicMarket Delineation in Antimerger
Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973); Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation
Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978); see Harris &Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition:
An IntegratedApproach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1984) (analogous approach to product market definition);
see generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 96-101 (description and evaluation of "historical
insularity" as a market definition paradigm); but see Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in
Defining Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (1981) (critical evaluation of product flow
approach to geographic market definition by one drafter of 1982 DOJ Guidelines).
A second alternative paradigm includes goods with correlated prices in the same market. Stigler
& Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, 28J. L. & ECON. 555 (1985); Horowitz, Market Definition in Antitrust
Analysis: A Regression-BasedApproach, 48 S. EcoN. J. I (1981); see generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra
note 35, at 102-105 (description and evaluation of "price relationships" paradigm); but seeJ. BAKER,
WHY PRICE CORRELATIONS Do NOT DEFINE ANTITRUST MARKETS:

ON ECONOMETRIC ALGORITHMS FOR

MARKET DEFINITION (Working Paper No. 149, FTC Bureau of Economics 1987) (critical evaluation of
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market as a set of products within a geographic area that could profitably be
sold at a significantly higher price (for example, a 5 percent price increase)
were their sellers to coordinate pricing and output decisions. 142 This
algorithm relies on projecting the profitability of a price increase to what the
DOJ Guidelines term a hypothetical "monopolist" of the products at issue.
43
These sellers might equivalently be viewed as a hypothetical cartel.
1. Demand and Supply Substitutability. The DOJ Guidelines emphasize that
two economic forces might defeat the attempt of a hypothetical cartel to raise
price through a coordinated reduction in output among cartel members. The
first is demand substitutability: consumers may respond to a high cartel price
by switching to goods not included in the hypothetical cartel, or by doing
without the cartelized product altogether, in sufficient numbers as to make the
price rise unprofitable. 144 The second force that might impede the
hypothetical cartel from successfully raising price is supply substitutability:
firms not included in the hypothetical cartel, or potential entrants, may be
able to produce profitably a product competitive with the good sold by the
hypothetical cartel while undercutting the cartel's price. If so, consumers may
switch to the new product in sufficient numbers to make the hypothetical
cartel's price increase unprofitable.' 4 5 In assessing both demand and supply
substitutability, the appropriate factual inquiry is a hypothetical one. It is
necessary to look beyond actual substitution patterns to the potential
substitution likely to follow a hypothetical 5 percent price rise.

14 6

price correlations approach to market definition); Scheffman & Spiller, Geographic Market Definition
Under the U.S. Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines, 30J. L. & ECON. 123, 124-28 (1987) (comparing
"economic markets" defined by price correlations with "antitrust markets" defined in accordance
with the DOJ Guidelines).
142. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2. The DOJ Guidelines can be understood as
defining a relevant market as a group of homogeneous products sold in a region such that the
collectivity faces a downward sloping residual demand curve, under the frequently plausible
assumption that the hypothetical cartel has roughly constant marginal costs for outputs between the
competitive and the cartel levels. See generally Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 141, at 124-28; J. BAKER, supra note 141; cf
Baker & Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-DifferentiatedIndustries, 33 J. INDUS.
EcON. 427 (1985) (technique for estimating residual demand curve); Baker & Bresnahan, Estimating
the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT'L J. INDUS. ORGANIZATION 283 (1988) (same);
Harris & Simons, Focusing M1arket Definition: How .luch Substitution is Necessar?, in RESEARCH IN L. &
EcON. (R. Zerbe ed.) (forthcoming) (identifying percentage sales loss necessary to make a price rise
unprofitable). Concentration and factors facilitating or frustrating collusion are important because
they influence the ability or interest of the firms in the collectivity to take advantage of the group's
downward sloping demand curve.
143. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.
144. For an analysis of how much sales the hypothetical cartel must lose before raising price
becomes unprofitable, see Harris & Simons, supra note 142.
145. A third force might defeat an actual cartel: cheating on the cartel price by cartel members.
However, the conceptual experiment for market definition of the DOJ Guidelines presumes that
cartel coordination is perfect and asks whether that hypothetical coordination would be profitable.
Once a market is defined according to this approach, the remainder of the Guidelines analysis
addresses whether coordination is likely within that market by considering concentration, entry
conditions, and other factors affecting the incentives of market participants to collude or to cheat on
a cartel. See generally infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
146. For many products, market demand may grow more elastic as price rises. If so. a smaller
fraction of customers will substitute away from the good when price rises from a low level, relative to
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In principle, an extremely large number of relevant markets that include
the merger partners will satisfy the DOJ Guidelines definition. 4 7 However, as
the DOJ Guidelines note, in most antitrust cases it will be sufficient to analyze
the transaction in the smallest market satisfying the market definition
algorithm.' 48 Such parsimony is not uniformly practiced in the antitrust
analysis of hospital mergers, however, as will become evident in the
discussion of the "cluster market" approach to product market definition.
2. Product Market Definition: Application of the DOJ Guidelines to Hospitals. The
substitutability analysis of the DOJ Guidelines readily applies to hospital
product market definition. The procedure begins with each hospital service
offered by the merging hospitals, such as childbirths, emergency room
treatment, or heart surgery. 4W To determine the extent of demand
substitutability for each service, a question like the following must be posed:
If the price of a medical service rises by 5 percent for one year, will a sufficient
fraction of patients forgo the use of that service or substitute some other form
of treatment to make that increase unprofitable? 50 Patients may make this
the fraction who will shift away if price rises the same percentage from a higher base. This likely
empirical regularity, termed the "Cellophane trap" in antitrust analysis, leads to the seeming paradox
that greater demand substitution may be observed when a good sells for a monopoly price than when
it sells for a competitive price. See Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and theJustice Department's Guidelines for
Horizontal 11ergers, 94 YALE LJ. 670 (1985).
147. For example, suppose that all the cola-flavored soft drinks constitute a product market
because consumers would accept a significant price rise coordinated among the cola brands
produced by Coke, Pepsi, RC, and other manufacturers, without switching to other soft drink flavors
such as lemon-lime or root beer. Then, necessarily, all soft drinks, all beverages, and all food
products, for example, will also constitute product markets, because coordinated action by all
producers of these goods could at a minimum lead to an increase in the price of soft drinks, and may
lead to higher prices for other goods as well. Similarly, if three neigboring states comprise a relevant
geographic market for the sale of some product, because a price increase limited to those states
would not be competed away by consumers shopping outside the area or by outside dealers shipping
a competitive product into the area, then other relevant geographic markets can always be defined by
adding additional states to the original three.
One might wish to analyze a merger in one of these broader markets as well as in the smallest
market that satisfies the DOJ Guidelines algorithm because anticompetitive behavior may be more
likely to occur in markets in which it is more attractive. If the gains from collusion are limited in a
narrow market (for example, because market demand is fairly elastic) while those gains are large in a
broad market (because demand is inelastic), and if the broad market incorporates few if any more
producers than the narrow market, then the danger from both collusion and its likelihood may be
greater in the broad market. See Weyerhaeuser Co., 106 F.T.C. 172, 289-90 (1985) (geographic
market excludes distant producers who nevertheless "limit the amount of harm [from] . . . any
exercise of market power"). Another example of a merger more troublesome in a broad market than
a narrow one appears infra note 204 (transactions complements). Furthermore, some mergers may
produce anticompetitive effects in markets in which the merging firms do not directly participate. See
FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986) (merger of upstream soft drink concentrate
producers has anticompetitive effect in downstream soft drink market), vacated, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
148. 1984 MERGER GutIDEINES, supra note 51, §§ 2.11, 2.31.
149. Each of these services could be viewed as the aggregation of more finely parsed services. In
the event there are significant limitations on demand and supply substitutability within these
groupings, the product mark t definition procedure should commence at a more disaggregated level,
perhaps with services such as normal childbirths, poisoning emergencies, or coronary bypass
surgery.
150. The DOJ Guidelines ask whether sellers could profitably impose a "small but significant and
nontransitory" price increase. In most contexts, the Department interprets this phrase as indicating
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decision on their own, their doctor may make it for them, or insurers may
influence patient decisions by refusing reimbursement for all or part of the
inflated charges.
If few patients will substitute some other treatment or forgo use of the
medical service in response to a 5 percent price rise, so that the price increase
would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist of the service, then demand
substitutability will not limit the ability of a hypothetical monopolist to
exercise market power. Hence, the service at issue constitutes a product
market under the Guidelines, unless the market must be expanded to account
for supply substitutability. If, instead, the price rise would be unprofitable
when limited to a service or a set of services, additional services must be
added to the proposed product market from those other treatments patients
would substitute for it until a set of services satisfying the demand
substitutability test is identified.
To determine the extent of supply substitutability for a service offered by
one of the merging hospitals, a similar question must be posed: If the
hospital raises prices for the service and its demand substitutes by 5 percent,
in combination with those other institutions also offering any of the services in
that set, will rival institutions currently or potentially offering other hospital
services be able to introduce the cartelized services within one year, and thus
compete away the hypothetical price increase?' 5 1 If production flexibility
would limit the ability of a hypothetical cartel to raise price profitably, the
product market must be expanded to account for the competitive influence of
firms selling supply substitutes. 15 2
The DOJ Guidelines approach emphasizes that different competitors may
be found in each product market in which the merging firms participate. For
large classes of hospital services, such as many types of secondary inpatient
care,' 5 3 the same firms-namely all the local hospitals-will likely be found in
a 5% price rise lasting one year. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.11. The Department
ofJustice may presently employ a 10% price rise rather than a 5% price rise as its standard in market
definition. Briggs, An Overview of Current Law and Policy Relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 ANTRUST
L.J. 657, 681 n.1 (1988). A 10% standard should tend to broaden product markets, although it is
difficult to gauge the practical significance of this change.
151.

1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.21.

152. It may be difficult to identify the amount of sales or capacity of firms producing supply
substitutes that must be included in the market share computation. See infra notes 267-72 and
accompanying text (units in which concentration is measured); 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
51, § 2.21 n.10 (1984); see generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 110-16.

153. Nearly all hospitals offer "primary" or outpatient care, as may a variety of non-hospital
health care providers including family practioners, physicians' offices, outpatient clinics, and perhaps
chiropractors. "Secondary" care is provided by most, although not all, hospitals. This category
involves the commomly requested services of specialists in areas such as surgery, radiology,
anesthesiology, obstetrics, and pediatrics. Some non-hospital institutions, such as surgi-centers, may
offer some forms of secondary care. Basic nursing, medical, surgical, anesthesiology, laboratory,
radiology, pharmacy, and dietary hospital services are sometimes considered primary care, and other
times considered secondary care. "Tertiary" care involves complex and specialized treatments, such
as complex surgery or the treatment of severe illnesses. It is usually provided by teaching hospitals
in large urban areas. The distinctions among these service groupings are fluid, but generally turn on
the frequency of patient utilization (tertiary care services are the least frequently required), the
number of hospitals offering the service (tertiary care services are least frequently offered, most likely
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each relevant product market.' 54 However, for some services, the product
market will include such new institutions as free standing ambulatory care
facilities or free standing surgical care facilities.
When product markets for hospital services are defined by the DOJ
Guidelines approach, supply substitutability is likely to be the most contested
issue in product market definition. Patients in need of one medical procedure
will rarely be able to substitute another; demand substitutability will generally
be limited. In contrast, it is possible that hospitals can easily shift resources
If, for example, hospitals offering
across vastly different services.
appendectomies, but not coronary bypass surgery, could quickly and cheaply

shift equipment, facilities, and personnel to offer the cardiac procedure, then
the two services should be incorporated into the same product market on
supply substitutability grounds.' 55 Even if supply substitutability is
substantial, the market definition approach of the DOJ Guidelines is likely to
generate a large number of relevant product markets in which a merger must

be evaluated. It is unlikely that all hospital services are supply substitutes,
however. 156
3. Product Market Definition: Cluster Markets. The reported hospital merger
decisions employ an approach to product market definition that relies on the
Supreme Court's "cluster of services" paradigm. The first cluster market was
defined by the Court in its 1963 decision in United States v. PhiladelphiaNational
Bank. 157 In that case, the Court determined that commercial banking
because few physicians can acquire sufficient experience to become competent providers when few
patients require the services), and the complexity of the service (tertiary care services are the most
complex). Tertiary care services are generally, if not always, provided by institutions also offering
secondary care. See Proger, Relevant Market, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 616 (1987).
154. For this reason, cluster markets probably are not inconsistent with the DOJ Guidelines
methodology. See infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text (pragmatic approach).
155. Some aspects of the two procedures appear to overlap: Both may require the use of some of
the same diagnostic instruments, the same operating rooms and hospital beds, and the same nursing
staff. However, a hospital performing one procedure may lack surgeons and specialists experienced
in the other procedure, and may not own some diagnostic and treatment tools. Furthermore, it may
take time to develop a reputation among referring physicians and patients for quality care in the new
medical practice area. If the hospital is unable to remedy these and any other omissions within one
year, the time horizon of the DOJ Guidelines for market definition, then the two procedures should
not be placed in the same market on supply substitutability grounds. In addition, if hospitals must
obtain regulatory approval to offer new services, such as certificate-of-need approval to create
additional facilities, and if the regulatory process is time-consuming, supply substitution possibilities
will be further reduced. Cf infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text (discussion of certificate of
need as entry barrier).
156. One commentator contends that all types of medical services, such as medical-surgical,
pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynecology are close substitutes in supply, and concludes that acute
inpatient care forms a relevant product under the substitutability criteria of the DOJ Guidelines.
Lynk, Antitrust Analysis and Hospital Certificate-of-Need Policy, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 61, 74 (1987). This
author offers no evidence for the claimed production flexibility and ignores the difficulties discussed
supra in note 155 thai impede a primary care hospital or limited secondary care facility considering
the addition of secondary or teritary care services. See also infra note 167.
157. 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963); accord United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656,
664-66 (1974); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1970); cf
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966) (defining cluster market of central station
protective services).
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activity-including loans and other types of credit, deposit accounts, checking
services, and trust administration-formed a unique cluster of products and
services distinct from those offered by other financial institutions such as

savings and loans, finance companies, and credit unions.
The Court has provided little theoretical justification for grouping
products or services into the one product market. Banking services were
clustered in Philadelphia National Bank because distinctiveness, cost
advantages, and "a settled consumer preference" insulated each commercial
banking product from competition. 1 58 In contrast with all previous product
markets defined by the Court, the goods and services clustered into the
commercial banking product market were neither demand nor supply
substitutes. 15 9 Although the Supreme Court has not defined a cluster market
since 1974, it has never renounced the approach. In consequence, lower
courts continue to apply the cluster market concept to exclude firms
supplying partial product lines from product markets when some producers
supply a full line. 160
The cluster market concept is to date the uniform approach to product
market definition of the hospital merger case law.16 1 Relying on the cluster of
158. 374 U.S. at 356-57. Outside of banking services, the Court has identified only one product
market termed a cluster of services, for accredited central station protective services. United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 573. This cluster was justified on the view that "to compete effectively,
[firms] must offer all or nearly all types of service." Id. at 572. Further, in both Philadephia Nat'l Bank
and Grinnell, the Court found "commercial realities" consistent with the cluster. 374 U.S. at 357; 384
U.S. at 572. In Grnnell, decided under Sherman Act § 2, the Court also established that the cluster
approach is not limited to market definition under the Clayton Act, the statute enforced in
Philadelphia Nat 'lBank.
159. The goods and services "viewed collectively [have] . . . characteristics which negate
reasonable interchangeability." United States v. Philadalphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 363
(E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). While neither the district court nor the
Supreme Court investigated the possibility of supply substitutability in its market definition analysis,
the opportunities for production flexibility appear limited in the banking industry. For example, the
resources devoted to trust administration are probably not well suited for making commercial loans
or accepting demand deposits. In contrast, the protective services clustered in Grinnell, including
burglary and fire protection when offered electronically from a central station, are likely supply
substitutes although they are not demand substitutes. See 384 U.S. at 572-73. Thus, Grinnell, unlike
the bank cases, may be understood as reflecting the supply substitution principle in market
definition. See supra note 41; cf 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.21 n.9 (production
substitution may lead to aggregate description of markets).
160. The commercial banking product cluster excludes financial intermediaries such as credit
unions and savings and loans that offer some but not all banking services. See HORIZONTAL MERGERS,
supra note 35, at 75-76, 75 n.370 (collecting lower court decisions excluding partial line producers
from cluster markets); but cf United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1970)
(other financial institutions do not provide the convenient customer access to financial services
offered by banks, hence do not offer close substitutes for any bank services). In banking cases, lower
courts arguably remain constrained by precedent to adopt the cluster market approach even when
substitutability considerations might suggest alternative product market definitions. See Note, The
Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907, 912
n.32 (1983); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1974) (similarity
between savings and commercial banks "is not sufficient at this stage in the development of savings
banks .. .to treat them together with commercial banks").
161. However, courts have generally ignored the cluster market concept in defining product
markets in recent non-merger cases involving medical services provided by hospitals. E.g., Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (anesthesiology services constitute a product
separate from other hospital services) (tying claim); Seidenstein v. National Medical Enter., 769 F.2d
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services paradigm, product markets have been defined consisting of "general
acute care hospital services," excluding outpatient substitutes for the
individual services comprising the cluster;' 6 2 "short term, acute care hospital
services;"'' 63 "inpatient psychiatric care by private psychiatric hospitals and
non-government general acute care hospitals;"' 64 "acute inpatient hospital
care;"' 16 5 and inpatient hospital services including outpatient substitutes for
those services. 16 6 As with the markets defined in the Supreme Court's bank
cases, these product markets include services that are neither demand nor
supply substitutes. 167
The cluster approach raises a variety of analytic and practical difficulties.
From the substitutability perspective of the DOJ Guidelines, the approach is
remarkable because it asserts antitrust relevance to collections of products
and services that are not substitutes. 68 Furthermore, the weak theoretical
basis for the groupings defined by the Court makes it difficult for lower courts
to identify other appropriate collections of non-substitutes in a principled
way.
The cluster approach is also troublesome in application. It appears likely
to lead government enforcers and courts to apply the antitrust laws in a
manner inconsistent with promoting economic efficiency in two situations,
when both of these difficulties may be avoided by defining product markets
for individual services pursuant to the DOJ Guidelines. First, the cluster
1100 (5th Cir. 1985) (invasive cardiology services market) (monopolization claim); Robinson v.
Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 878 (W.D. Pa.) (adult open heart surgery market) (refusal to deal and
monopolization claims), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Gonzales v.
Insignares, 1985 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,701 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (anesthesiology market and medical
services market) (exclusive dealing claim); but see Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 826-27 (3d Cir.)
(upholding jury finding of inpatient hospital health care cluster market) (monopolization claim), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
162. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 466; (quoting American Medical lntl, 104 F.T.C. at 192-94;
see United States v. National Medical Enter., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,640 (E.D. Cal. 1987)
(general acute care hospital services product market) (consent judgement).
163. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp 589, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
164. United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,721, at 77,852-53
(1980) (preliminary injunction case). Government hospitals were excluded because they offered a
different quality of care than private psychiatric hospitals.
165. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 23 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23,
1989), appealfiled.
166. United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989) (order
denying injunction), appealfiled, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989).
167. One commentator contends that an acute inpatient hospital care cluster is justified by strong
supply substitutability in the provision of hospital services. Lynk, supra note 156, at 74. This view
implictly rejects the narrower product market definitions common in non-merger antitrust litigation
involving hospital services, see supra note 163, and implicitly suggests that the inpatient hospital
product market clusters identified in merger litigation follow from Grinnell rather than from
Philadelphia National Bank. See supra note 159. This interpretation of hospital cluster markets is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the Federal Trade Commission, an economically sophisticated
decisionmaker, neither discussed nor relied on supply substitutability in arriving at its product
market definitions in American Medical Internationaland HospitalCorp. ofAmerica, 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985).
Indeed, the FTC refers to hospital services as complements in its discussion of market definition in
American Medical Int'l., 104 F.T.C. at 194. See also supra note 156.
168.

See Note, supra note 160; HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35,

commentary challenging cluster market concept).

139 n.692 (collecting
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approach ignores or undervalues the significance of competition from firms
offering a partial line of services but not all the services in the cluster. In
hospital industry terms, cluster markets may lead courts to underestimate the
significance of outpatient clinics in restraining some forms of hospital
collusion, and so to interdict mergers generating increased concentration
69
among hospitals when the danger of collusion is limited.'
Second, concentration figures for cluster market output or capacity are
potentially misleading because they award each multiproduct firm a market
share equal to an average of that firm's share in providing each of a number of
individual services. Thus, one hospital's low share of a region's total patients
or beds may obscure its high share in the provision of certain individual
services, particularly if those services account for a small fraction of total
hospital activities. In consequence, a merger which creates high
concentration in the provision of a service for which demand and supply
substitutability is limited could readily avoid antitrust challenge under the
cluster approach to product market definition when the same transaction
would properly receive careful scrutiny under the DOJ Guidelines approach
to market definition.
Two approaches to making sense of cluster markets under the DOJ
Guidelines methodology for assessing the likelihood of collusion are analyzed
below. The first, based on economic relationships of complementarity among
clustered products, is unsatisfactory because the role of complementarity in
affecting the ability of firms to collude is closer to that of a factor facilitating
or frustrating collusion than to the role substitutability plays in market
definition. The second approach, a pragmatic one, is more appealing. The
pragmatic approach finds clustering a cost-effective tool for implementing the
DOJ Guidelines when, as best can be told from available market information,
all competing firms sell multiple products or services, firm market shares do
not vary significantly across products, and entry conditions are similar across
products. In this situation, antitrust analysis will be similar across products or
services, so enforcers and courts sensibly conserve resources by treating the
services identically in aggregate form. As will be seen, however, the
pragmatic justification for cluster markets breaks down when some firms
successfully compete with a partial line of services.
a. Should product complements define cluster markets? Cluster markets have
been identified among goods or services that are complements in supply,
demand, or transactions. 170 This observation suggests to some commentators
169. If the firms supplying a partial line of services are plausible potential entrants into the
cluster, their competitive effect may be taken into account in considering entry barriers. However, an
entry analysis will not always correct for an improper market definition. Courts are unlikely to
consider outpatient surgical clinics, for example, as potential providers of the full spectrum of
hospital services grouped in an inpatient care cluster even though surgi-centers provide demand
substitutes for some types of inpatient care.
170.

See HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35,

139 n.694 (collecting cases clustering supply

complements), 140 n.698 (collecting cases clustering demand complements), 140 n.700 (collecting
cases clustering transactions complements). On other occasions, courts have refused to include
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that complementarity might provide a rationale for cluster markets.' 7' The
approach is initially attractive because it promises to offer a principled rule to
identify the bounds of product clusters based on an economic force, much as
the economic force of substitutability bounds relevant markets under the DOJ
Guidelines approach.
Three types of complementary products may be distinguished, one in
supply and two in demand. 7 2 If it is cheaper to produce or distribute two
goods together than separately, production technology is characterized by
economies of scope and the two goods are supply complements. 73 Extreme
cases of scope economies, in which the creation of one product is a necessary
by-product of manufacturing the other-such as beef with hides, or nitrogen
with oxygen in an air separation gas process-are sometimes termed
coproducts or joint products. Some scope economies seem plausible in the
hospital industry: a hospital already offering one surgical procedure may have
the equipment, operating rooms, surgeons, anesthesiologists, and support
staff available to allow it to offer many other surgical procedures at low
marginal cost. 174 However, little empirical evidence exists on the significance
75
of these economies for hospital operation.1
complementary products in the same product market. See HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, 140
n.699 (collecting cases refusing to place demand complements in the same product market).
However, when demand complements are also supply or demand substitutes, courts readily include
them in the same product market by applying the usual substitutability doctrines. Kaiser Aluminium
& Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 198 1) (basic bricks and basic specialties, substitutes
in production while demand complements for steel manufacturing, placed in same product market);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,619, at 90, 540-41
(N.D. Ill.1971) (vending machines and manual food service placed in same product market as
demand substitutes, although the two are demand complements for some consumers who purchase
part of their meals from each source).
171. See American Medical lt'l, 104 F.T.C. at 194 (clustered services are complements); see generally
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 139-40; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 107, at
521a,
at 352 (advocating inclusion of joint products in the same product market); Note, Rationalizing
Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109 (1985) (advocating transactions complementarity as the sole
basis for product clustering).
172.
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 138-4 1. A fourth type of complementarity, strategic
complementarity, is defined only for firms not cooperating and so is not directly relevant to an
assessment of the likelihood of collusion. See Bulow, Geanakopolis & Klemperer, Multimarket
Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON. 488 (1985). Furthermore, network
externalities-the benefits a customer obtains from buying a product or service compatible with the
purchases of other buyers-may constitute a fifth type of complementarity. See, e.g., David, Clio and
the Economics of Qwerty, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (Papers and Proceedings 1985).
173. See, e.g., Spence, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. A Review Article, 21 J.
EcON. LITERATURE 981 (1983); Panzar & Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268 (Papers and
Proceedings 1981).
174. Even if some inputs cannot be employed in both procedures-for example, if surgeons with
a gynecological specialty lack the training and experience to undertake heart surgery-it is plausible
that enough other inputs can be shared so as to make the marginal cost of offering the second
procedure, given that the first is offered, lower than the cost of creating a new facility with the sole
purpose of offering the second procedure.
175. One study finds diseconomies of scope for the offering of medical-surgical services,
maternity services, and emergency room services together with each other, but finds scope
economies for the offering of pediatrics with these other services. Cowing & Hohmann, Alultiproduct
Short-Run Hospital Cost Functions. Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications fron Cross-Section Data, 49
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 637, 648-50 (1982); see Grannemann, Brown & Pauly, Estimating Hospital Costs, 5J.
HEALTH ECON. 107 (1986) (scope diseconomies between emergency department and inpatient care).
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From the point of view of buyers, goods may be complements in two
ways: as demand complements or transactions complements. Demand
complements are, loosely speaking, goods that many buyers consume in
concert, such as peanut butter with jelly or cameras with film. Hence, if the
price of one demand complement rises, consumers reduce their purchases of
both products. 176 A variety of services in the hospital industry might be
demand complements, 17 7 including surgery and inpatient care,' 78 intensive
80
care and other forms of inpatient care, 179 or various diagnostic procedures.
Transactions complements are goods that buyers prefer to purchase
together, without necessarily consuming them together.18' The goods sold by
a supermarket are likely transactions complements because consumers would
pay a slight premium to buy milk and vegetables in one stop rather than make
separate visits to the dairy and the vegetable stand, even if the two products
will be eaten at separate meals. Most hospital services could be transactions
complements. For example, consumers often prefer to undergo diagnostic
tests and medical treatments in one hospital visit rather than purchasing these
services at different times. Similarly, the hotel services which a hospital
provides as a part of inpatient care would not be desired by patients except in
82
conjunction with nursing and other medical services.'
If complementarity is to serve as the basis for product market definition,
then this economic force must play a role in antitrust analysis of market power
comparable to that of substitutability, the basis for market definition under
the DOJ Guidelines, rather than the role of a factor facilitating or frustrating
collusion. The DOJ Guidelines radically distinguish between economic forces
that will impede cartel success assuming the best efforts of cartel members to
cooperate, and economic forces which increase or reduce the incentive of
each member to cooperate. Forces which will undercut cartel success even
176. See generally J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL
APPROACH 31 (3d ed. 1980).
177.
See Frech, supra note 98, at 266 ("[Mlany hospital services are strong complements to each
other. Hotel services, meals, blood tests, X-rays and surgery are all necessary to produce inpatient
surgical service.")
178. Surgical patients generally require post-surgical inpatient care, and some patients
hospitalized for illness also require surgery.
179.
Intensive care patients likely require inpatient care when they improve,
hospitalized patients may require intensive care in the course of their treatment.

and some

180. Patients with some complaints may require both x-rays and blood analyses in order to
distinguish possible diagnoses; in these cases the procedures would be demand complements.
181. See generally Note, supra note 171. These goods can be thought of as a special type of demand
complement: if goods are indexed by time of purchase, consumers prefer to acquire similarly timed
goods in concert.
182. Cf United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 21 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
23, 1989) ("In tandem with overnight care, the hospital has assembled a variety of services 'under
one roof.' This ability to perform a variety of tests and procedures in one place is .. . unmatched by a
non-hospital health provider."), appealfiled.
Hospital services may also be transactions complements from the point of view of insurers
purchasing prospective patient care. For example, an HMO wishing to offer a variety of hospital
services to its patients in the event they need care must contract with hospitals to provide a full line
of services. It may be cheaper for the HMO to contract with a single hospital for all the necessary
services than to provide those services through contracts with multiple hospitals.
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given perfect cooperation, namely demand and supply substitutability, are
incorporated into the market definition process. 83 Forces which might raise
or decrease the incentive of a cartel member to cooperate fully with its
84
colluding rivals are addressed later, after markets are defined.1
Concentration is the first economic issue evaluated after market definition
because the number of colluding rivals has historically been considered the
most important determinant of the difficulty of cartel coordination and the
ease of cheating on the cooperative agreement. 185 Other factors facilitating
or frustrating collusion are also addressed following market definition as
evidence that might rebut a presumption of anticompetitive effect resulting
from concentration. 186
As will be demonstrated below, each type of complementarity plays an
economic role in affecting the likelihood of collusion comparable to a factor
facilitating or frustrating collusion. While each type of complementarity
provides an incentive for producers of product complements to reduce
simultaneously the output of all complements, this incentive generally does
not limit the success of a cartel in which all members are cooperating to the
extent possible.' 8 7 Hence, complementarity is not comparable to a factor
which should be considered in market defintion.
i. Effect of supply complementarity. When a firm produces supply
complements, a reduction in the output of any one product in effect raises the
marginal cost of producing (the last units of) its complement, as scope
economies must be sacrificed to produce those units. In consequence, if a
multiproduct firm reduces its output of one good, it has an incentive to
reduce as well its output of all other products complementary in supply.' 88
Every other firm producing the supply complements has similar incentives, so
collusion to reduce the output of one product alone

8

9

will lead to a

decreased output of its supply complements.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42 (market definition).
184. Ease of entry is treated as a factor facilitating or frustrating collusion capable of rebutting a
presumption of anticompetitive effect arising from concentration. United States v. Waste
Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). However, entry plays a role in antitrust analysis
similar to supply substitution. See infra note 287. In consequence, the Federal Trade Commission is
moving toward evaluating the significance of entry before that of concentration-closer to the market
definition step of antitrust analysis than the facilitating factors step. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1988 Trade
Reg. Reports (CCH)
22,519, at 22,142-46 (F.T.C. 1988); Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 487
(1985). See infra notes 286-305 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 265-85 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 305-35 and accompanying text.
187. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the complementary goods are sold by the firms
selling the cartelized product. While supply complements are invariably sold by the multiproduct
firms that sell the cartelized products, and transactions complements are usually sold by such
multiproduct firms, demand complements are often sold by different firms.
188. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 107, at 521a, at 352.
189. A cartel composed of multiproduct producers may find it possible to coordinate a reduction
in output and increase in price for some but not all products if, for example, cheating is easy to
monitor and police in some markets while difficult in other markets.
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This by-product of collusion over the first product will not generally make
a single product cartel unprofitable because the reduction in output of the
complementary good allows the firm to avoid sales of the complementary
product generating low marginal revenue. 190 When the colluding firms are
unable to make marginal adjustments in output, however, it is possible that
cooperation will not be profitable among sellers of supply complements.' 9'
In neither case would profits likely increase significantly were the supply
complement brought into the collusive arrangement; the complement is
already in effect present by virtue of the joint production technology. Thus,
while supply complementarity may influence the total profits available to
colluding firms and thereby affect individual firm gains from cooperation, the
exclusion of products complementary in supply from a cooperative
190. This result can readily be demonstrated for joint products, the extreme case of scope
economies, under one set of plausible assumptions about the marketplace. Assume that a firm
producing joint products makes one unit of good A for every unit of good B, at a joint marginal cost
denoted MC. All firms are assumed to have identical cost functions, and marginal cost is assumed
constant for outputs between competitive and cooperative levels. Before the cartel was organized,
the two products sold at prices P" and P' respectively. If the market was competitive at that time,
MC = P" + P". If both products have downward sloping industry demand curves, marginal revenue
on each product (from the point of view of the industry as a whole) is less than price. Thus,
MC > MR" + MR '.
To raise the price of good A, colluding firms must sell less of that good. Assume that the only
profitable way to reduce output is to reduce production of both products (rather than preserving
production of A and B while destroying some units of good A). On the margin, a cooperating firm
gains by saving MC. However, the firm loses MR" + MRb, the marginal revenues available from
selling the last unit of the joint products produced. As MC > MR" + MRb at the previous
competitive equilibrium, some output reduction necessarily increases the firm's profits.
This result would not change were the price in market B to remain at P, as might occur were
single product firms able to employ an alternative technology to produce good B at a marginal cost
ofP". In this case, .11C > MR"+ P' at the competitive equilibrium. Now a reduction in the output of
both products by multiproduct producers colluding over good A saves each firm costs equal to MC,
but causes each producer to forgo revenues equal to MR"+ P'. Collusion in market A remains
profitable on the margin, even though the practice no longer raises the revenues available from the
last unit sold in market B.
Were the goods not extreme supply complements, the firm would likely prefer to reduce the
output of good A by more than the output reduction chosen for joint products if the demand curve
for good A is more inelastic than the demand curve for good B.
191. The unprofitability of cooperation in this special case turns on production indivisibilities
rather than supply complementarity. Suppose that a multiproduct firm produces two goods, denoted
A and B. Assume extreme supply complementarity: The firm can produce one unit of each good for
a total expenditure of $18 or else two units of each at a total cost of $28, but it cannot manufacture
the goods in unequal amounts or produce more than two units. Suppose further that each good sells
for a market price of $7, and that there are a large number of firms with identical production
technologies as the first. Under these assumptions, each firm will choose to produce two units of
each good. At this output, the firm receives total revenues of $28, equal to firm costs, and earns no
economic profit.
The firm of interest might consider participating in a collusive arrangement with its rivals under
which all firms would halve their output of good A. in the expectation based on demand conditions
that the market price for A would rise to $10 before it would become profitable for entrants to
produce A alone using some other technology. However, if an alternative technology for producing
good B is available, and if new entrants using that technology would be attracted by a market price
above $7, the firm will choose not to participate in the cartel. If it reduces its output of goodA to one
unit, it necessarily reduces its output of B as well. The firm would find that it spends $18 to produce
two products generating revenues of $17, so it loses $1. Nor could the firm profit by producing two
units of each good and destroying one unit of good A; this strategy would generate a loss of $4.
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arrangement will not generally make unprofitable an otherwise profitable
cartel. 192
ii. Effect of demand complementarity. When a firm sells a good having
demand complements, it recognizes that an increase in the price of that
product, as might result from cartel behavior, reduces the demand for the
complementary products regardless of whether it or another firm produces
the complementary goods. Multiproduct firms collaborating on a reduction
in output for one good thus necessarily also collaborate to reduce the sales of
those demand complements they also produce. In consequence, aggregate
profits will likely be lower for a colluding firm also selling demand
complements for the cartelized product than for a corresponding single good
producer in the cartel. But the injury multiproduct producers of demand
complements inflict on themselves, and their resulting disincentive to
cooperate in a cartel over the first product, will typically not deter cartel
formation whether or not the cartel also is able to coordinate price and output

192. Cf Note, supra note 17 1, at 117 (multiproduct firms selling supply complements can collude
on single products profitably).
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of the second product, I9 3 although exceptions to this generalization may
9 4

occur.

1

193. For example, suppose two demand complements, denoted A and B, have the following
symmetric inverse demand curves: P" = 100 - 3Q" + Qb and Ph = 100 - 3Q ' + Q". (As a technical
matter, the assumption that these linear demand functions are derived from maximizing the utility
function of the same representative consumer requires that the coefficients of the complementary
products be identical, here unity.) Assume further that only one firm produces both goods. For this
firm, fixed costs are zero, and the marginal cost of producing either product equals the quantity of
that good it produces: MC" = Q" and MC' = Q,. The profits available to this hypothetical single
firm would also be available collectively to cartel members whose aggregate demand and marginal
cost functions equal those assumed for this one producer. Thus, structural features affecting the
incentives of this firm to act as a monopolist equally suggest the incentives of firms in an oligopoly to
collude.
Two benchmark equilibria may be derived for this problem. First, if the firm acts as a price taker
in both markets (case I), an assumption that defines the competitive equlibrium, it can be shown that
it will produce 33.3 units of each good, sell them at a price of 33.3, and earn profits of 555.6 in each
market for a total profit of 1111.1. Second, if the firm instead acts as a monopolist in both markets
(case II), it will sell 20 units of each product at a price of 60 in each market, and earn 1000 in profits
in each market for a total profit of 2000.
To determine the significance of the sale of a demand complement on a firm's incentives to
collude, the profits of a single product monopolist are compared with those of a multiproduct firm
monopolizing only one market. Assume that a single producer monopolizes good A, while good B
sells in a competitive market (case III). This monopolist recognizes that the output and price of good
A, which it controls, affect the demand for good B, and thereby affect the equilibrium output in that
market and in turn influence the demand for good A. With this indirect feedback effect in mind, the
single product producer will choose to make 19.2 units of good A and sell them at a price of 72.1. It
will earn profits of 1201.9. (The competitive B industry would then sell 29.9 units of that product at
a price of 29.8 and earn profits of 444.2.) This monopolist reduces the output of good A to a level
even lower than that of the monopolist in both markets because it does not bear the costs of the
negative demand externality it imposes on sellers of the complementary product.
A final case is employed to analyze the effect of demand complementarity on the incentive of a
multiproduct firm to monopolize one product when its demand complement is not monopolized.
Assume that a multiproduct producer of both goods recognizes its market power over product A but
acts as a price taker in market B (case IV). In other words, a multiproduct firm producing both
products observes that its output decision in market A affects the demand curve it faces in market B.
But unlike the monopolist in both markets considered in case II, it does not recognize that it faces a
downward sloping demand for the second good. In this situation, the firm produces 20.4 units of
good .4, which sell at a price of 68.9. It also manufactures 30.1 units of good B, which sell for the
price of 20.4. Firm profits are 1197.6 in market A and 405.8 in market B, for a total profit of 1603.4.
This firm produces slightly more of good A than does the single product monopolist (case III)
because it internalizes the negative externality inflicted on the demand for good B by a monopoly in
good A. While firm profits in market .4 are slightly lower in this case than for the single product
monopolist (1197.6 as compared with 1201.9 in case 1i1), aggregate firm profits of 1603.4
substantially exceed the aggregate profits of 1201.9 for the single product monpolist. Furthermore,
while the multiproduct firm able to monopolize only one market earns fewer profits than the
mulitproduct firm able to monopolize both markets (1603.4 in case IV versus 2000 in case II), the
multiproduct firm limited to monopolizing market A earns substantially more profits than a
multiproduct producer forced to act as competitively in both markets (1603.4 in case IV versus
1111.1 in case 1).
In this example, the incentives of the single product firm to monopolize good A (case III) are not
significantly different from those of the multiproduct firm able to monopolize only one market (case
IV). Further, the total profits available to the multiproduct firm able to monopolize only one market
(case IV) are substantially in excess of the profits earned by a competitive industry (case I). Hence,
demand complementarity did not reduce the incentive of a multiproduct firm to monopolize one
market alone.
194. Suppose the two demand complements A and B each sell at the market price of$7, and each
good costs $6.50 to produce. Some firms produce only one of these products, and others produce
both. No incumbent firm can expand its output at a marginal cost of less than $8 for each good, and
new entry would also be forthcoming in both markets at a price of $8. Suppose further that the
producers of good A recognize that if they each reduce their output by 20%, the market price will
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The factors affecting the profitability of single product collusion for the

multiproduct producer of demand complements are readily identified. A
multiproduct firm selling a demand complement as well as the cartelized
product experiences the least potential disincentive to cartel formation when
the firm's sales revenues from the complement are small relative to its
revenues from the cartelized good, when the degree of complementarity is
weak, and when the product subject to collusion has an inelastic demand
curve. On the other hand, a multiproduct producer may find it unprofitable
to participate in a cartel to raise the price of one product when the firm has
much greater sales of a demand complement, the goods are strong
complements, and the good subject to collusion has an elastic demand
curve. 115 In such a case, the cartel in the first product will increase firm
revenues derived from that market, but that benefit could be outweighed by
lost revenue in the large market for the complementary product if the high
price for the first good dramatically reduces demand for the complement.
rise to $8. Because the goods are demand complements, the higher price of good A will generate a
10% reduction in the demand for good B and the market price for good B will decline to $6.90.
A firm producing good A but not good B will profit from a cooperative agreement to reduce
output by 20%. If this firm makes five units of good A, its profits are $2.50 before collusion. But
under the cooperative arrangement, the firm's profits will rise to $6, even though its output of good
A declines to four units. In contrast, a firm producing both products might find collusion in the A
market unprofitable. If that firm produces five units of good A and 50 units of good B, its precollusive profit is $2.50 on good A and $25 on good B, for a total profit of $27.50. When the firm
joins the cartel, it reduces its production of good A to four units, and finds that its share of the
decreased market demand for good B allows it to sell only 45 units. Its profit on good A rises to $6,
but its profit on good B falls to $18, so its total profit declines to $24. This firm would not lose
money, however, if the collusive price of good A is $9 or more, or if the firm's share of revenues from
good B is reduced.
In this example, the reduction in demand for a demand complement removed the incentive of a
multiproduct producer to collude on one product alone. If instead the multiproduct firm was able to
collude on both goods simultaneously, it likely would have found cooperation profitable. For
example, a 20% reduction in the output of both products might generate a market price of $7.80 for
each. Under this assumption, a firm formerly producing five units of good A and 50 units of good B
would, in concert with its rivals, reduce output to four units of good A and 40 units of good B. Its
profits would rise from $27.50 to $57.20.
195. These are the factors causing collusion to be profitable in the example described supra note
194.
This situation is most likely to arise in the context of collusion in the sale of one product by
vertically integrated producers. An integrated firm making both an upstream input and a
downstream product, such as a firm producing both steel and fabricated steel products, is selling
demand complements. Consumers of fabricated steel goods are in effect purchasing both the steel
and the fabrication. Further the goods may be strong demand complements; the fabricator may have
little leeway to vary the steel content of many of his downstream products. Consequently, a firm that
is primarily a fabricator, with very little captive steel production, may not find it profitable to
participate in a steel cartel if the cartel price is at the high level preferred by unintegrated steel
producers. Indeed, this producer might undermine a steel cartel by expanding captive production.
This firm would, however, profit from a fabricated goods cartel. In contrast, a firm primarily
producing steel with very small fabrication operations would find the steel cartel very profitable, but
would find a fabrication cartel unprofitable if the cartel price is at the high level preferred by
unintegrated fabricators. While some output reduction and price rise in one or both markets would
profit both these firms, unintegrated firms and integrated firms may have substantially different views
as to the best output reduction in each market. Under such circumstances, horizontal coordination
may be difficult to arrange. Moreover, vertical integration may increase the ability of cartel members
to cheat secretly, thereby deterring cartel formation. See infra note 200. These issues are discussed in
detail in B.F. Goodrich, 1988 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,519, at 22,161-66 (F.T.C. 1988).
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Even in this extreme case, however, some output reduction for both goods
will profit this multiproduct firm; this producer's complaint is that the cartel
chose a mix of output reductions very profitable for other cartel members but
unprofitable for it.196 Thus, if a multiproduct producer of demand
complements acts in the best interests of the cartel, and if the cartel chooses
an output reduction that maximizes joint profits of all members, then the firm
97
would always be willing to participate in a collusive agreement.1
Unincluded demand complements are qualitatively less troublesome to a
cartel than unincluded demand substitutes. Consider a case of strong
demand substitutability: Assume that two products, such as California and
New York table wine, are virtually interchangeable for buyers. Assume also
that each good can be produced with constant marginal cost, and that the
costs of making each are nearly identical. No matter how much the sellers of
the first product reduce their output in an attempt to raise price, the market
price of both will remain near marginal cost. By reducing output, collusive
sellers of the first good will succeed in lowering rather than raising their
revenues, so will almost surely find collusion unprofitable. Compare a case of
strong demand complementarity: Two products are consumed in fixed
proportions, one unit of each. These products might be nuts and bolts, or lift
tickets and hotel rooms at a ski resort. 198 In this case, consumers care only
about the sum of the two prices; buyer demand is for both goods together. If
the output of one of these goods is reduced, as by a cartel among the
producers of that product, consumers will reduce their purchases of the other
good and will bid up the total price they are willing to pay for the package of
the two products. Unless joint demand is elastic, this action will raise the total
revenues available to producers of the two goods, allowing the producers of
As unincluded substitutes are much more likely than
each to profit.'
unincluded complements to reduce cartel profitability, it is appropriate that
demand substitutes but not demand complements be taken into account
20 0
during the market definition stage of antitrust analysis.
196. This divergence of interests arises because the multiproduct producer internalizes the
demand externality created by complementarity, while the single product producer does not. Hence,
a cartel composed of some single product producers and some other firms that also produce demand
complements may have a difficult coordination task, to the extent the interests of the single product
firms and the multiproduct firms differ.
197. In some cases, side payments between other cartel members and this firm may be required
to induce the firm to participate, further increasing the difficulties of cartel coordination.
198. The goods might also be downstream consumer products and upstream inputs. See infra
note 195.
199. The sellers of the first product may be able to earn monopoly profits by raising the price of
that good even if they are unable to raise the total price of both goods to consumers. Consumers will
happily pay more for the first good if the price of the demand complement is reduced, as consumers
care only about the total price. Further, so long as the lower price for the demand complement
exceeds the sum of its marginal cost plus its average recoverable fixed cost, the competing producers
of the demand complements will remain in the marketplace while accepting a revenue reduction, and
the equilibrium output and market price for the package need never change. Hence the cartel in one
good can profit by appropriating the rents that a competitive market would have awarded its demand
complement. The author is indebted to Steven Salop for this observation.
200. Demand complementarity may also create a second difficulty for cartel formation when one
firm sells all the complementary goods. Multiproduct sellers of demand complements may find it
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iii. Effects of transactions complementarity. Sellers of transactions
complements must recognize that consumers care about the total price of
their consumption bundle but are not otherwise concerned about the price of
individual goods. For example, grocery store shoppers may primarily be
interested in the aggregate cost of the goods in their grocery shopping cart,
and may not otherwise be concerned about the price of milk. If goods are
transactions complements, a cooperative agreement to raise the price of one
good could be undercut by firms that lower the price of one of the good's
transactions complements. 20 1 Because a cartel composed of multiproduct
sellers must foreclose this option for cheating, the cartel may find it necessary
to raise price on all products with transactions complementarity sold by
member firms; the members of a grocery store cartel may agree to raise their
markup on all products in the store, across the board, rather than limit the
price raise to a handful of individual products such as milk and other dairy
goods. 20 2 But if the meat department in the grocery were owned by a
separate firm from the rest of the store, for example, the grocery need not
fear that its meat subcontractor would lower price to undercut collusion

possible to cheat on a cartel in one good by lowering their price of its demand complement for
consumers willing to buy both goods from it. However, lowering the price of a complement allows a
multiproduct firm to cheat on a cartel only if the firm is able to increase sales of the cartelized
product. A tied purchase requirement is one mechanism for accomplishing this result. This
mechanism for undercutting a cartel cannot be employed unless consumers purchase all demand
complements from one buyer, as when goods are strong transactions complements. See infra notes
201-04 and accompanying text. Another situation in which consumers purchase demand
complements simultaneously occurs when consumers buy the downstream output of a vertically
integrated producer. This firm in effect sells the demand complements of upstream inputs and
downstream fabrication. See infra note 195. In both cases, the difficulty for cartel formation does not
arise if multiproduct firms act in the best interest of the cartel. Thus, this problem is best treated as a
factor facilitating collusion rather than as a concern of market definition.
201. See Note, supra note 171, at 119; supra note 200.
For an example of how transactions complementarity may facilitate cheating on a cartel, suppose
that consumers invariably buy one unit of product A and one unit of product B each week, and that it
costs consumers an extra $1 to shop at two stores rather than one because of the extra time involved.
Then goods A and B are transactions complements.
Suppose that a store sells 10 units of goods A and B each day for $7 each. Assume further that
these goods cost the store $7 each, so it earns no economic profit. If there are many identical stores,
and all raise the price of good A to $8, suppose that each would then sell only eight units of that
product. Cooperation limited to good A would be desired by each, as it would create profits of $8. If
such cooperation occurs, however, each firm would likely have a strong incentive to lower its price on
good B to $6.50, even though that price is below the cost of good B. Consumers will discover that
they can obtain one unit of both A and B for $14.50 at a store which lowers the price of B, while their
shopping trip will cost $15 otherwise. In consequence, any one store might be able to attract, for
example, 40 customers purchasing one unit of each product if it is the only store colluding on good A
and simultaneously discounting good B. In that case the store will earn a total profit of $20.
Competition on good B will likely emerge, until its price falls to $6 and firms no longer earn
economic profits despite their cooperation on the price of good A. This problem with collective
action would be remedied by an agreement not to reduce the price of good B when increasing the
price of good A or an agreement to raise the price of both products.
202. The fact that milk is a transactions complement for other goods when sold in a grocery store
does not mean that a dairy cartel desiring to collude on the price of milk must make an agreement
with the vegetable cartel and the meat cartel. Dairies produce only one product, milk at wholesale,
while grocery stores distribute a variety of transactions complements at retail.
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involving the remaining grocery products. 20 3 Thus, if collusion over one set
of products, such as the retail sale of dairy goods, would be profitable, it will
never be undercut by the failure of the cartel to include other firms selling
transactions complements; it will only be undercut by cartel members
choosing not to act in the best efforts of the cartel by cheating through
lowering the price of those complements which they also sell. Hence
transaction complementarity operates for multiproduct sellers like a factor
facilitating or frustrating collusion, by altering the incentives of such sellers to
make their best efforts for cartel success, rather than as an economic force
impeding those best efforts, which should be taken into account in market
204
definition.
Iv. Complementarity as a market definition criterion. Each type of
complementarity has been shown to play a role in affecting the likelihood of
collusion comparable to a factor facilitating collusion rather than an economic
20 5
If
force suitable for consideration during market definition.
complementarity is nevertheless allowed to form a basis for product market
definition, two analytic problems will be created.
First, using
complementarity as well as substitutability as a market definition criterion may
generate inappropriate product markets. When goods are moderate but not
strong complements, or when there are substitutes for some but not all goods
in the cluster, it may well be misleading to expand provisional product
markets by adding complements instead of adding substitutes. 20 6 For
example, suppose market power inferences regarding hospital mergers are
derived from a cluster market defined by acute inpatient hospital care, based
on some form of complementarity among hospital services. At some point the
presence of new institutions competing with respect to some but not all of
those services, such as free standing ambulatory or surgical clinics, belies
those inferences. 20 7 Yet the complementarity logic does not assist in

203. The grocery is likely to benefit from this action because the reduction in market basket
prices would shift business to it from its rival colluding firms. The meat counter would not benefit
because its price reduction would cause it to sell at a price below marginal cost unless side payments
were arranged.
204. Even if a retail dairy cartel is made unsuccessful by the incentives of grocery store sellers of
milk to cheat by lowering the price of other grocery products, a retail grocery cartel might be
successful. This observation suggests that a merger of two groceries analyzed in both a dairy product
market and a grocery product market might appear more anticompetitive in the grocery market than
the dairy market. For another example of a merger more troubling in a broad product market than a
narrow one, see supra note 147.
205. Furthermore, it is possible to consider fully the significance of complementary products by
treating them as a factor facilitating or frustrating collusion. See infra notes 321-26 and
accompanying text. It is therefore unnecessary to consider their effect during market definition.
206. Even if this process is not misleading, it may be complex. When provisional product
markets may be expanded either by adding close complements or by adding close substitutes, the
market definition task requires choosing between dissimilar alternatives.
207. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 465-66 (1985) (narrowing the cluster in
response to new forms of competition), aftd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1038 (1987).
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identifying situations when markets based on substitutability are to be
20 8
preferred to the cluster based on complementarity.
Second, product market definitions based on complementarity may
confuse rather than clarify a court's or enforcer's understanding of the
economic forces affecting the likelihood of industry collusion. For example,
when goods have strong complements, the monopoly profits from
cooperative action most likely derive primarily from the subset of those
products lacking substitutes. Indeed, it is necessary that some products in the
cluster meet the market definition standards involving substitutability for any
20 9
product in the group to increase in price as a result of producer collusion.
Thus, it is the absence of substitutes, not the presence of complements, that
confers the possibility of market power on producers of a product or service,
although the presence of complementary goods may affect the incentives of
such producers to take advantage of their potential ability to increase
revenues through a cooperative reduction in output. Product market
definition based exclusively on the extent of demand and supply
substitutability preserves the focus of antitrust concern on the necessary
condition for cartel success. 210 It is misleading to shift attention away from
the product or service where collusion can generate supracompetitive pricing
in order to highlight one factor (complementarity) potentially facilitating or
frustrating collusion, particularly when this factor will rarely be the most
significant factor affecting firm incentives to collude.
b. Pragmaticapproach to product clusters. 2 '' A superior approach to making
sense of cluster markets applies the term solely for descriptive and analytic
208. Cf Note, supra note 160 (new competition in banking makes previous cluster markets
inadvisable).
The clustering of product complements can also increase market definition difficulties if the
geographic extent of competition for each good differs, as might easily be the case for supply
complements. In such a case, geographic market definition will be confused. See infra note 237 and
accompanying text.
209. For example, if beef producers would be able to raise the price of beef through a cooperative
output reduction, then beef satisfies the product market definition algorithm of the DOJ Guidelines.
Even if beef producers must also reduce their output of beef's supply complement, hides, in order to
take advantage of their market power in beef, the higher price of beef will contribute to increasing
aggregate firm profits. If hides also form a relevant product market, the reduction in output of hides
may increase profits in that market as well, so a separate antitrust analysis of the hides market may
demonstrate that the beef market collusion creates anticompetitive problems in more than one
market. But if neither beef nor hides forms a relevant product market based upon the substitutability
considerations of the DOJ Guidelines, neither good will increase in price as a result of producer
collusion to reduce the output of the two complements simultaneously.
210. However, defining a broader market aggregate including complements for the product
lacking substitutes is not formally inconsistent with the DOJ Guidelines because a large number of
product markets satisfy the DOJ Guidelines methodology. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying
text.
211. The term "pragmatic approach" may be misleading to the extent it suggests, incorrectly,
that the resulting markets do not reflect the economic principles of the DOJ Guidelines. Rather, this
approach defines cluster markets in order to apply the DOJ Guidelines analysis more effectively by
avoiding unnecessary complexity, but only in situations where the result would not change were the
market power analysis undertaken for individual product markets. The author is indebted to George
Priest for this observation.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 2

convenience in situations where it will not be misleading. In two related
situations, the cluster approach will likely generate the same market power
inferences as the DOJ Guidelines substitutability analysis while minimizing
analytic complexities. First, when the same firms sell the same set of
products, which do not happen to be substitutes, in the same geographic areas
with similar market shares, and when each individual prodtct would
constitute a product market under the DOJ Guidelines, the antitrust analysis
of each would be so similar in practice that no loss of analytic power comes
from treating the products as a collection. For example, if cardiac surgery and
computerized axial tomography (CAT scans) are neither demand nor supply
substitutes, it would be sensible to incorporate these procedures in an
inpatient hospital care cluster market when each procedure would form a
product market individually under the usual substitutability tests, and when
they are offered by the identical set of hospitals with similar market shares.
Alternatively, if finely partitioned market share data are unavailable,
concentration in many individual product markets will necessarily be
estimated with the same aggregate figures. If there is no compelling reason to
believe demand and supply substitutability opportunities, entry conditions, or
market shares differ significantly across individual products, then the antitrust
analysis will be similar for each good so they may conveniently be analyzed as
a collection. 2 12 Thus, cardiac surgery and neurosurgery might be placed in
the same surgery cluster market if statistics on surgical patients days do not
distinguish between these procedures, and if there is no reason to believe
substitution opportunities, entry conditions, or market shares differ among
them. But this cluster is less compelling, for example, if one hospital
specializes in one procedure so is likely to have a particularly high share of
that service, if the equipment employed in orthopedic surgery can be used in
heart surgery but not neurosurgery, or if there is a nationwide shortage of
cardiac surgeons and a glut of neurosurgeons.
This pragmatic approach to cluster market definition is not inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's delineation of cluster markets in the bank cases.
The Court's emphasis on the "commercial realities" that insulate products
within the cluster from outside competition 21 3 suggests that the same firms
compete across all products with similar shares. Under this interpretation,
the Court's cluster market of banking services makes sense if, for example,
banks with large deposits also have large loan portfolios and extensive trust

212. The Department of Justice takes a similar view. 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 257, 274-75 (1988); Rule, supra note 115, at 12627. Differences in market shares across services in hospital market clusters may be substantial,
however. One commentator suggests that the individual services grouped in the cluster market
defined by the FTC in its Hospital Corp. of America opinion differ widely in concentration from the
aggregate concentration figures. T. MCCARTHY, EMERGING COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE
MARKETS, Eighth Annual Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar of the National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. (July 10, 1987).
213. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
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services, and regulatory barriers limit entry into these

The Court also adopted a pragmatic market definition approach unrelated
to substitutability or complementarity in undertaking its geographic market
definition in Grinnell,21 5 but not in its product market definition where the
cluster market recognized by the Court was likely predicated on supply
substitutability. 21 6 The Court in Grinnell defined a national market for
accredited central station protective services when it expected little variation
in concentration and competitive conditions across individual geographic
markets. In a large number of geographic regions, the same firm was the
exclusive provider of central station services.2 1 7 Further, in each location a
large number of customers were unwilling to purchase protective services
other than through a central station provider.2 1 8 Thus, one producer was
likely a monopolist for central station protection in each of a large number of
regions of the country. Rather than analyze the similar markets for several
services in over 100 cities, the Court chose to define a cluster market for these
services and a nationwide geographic market. 21 9 Assuming the product
market was correctly defined, the defendant's 73 percent nationwide market
share of central station protective services 22 0 probably did not misrepresent
its monopoly power in the local regions underlying this geographic market
22 1
definition.
The pragmatic rationale will not justify a cluster market when some firms
sell subsets of the clustered goods but not the full line. When partial line
sellers are present, a different collection of sellers can offer each good,
214. The product market involving a cluster of banking services may also be consistent with a
rationale for clustering based on demand or transactions complementarity, or on supply
substitutability. The district court in the PhiladelphiaNational Bank case found that "Each [banking
service] is an integral part of the the whole, almost every one of which is dependent upon and would
not exist but for the other." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 363 (E.D. Pa.
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). In affirming the district court's product market
definition clustering banking services, the Court noted both "cost advantages" for banks in
providing personal loans relative to small-loan companies-suggesting supply substitutability with
other banking services, the basis for the cluster market defined in Grinnell-and a "settled consumer
preference" for bank provision of financial services, suggesting demand or transactions
complementarity. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356-57.
215. United States v. Grinnell, 394 U.S. 521 (1966). The author is indebted to Terry Calvani for
helpful discussions concerning this point.
216. See supra note 149.
217. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 578.
218. Alternatives, such as watchmen or audible alarms, differ in "utility, efficiency, reliability,
responsiveness, and continuity . . . . For many customers, only central station protection will do."
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 574. But see id. at 590-91 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
219. The Court recognized that individual stations operate only within an area 25 miles in radius,
id. at 575, so it in effect defined a geographic cluster market as well as a product cluster market. The
dissent found the majority's nationwide geographic market indefensible because of the absence of
demand and supply substitutability. Id. at 588-89 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 578.
221. The dissent excoriated the majority for not undertaking a "market-by-market" analysis of
competition, but recognized that "it might well be the case" that defendant had monopoly power in
"a number of those local areas." Id. at 589-90 (Fortas, J., dissenting). However, the dissent also
presented some evidence of differences in concentration across markets, which would recommend a
market-by-market analysis. Id. at 592.
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multiproduct sellers may have widely differing market shares for each
product, and entry conditions likely vary across goods. Under these
circumstances, cluster markets will misrepresent the nature of competition for
many if not all the products clustered. 2 2 2 Thus, the "acute inpatient care"
cluster market for hospital services defined in the recent FTC cases is not
appropriate when hospitals have significant actual or potential competition
from free standing surgical or emergency room facilities, 22 3 or when nonhospital providers of outpatient services could readily serve additional
patients presently obtaining medical care from hospitals. 224 Similarly,
commentators identify the rise of new financial institutions offering some but
not all the services of commercial banks as a reason for replacing the cluster
approach with the DOJ Guidelines substitutability methodology in defining
22 5
product markets for bank services.
When cluster markets are defined by applying this pragmatic rationale, the
underlying principle behind market definition remains the substitutability
analysis of the DOJ Guidelines. Hence, when new substitutes in demand or
supply become available, the cluster market must give way to product markets
defined by each service and its substitutes. In future hospital merger cases, in
consequence, services for which hospitals face competition from non-hospital
providers will likely merit separate product markets. 2 26 However, cluster
markets may continue to be appropriate for those limited groups of services
offered exclusively by hospitals, 2 27 especially when all hospitals offer them in
similar shares, or when data limitations prevent market share computations by
individual services.228

222. Approaching the competitive analysis market by market may also suggest a curative
divestiture that would not be apparent if competition is analyzed solely within the cluster. See infra
note 341 and accompanying text (fix-it-first policy).
223. American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 193 (1984).
224. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 465 n.6 (1984), afftd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987). Cf id. at 466 ("It may well be that in this case the proper
product market excludes all outpatient care; perhaps outpatient care should be a separate relevant
market or markets.").
225. See HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 75 n.369 (collecting commentary questioning
whether cluster markets remain appropriate in the financial services sector "after two decades of
evolution").
226. Cf Proger, supra note 153, at 619 ("[A]s more evidence becomes available about the
emerging forms of new competition in health care and about their substitutability with hospital based
services, relevant product market definition in hospital cases will take into account these new forms
of competition.").
227. Cf Proger, supra note 153, at 621 ("[T]here may be a core of inpatient tertiary hospital
services for which there are no non-hospital substitutes. But not all services provided by a hospital
are within that core.").
228. Even if large clusters continue to appear justified, it would be inappropriate to place
secondary inpatient care services and tertiary inpatient care services in the same cluster because all
hospitals do not offer both types of patient care in the same market shares. This is evident from the
observations that the geographic markets for tertiary care services are generally much larger than the
geographic markets for secondary care services, see infra note 237 and accompanying text, and that
some hospitals offering secondary care services are unable to offer tertiary care.
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GeographicMarket Definition.

a. Application of the DOJ Guidelines to hospitals. The DOJ Guidelines
approach to market definition identifies the geographic market in which a
merging hospital producing a relevant product competes similarly to the way
it defines the product market. Under the DOJ Guidelines, geographic market
definition begins with the location of each merging hospital or each facility of
a multi-hospital entity. The DOJ Guidelines ask whether a hypothetical
monopolist of each relevant product at that location would find it profitable to
raise the product's price significantly. If not, the location of a nearby actual or
potential competitor in the product market is added to the proposed market
and the question is repeated. Increasingly distant locations are incorporated
in the provisional market until a geographic area is identified in which a
hypothetical cartel selling a given relevant product would be able to raise
price a significant amount without unprofitably losing many patients to actual
or potential competitors outside the area. This region is the smallest relevant
geographic market associated with a given relevant product market. 2 29 A

different geographic market may correspond to each separate relevant
product market.
As with product market definition, the DOJ Guidelines approach to
geographic market definition takes into account both demand and supply

substitutability. 23 0 A proposed geographic market is too small so long as a
229.

See 1984

MERGER GUIDELINES,

supra note 51, § 2.3.

For antitrust analysis, the DOJ Guidelines market definition algorithm is superior to the
geographic market definition methodology described in Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault,
Appropriate Measures of Hospital Market Areas, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 69, 73 (1987). These authors
incorporate an outside hospital into their provisional geographic market so long as a significant
fraction of patients substitute care at that more distant hospital for care at any single hospital within
the proposed market. This algorithm will lead to markets that are broader than those of the DOJ
Guidelines because this test is much easier for a distant hospital to meet than the DOJ Guidelines
standard for inclusion. Under the DOJ Guidelines methodology, more distant hospitals are added to
the proposed market only if the number of customers who would substitute any outside hospital, the
marginal patients, is a large fraction of the patients collectively served by all the hospitals within the
proposed market. Only then will distant hospitals collectively provide a competitive brake on cartel
pricing within the provisional geographic market, so only then must one or more distant hospitals be
added to the relevant market. Under the Garnick et al. methodology, the proposed market will
instead be expanded if the number of marginal patients is a large fraction of the patients served by
any one of the hospitals within the proposed market, namely the hospital from which in large part
they switch. In consequence, some hospitals included in the resulting market could be excluded
without jeopardizing a cartel's ability to collude successfully.
The Guidelines algorithm is also superior for antitrust analysis to a second methodology
proposed by these authors that identifies the competitors of a given hospital as all hospitals within an
arbitrary 5 or 15 mile radius around it. Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault, supra, at 69. This
approach ignores physical features of geography, population distributions, and other factors
affecting patient substitution patterns. Hence the resulting geographic markets may bear no relation
to areas within which collusive arrangements might occur.
230. The one geographic cluster market defined by the Supreme Court, in Grinnell, 384 U.S. 521,
can be rationalized on pragmatic grounds consistent with the substitutability concerns of the DOJ
Guidelines. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. Complementarity is not an issue for
geographic market definition, unlike product market definition. Under a supply complementarity
rationale for product cluster markets, a geographic cluster market could in principle be defined for
multi-hospital chains if scope economies across multi-plant firms are substantial. Such a market
would be analogous to product cluster markets based on scope economies. However, geographic
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substantial fraction of patients would purchase hospital services from firms at
locations outside the initially defined area if prices rose slightly at nearby
hospitals. The market need no longer expand when a sufficient number of
patients would pay a high collusive price rather than bear the costs of
traveling for health care to locations outside the boundaries of the
hypothetical cartel, 2 31 for then a cartel within the region would be profitable.
In general, the larger the geographic region, the fewer the number of
customers who will consider locations outside the region where the relevant
product is sold to be demand substitutes for locations within the region. As a
result, the larger the region, the less the threat that new competition located
outside the region will compete away the monopoly profits of the hypothetical
cartel.
Perhaps the most important factor limiting the geographic scope of
markets for the services offered by hospitals is the unwillingness of patients to
patronize hospitals far from their residences.2 3 2 Often, the longer the
distance a patient must travel, the farther his friends and relatives must also
travel to visit him and the farther his physicians must travel. Further, long
distances between home and hospital are disfavored because a patient may be
forced by physician affiliations to switch doctors if he wishes to select a distant
hospital. 233 Indeed, to the extent the physician is the patient's agent in
advising on health care choices, physician preferences and affiliation are likely

scope economies fail to approach in magnitude the scope economies at issue in product markets, and
in any event complementarity is an unsatisfactory basis for market definition.
231. It is not possible to quantify the critical fraction of patients unwilling to switch locations
without knowing the demand curves facing the two groups and the cost function for the hypothetical
cartel. Thus, survey data on the propensity of customers to switch hospitals as relative prices change
can be suggestive but not conclusive concerning the extent of geographic markets. Cf supra note 142
and accompanying text (comparable issue for product market definition); Baker & Bresnahan, The
Gains from Aerger or Collusion in Product-DifferentiatedIndustries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985) (market
power of sellers in product differentiated industries depends upon fraction of inframarginal
customers).
Further, surveys describing pre-merger behavior can be misleading as evidence of demand
substitution predilections. If the market is competitive prior to the merger, few patients will have
reason to travel to distant locations, so surveys of actual substitution patterns will show patient
substitution to be low. Yet many of these patients would be willing to travel to avoid 5% price
increases by nearby hospitals. See supra note 134 (Cellophane trap); infra notes 241-42 and
accompanying text (hospital patient-flow data).
232. McGuirk & Porell, Spatial Patterns of Hospital Utilization: The Impact of Distance and Time, 21
INQUIRY 84, 86 (1984).

233. A patient is likely to select a specialist in his community, if one acceptable to his primary care
physician is available, for similar reasons of minimizing transportation costs. Through this
mechanism, patient hospital preferences may be taken into account in choice of physician. McGuirk
& Porell, supra note 232, at 86. Similarly, if HMO's have limited hospital affiliations, a patient will
factor both travel time and insurance premium into his selection of health care provider, and thus,
choice of hospital.
Further, if some hospitals raise the price of a hospital service, doctors may alter their hospital
affiliations, admitting patients to lower priced hospitals (or employing ambulatory care clinics)
instead of hospitals whose prices have increased. Indeed, doctors can be expected to consider the
price of hospital services in making recommendations to patients, to the extent hospitals and doctors
compete for patient rents and joint (health care) demand is elastic. Cf supra note 199.
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to count strongly in the patient's decision. 23 4 Not surprisingly, doctors prefer
to obtain affiliations and admit patients into hospitals located near the
doctor's office. 23 5 Similarly, third party payers (health insurers) may create
financial incentives for patients to favor hospitals in a narrow geographic area,
23 6
thereby limiting the scope of geographic markets.
Patient substitution preferences vary across hospital services. To obtain
some hospital services, primarily the specialized services offered by "tertiary"
care providers, many patients will travel long distances. Therefore, the
geographic markets for such services are likely to be larger than the
2 37
geographic markets for primary and secondary care services.
b. Patient flow statistics. Geographic market definition in the extant
hospital merger opinions has been based primarily upon patient flow
statistics, the most readily available information on geographic competition.
This methodology applies in the hospital context the Elzinga-Hogarty
approach to geographic market definition, under which geographic markets
are identified based on shipment patterns of the products at issue. 238 Under
this methodology, the geographic market is expanded until two tests are
simultaneously satisfied: The firms within it must account for most of the
shipment inside the candidate region, and those firms must do most of their
business inside the candidate region. In the hospital industry, patient flow is
the analogue of shipments. Thus a geographic market for a given product
234. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 467 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987); American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 197 (1984); McGuirk & Porell,
supra note 232, at 84, 86. The Department of Justice relied on this observation in defining the
geographic market it alleged in a recently litigated hospital merger case. It pointed to the narrow
geographic spread of physician privileges and the resulting patient admitting practices as evidence
for a narrow geographic market. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 28-29 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 23, 1989),
appealfiled.
235. See Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault, supra note 229, at 69, 72.
236. See Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 29-30 (N.D. 111.Feb. 23, 1989), appealfiled.
237. Rule, supra note 115, at 127. See Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 468. This observation
creates a problem for geographic market definition if the product market is defined based upon the
cluster of services approach. In HospitalCorp. of Am., the FTC chose to ignore the broad tertiary care
service areas, and defined geographic markets based primarily on patient flows for secondary care.
This was probably the best choice given that the cluster approach to product definition was
employed, because the Commission's primary competitive concern was with the potential for
collusion among secondary care providers. However, if individual secondary and tertiary care
services form separate product markets, each can have a different geographic market. See supra note
228.
238. Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18
ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973) [hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty, Antimerger Suits]; Elzinga & Hogarty, The
Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978)
[hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty, The Case of Coal]; see HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 96-101.
A related methodology from the health policy literature defines hospital market areas for hospital
planning purposes based on patient flow, whether determined from hospital admissions and
discharges, see Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault, supra note 229, at 69, 73, or vital statistics
mortality data, see Carpenter & Plessas, Estimating Hospital Service Areas Using Mortality Statistics, 20
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 19 (1985). This literature attempts to explain hospital admissions by distance
from the patient's community, controlling for demographic characteristics, medical care
requirements, and the distance to alternative hospitals. McGuirk & Porell, supra note 232, at 84, 8586.
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market is identified when the hospitals in the region serve most of the patients
using the services in the product market who originate in that region, and
when most of the hospital patients seeking the services in the product market
2 39
come from that region.
Several difficulties with the Elzinga-Hogarty approach have been
identified. Geographic market definition based on actual patterns of customer
association with firms can either be underinclusive or overinclusive relative to
the regions that the DOJ Guidelines would delineate. 2 40 On the one hand,
defining markets for hospital services based on patient flow can understate the
geographic regions relevant for antitrust merger analysis. This difficulty
arises because the hospital choices patients actually make are based on
current prices. Yet, if a hospital cartel consisting only of hospitals actually
patronized were to increase price, enough patients may shift to hospitals
24
slightly farther away, not currently patronized, to defeat the price increase. '
In short, potential competitors must be included in the relevant geographic
market for merger analysis but these firms will not be identified by patient
2
flow data.

42

On the other hand, markets based on patients flows may overstate the
geographic markets relevant to antitrust merger analysis when the product
market includes hospital services that are not perfect substitutes. In this case,
those patients with strong preferences for obtaining services at distant
hospitals-such as many tertiary care patients or patients desiring higher
quality care than is available locally-will travel there, even if most patients
are unwilling to travel. 24 3 A hospital market that includes these distant
institutions will therefore encompass a region larger than the smallest region
239. Technically, the market is expanded until the LIFO (little in from outside) and LOFI (little
out from inside) statistics are small. To apply this test to hospital markets, it is necessary to calculate
the fraction of hospital patients from a particular region who are admitted to hospitals outside the
region (to test whether the LOFI requirement holds) and the fraction of patients admitted to
hospitals inside the region who originate outside the area (to see if LIFO holds). See Hospital Corp. of
Am., 106 F.T.C. at 468 n.7. Elzinga and Hogarty have variously argued that these tests are met for a
proposed area when the LIFO and LOFI fractions fall below 25%, Elzinga & Hogarty, Antimerger
Suits, supra note 238, at 45, 74-75, and when they fall below 10%, Elzinga & Hogarty, The Case of Coal,
supra note 238, at 1, 2.
240. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Departments Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514,
576 [hereinafter Werden, Market Delineation];Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining
Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (1981) [hereinafter Werden, Shipments Data]; Scheffman
& Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 123, 129 (1987).

241. Similarly, hospitals in the neighborhood of colluding hospitals yet not offering the services
defined by the relevant product market may respond to the higher cartel price by introducing new
services, and thereby inducing patients to depart from their current hospital choices.
242. One recent study in the health policy literature recognizes this antitrust criticism of the
patient origin approach. "One limitation of a direct measurement of demand for hospital services is
inclusion only of institutions that currently provide care. For many issues, it is important also to
include potential competitors-that is, hospitals that could obtain the equipment and staff to begin to
compete for certain sets of patients (for example, by adding a heart surgery program)." Garnick,
Luft, Robinson & Tetreault, supra note 229, at 69, 71.
243. Werden, The Limited Relevance of Patient Migration Data in Market Delineationfor HospitalMerger
Cases, J. HEALTH ECON. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Werden, Patient Migration];Ordover & Willig, The
1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 551-52
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in which a hospital cartel could successfully collude. This difficulty may be
particularly serious when product markets are defined based on the cluster of
services methodology, rather than when product markets are more finely
24 4
partitioned based on the DOJ Guidelines methodology.
Once these criticisms of geographic market definition based on patient
flow are recognized, market boundaries can readily be adjusted to account for
them. The first adjustment avoids underinclusion. Hospitals outside the
region of current patient flow need not be considered potential competitors
and included in a broadened geographic market if evidence of patient travel
245
preferences, Qbtained independently from patient flow statistics,
establishes that the outside hospitals would not be turned to for medical care
in the event that the currently patronized hospitals were to collude and raise
prices. Because it is typically costly for patients to patronize distant hospitals,
however, it will rarely be necessary to expand the market beyond the area of
current patient choice.
The second adjustment avoids overinclusion. Distant hospitals can be
excluded from the market even if a fraction of patients from the market obtain
care there, so long as those patients traveling long distances obtain
qualitatively different services from the services available nearby. Thus, if
patients leave the region only for specialized treatment at tertiary care
hospitals, those facilities and other hospitals equally distant can be excluded
from the geographic market if the product market involves less specialized
services. 2 46 With these two adjustments, patient flow statistics will allow the
identification of the relevant geographic market as defined by the DOJ
24 7
Guidelines.
(1983); Werden, Market Delineation, supra note 240, at 514, 576; Werden, Shipments Data, supra note
240, at 719, 725-26.
Patient origin data may also overstate the size of the relevant geographic market if the more
distant hospitals operate at full capacity. Capacity constrained hospitals will be unable to expand
output to compete away the price increase created by the other hospitals in the area with excess
capacity, so may be excluded from a cartel without jeopardizing collusive profits.
Further, the ability of a monopolist to practice geographic price discrimination can lead the
Elzinga-Hogarty approach to underestimate the geographic market because there will be "significant
exports of a product from an area even though that product and area are a market under the
Guidelines." Werden, Market Delineation, supra note 240, at 514, 576.
244. See infra note 258 and accompanying text (adjustment in Hospital Corp. of Am. or this
problem).
245. See infra note 249 and accompanying text (adjustment in American Medical Intl for this
problem).
246. Similarly, patient inmigration from surrounding regions to hospitals in a city will often
substantially exceed patient outmigration from the city to more distant hospitals because of the
higher perceived quality of city hospitals. Werden, Patient Migration, supra note 243. Under such
circumstances, geographic market definition can be based exclusively on outmigration data to avoid
overinclusion. See infra note 262. Alternatively, one study employing patient flow data attempts to
avoid overinclusion by excluding patient cases with high DRG weights, thought to represent those
patients requiring the most specialized care. Morrisey, Sloan & Valvona, Defining Geographic Markets
for Hospital Care, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring, 1988, at 165, 179-80, 185-86.
247. Alternatively, one might identify geographic markets pursuant to the DOJ Guidelines
methodology by estimating residual demand curves. Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 141, at 123.
However, the necessary data may be unavailable.
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In its recent hospital merger decisions, the Federal Trade Commission
used patient flow statistics to define the geographic markets, while making
adjustments in order to avoid the overinclusion and underinclusion problems.
In both American Medical International and Hospital Corp. of America, the
Commission defined geographic markets for its acute inpatient care product
market clusters. The geographic market in American Medical International,the
California region comprised of San Luis Obispo County and the City of San
Luis Obispo, was defined primarily based on statistics describing patient "in
flow" and patient "outmigration. ' 2 48 However, the FTC confirmed that this
market did not exclude more distant potential competitors by observing that
its market definition was also supported by "geographic barriers (patient
convenience and limited mobility, location of admitting physician)." ' 249 The

resulting market excluded a hospital located twenty-five miles from the city of
San Luis Obispo.

2 50

In Hospital Corp. of America, the Commission recognized that a geographic
market must be expanded beyond the region of those hospitals currently
selected by patients to include significant potential competitors . 2 5 However,
the FTC was forced to adopt the Chattanooga, Tennessee, urban area as its
geographic market because the region was accepted by the parties to the case
and there was insufficient factual evidence from which to define the extent of a
broader market. 2 52 The Commission nevertheless recognized the need to
avoid overinclusion in its market definition by ignoring distant patient travel
to obtain specialized, tertiary care when it interpreted patient flows.

A recent federal district court decision in a
extensively upon patient flow statistics to define
three-county area (plus small parts of two other
Illinois.254 The court recognized that geographic

2 53

hospital merger case relied
the geographic market as a
counties) around Rockford,
markets for tertiary services

248. American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. at 195-96.
249. Id. at 196. The Commission also argued that its geographic market definition was supported
by industry recognition of competitive regions. See id. at 196, 197.
250. Id. at 197.
251. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 466, 471-72.
252. Id at 472. The accepted urban area is comprised of one Tennessee county and three
adjoining Georgia counties. The Commission rejected complaint counsel's proposed broader
market on the ground that there was no credible basis for adding the regions proposed, in which
many of the hospitals were managed by respondent, without adding other areas equally distant from
Chattanooga, in which other parties owned and managed the hospitals. Id. at 470. This market
excluded a number of hospitals located within a 45-minute driving radius of Chattanooga. See id. at
463-64.
253. Id. at 468. See United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 844, 848 (W.D. Va.
1989) (larger geographic market for tertiary care than for primary and secondary care services),
appeal filed, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989); cf American Medical International, 104 F.T.C. at 196-97
(patient flow statistics vary with the service rendered).
254. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 32-68 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
23, 1989), appealfiled. The court defined a geographic market such that "the defendants compete
with four other hospitals for the group of patients representing about 90% of the admissions of the
defendants." Id. at 67. Because there was little difference in the LIFO and LOFI statistics across
alternative geographic market proposals, id. at 54-55, the court chose the smallest area satisfying the
Elzinga-Hogarty test. Id. at 56. Moreover, there was little variation between patient flow statistics
computed from admissions data and statistics computed from discharges data. Id. at 47. Cf Carilion,
707 F. Supp. 840, 848 (W.D. Va. 1989) (broadening market beyond the immediate vicinity of
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were broader than those for primary and secondary care, so it ignored
competition from tertiary care providers. 25 5 Similarly, the court discounted
patient travel from outside the metropolitan area because a majority of the
distant patients were attracted by the opportunity to obtain specialized service
2 56
unavailable in their local hospitals.
Older hospital merger decisions, written prior to the promulgation of the
1982 Guidelines, 25 7 have relied on the political boundaries of Health Service
Areas as a basis for geographic market definition. 2 58 This approach is unlikely
to be employed today, except insofar as patient flow statistics may be kept in
terms of these regions, because these areas bear no apparent relation to
competitive conditions or the substitutability considerations of the DOJ
Guidelines .259
Even taking into account the potential competition from hospitals not
currently serving the patients of a local area, courts have generally concluded
that geographic markets for most hospital services are small. For most
hospital services, courts typically delineate markets no larger than a
metropolitan area or the county surrounding a city, except for the specialized
care available at teaching hospitals, for which geographic markets are thought
to be broader.2 60 The geographic market was the San Luis Obispo area in
American Medical International,the Chattanooga area in Hospital Corp. of America,
and the New Orleans area in Hospital Affiliates. 26 1 Moreover, a recent
systematic study of geographic markets is consistent with the view that the
metropolitan area should be the size of a typical market for secondary care
Roanoke, Virginia, to include surrounding counties based on patient flow statistics), appealfiled, No.
89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989).
255. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip. op. at 62-63, appealfiled.
256. Id. at 33-38, 65. Patient inmigration statistics should also be discounted if distant patients
are attracted by the opportunity to obtain better care than their local hospitals would provide.
Werden, Patient M'igration, supra note 243.
257.
1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51.
258. United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,721, at 77,853
(E.D. La. 1980) (geographic market of New Orleans and surrounding areas); American Medicorp. v.
Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1977). However, the court in Hospital Affiliates
supported its decision based upon the location of most psychiatrist's offices and patient flow
statistics. Hospital Affiliates, at 77,852-53.
259. See Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 471; but see Schramm & Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market
Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hisrchman Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869, 873 (1984).
260. See Rule, supra note 115, at 127 ("In most cases the geographic market [for hospital services]
will be highly localized."); cf. United States v. National Medical Enter., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,640 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (Modesto area geographic market, roughly one county) (consent
judgement). Courts defining geographic markets in non-merger antitrust cases involving hospital
services have defined markets of similar small size. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984) (New Orleans metropolitan area); Seidenstein v. National Medical Enter., 769 F.2d
1100, 1106 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (city of El Paso); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d Cir.
1984) (most of York County, Pennsylvania), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); but see Robinson v.
Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (16-county geographic market in three states
surrounding Pittsburgh), aft'd, 688 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
261. See also Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 32-68 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1989) (three-county
area around Rockford, Illinois with roughly a 30-mile radius), appealfiled; but cf Carilion, 707 F. Supp.
840, 847-48 (W.D. Va. 1989) (19-county market around Roanoke, Virginia, for primary and
secondary services with roughly a 50-mile radius; much larger market for tertiary care services),
appealfiled, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989).
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services in urban regions, although its authors interpret the results as
demonstrating that geographic markets are broader than Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). 26 2 This study also suggests that the
2 63
typical rural market might have a radius no larger than fifty miles.
The delineation of geographic markets is likely to be contested because
the hospital industry is often highly concentrated within SMSA's, while not
concentrated within broader regions.2 64 In consequence, geographic market
definition can be expected to determine the outcome of many hospital merger
cases.

262. Morrisey, Sloan & Valvona, supra note 246, at 175-88. This study of hospital concentration
in Birmingham, Omaha, Philadelphia, and Phoenix found that residents of each SMSA seldom left
their metropolitan area for inpatient care. In three of these cities many treated cases came from
outside the SMSA, so a strict application of the Elzinga-Hogarty approach to geographic market
definition would require expanding the market beyond the SMSA. (For Philadephia, patient inflows
were more limited.)
However, some urban hospitals likely provide better care than most or all rural hospitals in these
regions, and thus likely offer a superior product. For example, of the 44 hospitals in a broadly
defined Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, eleven were rated of superior quality by one consumer
group (and five could not be rated).

HospitaLs, 6 WASHINGTON CONSUMERS' CHECKBOOK 13, 20-21

(1987). All but one of the I I high quality hospitals were within Washington's city limits or its closein suburbs. (The exception, Johns Hopkins, is a tertiary care provider in Baltimore.) Five out of 14
hospitals within city limits were rated top quality, while only two hospitals were found high quality of
the II rated for the Virginia suburbs. This evidence suggests that even if the flow of rural patients
into urban hospitals is large, these patients are among those likely to have the most inelastic demand
for urban care. Cf Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip. op. at A30 (N.D. I1. Feb. 23, 1989) (finding of fact
120) (most patients who travel to Rockford, Illinois, hospitals from out of town come "to receive
services that are not available at the hospitals closest to them" or "because they believe that the
Rockford hospitals provide higher quality."), appealfiled.
Under these circumstances, geographic markets for urban hospitals will be more narrow than the
area from which patients are drawn. See generally Werden, Patient MIigration, supra note 243. Hence,
the more narrow area of patient outflows is likely to provide a better indicator of geographic market
bounds than the area of patient inflow. But cf. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip. op. at 54-55 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 23, 1989) (LIFO statistic is greater than LOFI in narrow geographic market), appeal filed.
Although the authors attempt to control for this difficulty with a measure of case complexity, their
measure at best controls for whether rural patients are obtaining specialized tertiary care services in
urban areas, and not for the relative quality of urban versus rural hospital care.
263. Morissey, Sloan & Valvona, supra note 246, at 190-91. Based on evidence from patient flows
in rural Nebraska counties, the authors conclude that typical markets extend six counties, generally
reaching to include the nearest urban area. As the typical Nebraska county with one or two hospitals
has no more than 1000 square miles, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND
CITY DATA BOOK 340, 342, 354, 356 (1983), a four- to nine-county region might have a radius of 35
to 55 miles. If local hospitals do not offer close substitutes for more specialized care available in
urban areas, then these aggregate statistics suggest that rural markets may be smaller than six
counties for primary care.
Similarly sized markets defined by patient flows were found in a recent study of hospital markets
in the six New England states. Wennberg & Gittelson, Variations in Medical Care among Small Areas, 246
SCI. AM., Apr. 1982, at 120. Wennberg and Gittelson identify 193 hospitals areas in these states as
regions "whose residents were most likely to go to a particular community to be treated." The
typical market area defined for Vermont, a largely rural state, has a radius of less than 50 miles. A
companion study of Iowa identified over 100 markets. Wennberg, Dealing With Medical Practice
Vanations: A Proposalfor Action, HEALTH AFFS., Summer 1984, at 6, 16.
264. See infra note 285 and accompanying text. Cf Werden, Patient 1igration, supra note 243, at
note 13 (hospital mergers in small cities far from large cities raise the greatest competitive concern).
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Concentration Measures
Courts and antitrust enforcers

compute market shares in order to

determine concentration and the increase in concentration resulting from a
merger in a relevant market. When concentration rises, collusion becomes
more likely because the fewer the number of firms, the easier it is for them to

coordinate a reduction in industry output and to monitor and police
cheating. 2 65

Thus, a high level of concentration

2 66
presumption of anticompetitive effect.

creates

a rebuttable

The available data often do not permit government enforcers and courts
to choose the units in which concentration is measured.2 67 When a choice of
units is possible, it is usually between an output measure and a capacity
measure. 26 8 For example, in an acute inpatient hospital care product cluster

market, the number of hospital beds available is a measure of hospital capacity
while the number of patient days or total patient revenues measures hospital
output.269

The DOJ Guidelines suggest that when a choice can be made, output
measure should be used to compute concentration for markets involving

differentiated products, while capacity measured should be employed to
compute concentration for markets involving homogeneous goods. 270 In the
recent hospital merger decisions, however, neither the Federal Trade
Commission nor the courts have discovered significant practical difference
among the various measures for determing the competitive significance of
hospitals within acute care inpatient cluster markets. 27' If instead individual
services constitute product markets, it is likely that the number of patients, an

265. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text. Adjustments to the inferences of market
power derived from market shares are considered infra notes 286-336 and accompanying text
(facilitating factors).
266. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (presumption rebutted
by non-market share evidence); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
267. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.4.
268. See generally HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 153-161.
269. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 487 (1985), afftd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987).
270. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.4. Firm capacity measures the competitive
significance of producers of homogeneous goods because each firm can readily expand production to
the limits of capacity. However, when goods are differentiated, firms may be unable to increase sales
even if additional units can be produced at low marginal cost. In this case, firm output rather than
capacity is likely the better measure of competitive significance. This adjustment is rough at best.
Other ways of taking into account the significance of product differentiation are discussed supro notes
133-35 and accompanying text (direct competition). The role of excess capacity as a factor
frustrating collusion is considered infra note 319 and accompanying text, and its role as a barrier to
entry is considered infra note 302 and accompanying text.
271. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 487 (beds, inpatient days, and patient revenues);
American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 201 & n. 1 (1984) (inpatient days and revenues); United States
v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,721 (E.D. La. 1981) (beds and
patient days); Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 72-73 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 23, 1989) (beds, inpatient
admissions, and inpatient days), appealfiled.
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output measure, will be the only information available from which to estimate
2 72

market shares.
Hospital management contracts raise a question for the calculation of
market shares: Should separately owned hospitals managed by the same firm
be aggregated in the market share calculation? In HospitalCorp. of America, the
FTC treated commonly managed hospitals as an aggregate entity in
determining firm market shares. The Commission recognized that commonly
managed firms have a reduced incentive to compete independently and thus
have an increased incentive to coordinate output reductions and price
increases. 27 3 This argument would seem equally applicable to contracts
2 74
among nonprofit hospitals.
The DOJ Guidelines measure concentration in the relevant market with
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), derived by summing the square of
firm market shares. 2 7 5 The Department of Justice has attempted to create
bright line standards to identify concentration levels and increases which
create a dangerous likelihood of collusion. In particular, the Justice
Department is likely to challenge acquisitions which lead to post-merger
HHI's above 1800 if the HHI increase exceeds 50, or acquisitions which lead
to post-merger HHI's above 1000 if the HHI increase exceeds 100.276
Courts use similar standards to evaluate the anticompetitive significance of
market concentration, whether those standards are expressed in terms of
HHI's or four-firm concentration ratios. 27 7 In American Medical International
272. See Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 884-86 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (market shares based
on number of adult open heart surgery patients) (monopolization claim), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
273. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 476-78 & 477 n.13. After finding a violation of the
antitrust laws in this case, the FTC ordered a curative divestiture of a hospital management contract
as well as the divestiture of two hospitals. Id. at 521. See Bresnahan & Salop, Quantifying the
Competitive Effects of ProductionJoint Ientures, 4 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 155 (1986); cf. Rockford, No. 88-C20186, slip op. at 73 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1989) (calculating concentration both taking into account and
not taking into account affiliation by management contract and through common ownership by a
religious order), appealfiled.
274. Nonprofit firms with common managements are unlikely to have different objectives. See
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
275.

1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.1.

276. Id. § 3.11. However, in the second term of the Reagan Administration the Department of
Justice has effectively raised the 1000 threshold to at least 1600. Baxter, Counseling Your Client on
Monopolization, Mergers and Joint Ventures, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 321, 328 (1986); cf. Krattenmatter &
Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 226-27 (1988).
Acquisitons are also likely to be challenged if they satisfy the "leading firm proviso" of the DOJ
Guidelines, which frowns upon the acquisition of a 1% competitor by any firm with a 35% or greater
market share.

1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.12.

The empirical evidence connecting concentration with collusion is ambiguous, and the critical
concentration levels selected for increased antitrust scrutiny appear influenced at least as much by
precedent and a desire for a bright line standard as by economic learning. Cf HORIZONTAL MERGERS,
supra note 35, at 182-89 (reviewing economic studies). However, it is difficult to suggest any
generally applicable superior alternative to relying on concentration as an indicator of collusive
potential, and the critical concentration levels currently employed are not implausible. But cf
Bresnahan, supra note 47 (surveying new empirical techniques for measuring market power).
277. The Federal Trade Commission measured concentration in Hospital Corp. of Am. using three
statistics: the two-firm concentration ratio, the four-firm concentration ratio, and the HHI. Hospital
Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 487-89. In most cases, all measures of concentration will lead to similar
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the Federal Trade Commission proscribed a merger which raised the HHI
from 3818 to 6025.278 The FTC found a violation of Clayton Act section 7
when the HHI rose approximately 400 points to exceed 2400 in the
acquisitions considered in Hospital Corp. of America. 2 79 A federal court has
prohibited a hospital merger that raised the HHI from the 2,500 to 3,000
28 0
range to the 4,600 to 5,600 range.
By these standards, hospital markets generally appear concentrated if the
typical geographic market is a metropolitan area. 2 8' One study computed
HHI statistics by hospital diagnosis, 28 2 for the Columbia, South Carolina,
metropolitan area (SMSA), and for Orangeburg County, a rural region with
one general hospital. 2 83 In both cases, HHI's typically exceeded 2000.284

Another study computed concentration levels for 336 urban areas. It found
that the vast majority of HHI statistics exceeded 1800 if the geographic
markets were metropolitan areas. 28 5 In combination with the high reported
concentration levels in the extant sample of hospital merger antitrust cases,
these results suggest that many if not most hospital mergers will be subject to
a high level of scrutiny by the courts and antitrust enforcers.

conclusions for a given relevant market. See HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 35, at 181-82; see
generally id. at 175-201.
278. American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. at 201. In a narrower geographic market, the HHI
increased from 4,370 to 7,775. With market shares based on revenues rather than inpatient days, the
increase in the HHI was from 3,518 to 5,507 in one geographic market, and from 3,996 to 7,097 in
the other. Id. at 201 n.12.
279. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 487-88.
280. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 73 (N.D. Il. Feb. 23, 1989), appealfiled.
281. Cf Rule, supra note 105, at 127-28 (hospital markets in towns and smaller cities typically
have HHI's exceeding 1800, while HHI's below 1800 may be observed in large metropolitan areas).
A similar conclusion arises from reviewing market concentration in non-merger antitrust cases
involving hospitals. In Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (refusal to
deal and monopolization claims), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982), the
court found that six hospitals offered adult heart surgery in the Pittsburgh area. The HHI for this
market must equal or exceed 1667, as that is the HHI for six identically sized firms. Five hospitals
offered invasive cardiology services in the El Paso market, implying an HHI of at least 2000.
Seidenstein v. Nat'l Medical Enter., Inc., 769 F.2d 1100, 1106 (5th Cir. 1985) (monopolization
claim). However, over 20 hospitals in the New Orleans area offer the anesthesiology services at issue
in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984).
282. Over 20 diagnoses were studied, including obstetrics and surgical procedures for
opthalmology, vascular/cardiac, hernia repair, orthopedic, plastic surgery, urological, nervous
system, and procto-surgery.
283. Wilder & Jacobs, Antitrust Considerations for Hospital Mergers: Market Definition and Market
Concentration, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. 245 (1987).
284. This study should be treated with caution, however. It is difficult to be confident that these
statistics correctly represent the concentration ratios that will be found in markets for most hospital
services. It is also uncertain whether these regions are representative of hospital concentration in
most localities; whether the areas studied constitute geographic markets; and whether hospitals lack
production flexibility among the various procedures (so that each diagnosis identifies a product
market). See Frech, Comments on Antitrust Issues, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. AND HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 263, 266 (1987).
285. Morissey, Sloan & Valvona, supra note 246, at 186. However, in three out of four SMSA's
chosen for closer study, the HHI fell below 1800 if the geographic market was broadened beyond the
metropolitan area. Id. The appropriate geographic market is discussed supra note 262.
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Factors Facilitating or Frustrating Collusion

In the DOJ Guidelines merger analysis, the inference about likelihood of
collusion in the relevant market obtained from concentration statistics is
adjusted based on an examination of entry conditions and other factors
affecting the ability of the firms to collude. These factors may be sufficient to
rebut the inference of anticompetitive effect created by a high degree of
286
concentration.
28 7

Entry Conditions
Along with the courts, 2 88 the DOJ Guidelines recognize that no proposed
market has antitrust significance if entry is easy. 28 9 In a market without entry
barriers,2 9 0 any price rise undertaken by a firm or group of firms would
immediately be competed away by a new entrant into the industry. Even if
limited entry difficulties exist, the threat of entry may nevertheless be
1.

286. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (concentration creates a
rebuttable presumption of anticompetitive effect).
287. The term "entry" in the DOJ Guidelines refers to one form of new competition that may
discipline incumbent firms from exercising market power. Other forms of new competition are also
recognized in antitrust analysis. Production flexibility (supply substitutabilty) is taken into account in
market definition: The relevant market is broadened when production substitution is likely to occur
within one year. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 2.21. Production substitution requiring
significant modification of existing facilities, so likely to occur within two years, is treated as entry
along with the construction of new facilities. Id. § 3.3. The ability of incumbent firms to expand at
low marginal cost is taken into account in defining market shares, see id. § 2.4, and for small
incumbent firms is considered an independent factor frustrating collusion, id. § 3.43.
288. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); Echlin Mfg. Co., 105
F.T.C. 410 (1985); United States v. Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985).
289. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.3. The Justice Department may require that
potential defendants satisfy a higher evidentiary burden in demonstrating ease of entry than the
courts require. Compare Rule, Mlerger Enforcement Polic': Protecting the Consumer (Remarks of Charles
Rule Before the 1987 National Institute of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
(October 9, 1987)), reprinted in 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 745 (1988), with United States v. Waste
Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
A market characterized by "ease of entry" in the antitrust literature is termed "contestable" in the
economics literature. See generally W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

(1962); Baumol & Willig, Contestability: Developments Since the Book, in STRATEGIC
(D. Morris, P. Sinclair, M. Slater &J. Vickers eds. 1986).

BEHAVIOUR AND INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION

In such a market, even a single firm would be incapable of raising price to supracompetitive levels for
an instant because that price increase would attract hit and run entry. An entrant would find it
profitable to enter if prices were even slightly above competitive levels, and would compete just long
enough to drive prices back down to their competitive level before exiting. For a market to be
contestable, either entrants must bear no sunk costs (costs unrecoverable upon exit) or incumbent
producers who are charging a supracompetitive price must be unable to increase output in response
to entry for long enough to allow the entrant to recover its sunk costs through prices above entrant
marginal cost. Farrell, How Effective is Potential Competition, 9 ECON. LETTERS 67 (1986); Schwartz &
Reynolds, Contestable Markets: An Uprisingin the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
488 (1983); see Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 883; see generally Spence, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review

Article, 21 J.

ECON. LITERATURE

981 (1983).

290. Entry is relevant to merger analysis insofar as the prospect of new competition deters
incumbent producers from anticompetitive actions. Thus, whether entry difficulties are classified as
Stiglerian "barriers" or as "impediments" has little practical consequence for merger review. See
Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 485-87. In this article the term "entry barriers" encompasses both Stiglerian
barriers and impediments. The Department ofJustice similarly accepts a definition of entry barriers
broader than Professor Stigler's. Rule, supra note 289, at 749-50.
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sufficient to create an effective deterrent to anticompetitive behavior. The
DOJ Guidelines treat the possibility of entry as too remote to discipline the
anticompetitive behavior of incumbent firms if entry will take more than two
years.

29 I

One entry barrier into providing medical services is created by the
regulatory process. Certificate-of-need ("CON") legislation, intended to limit
the tendency of hospitals serving insured patients to over-provide medical
care, 292 has an unintended by-product: it makes new competition more
difficult. 29 3 In states where they are required, CON proceedings impose both

barriers to entry and impediments to expansion by incumbent producers. 29 4
Under most state rules, de novo entry into the hospital industry or a major
expansion by an incumbent competitor must be approved by the local CON
board. Examples from the states show that this process can easily take at least
two years, and thus create an entry barrier under the DOJ Guidelines
definitions. 29 5 The empirical economic evidence on the effect of CON laws is
also consistent with the conclusion that they make entry difficult. 29 6 This
291. The longer it will take before entry can compete away the exercise of market power, the
more likely is an incumbent firm to exercise that power rather than be deterred from doing so. The
DOJ Guidelines in effect presume that the prospect of entry within two years will deter the exercise
of market power by incumbent firms. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.3. Although the
period within which entry must occur to have this effect depends on a variety of factors including the
potential gains from collusion, the real rate of interest, and the extent of entrant cost disadvantages,
the two year horizon of the DOJ Guidelines appears to represent a reasonable rule of thumb.
292. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
293. Under the capture theory of regulation, this by-product is not unintended. Cf Miller,
Antitrust and Certificate of iVeed: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 GEO. L.
REV. 873 (1980) (recommending statutory interpretation to limit possibility of capture).
294. See generally Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 489-96 (1985) (Georgia and Tennessee
CON laws make speedy entry impossible), aft'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 201 (1984) (California's CON
procedure created "very high" barriers to entry).
295. The Federal Trade Commission found that the Tennessee CON process takes at minimum
several months. If opposed by a competitor, as may often occur following a merger, the process may
require several years even for a CON application that is ultimately approved. Administrative appeals
and judicial review can add additional years to the process. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 492.
Similarly, in the late 1970's, once the state of Massachusetts began applying its CON laws in more
than a pro forma manner, CON approval for major hospital bed projects took more than three years
for a sample of hospitals. Howell, Evaluating the Impact of Certificate-Of-Need Regulation Using Measures of
Ultimate Outcome: Some Cautionsfrom the Experience in ilassachusetts, 19 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 587, 607
(1984). Further, if state CON boards are "captured" by the incumbent hospitals, procompetitive
entry and expansion could run a substantial risk of failing to obtain regulatory approval. See Miller,
supra note 293, at 873; cf. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 573, 602 n.9 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (plaintiff claimed that a competing hospital acted to delay or prevent issuance of plaintiff's
CON).
296. CON laws appear to raise both hospital prices and hospital expenses. M. NOETHER, supra
note 25, at 38, 74, 77. This evidence suggests that entry barriers are raised, but that the hospitals
studied dissipated their potential monopoly profits through expensive quality competition.
Furthermore, using nationwide data from 1977 and 1978, Noether found that prices rose roughly
over 4% on average in response to CON laws, just under the 5% level suggested as a deterrent to
entry by the DOJ Guidelines. This average level is consistent with the view that CON laws form a
high entry barrier in some states. Cf Howell, supra note 295, at 587, 607 (differential enforcement of
same laws over time in Massachusetts); see Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 494 (terming empirical
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barrier appears to be declining in significance over time, however, as states
29 7
repeal their CON laws.

Even absent CON requirements, entry into the hospital industry may be
difficult. For many hospital services, the technological requirements of
modern medical care demand buildings constructed or extensively remodeled
to unusual specifications, including wide corridors and doorways, large
elevators, strongly supported flooring, and extensive plumbing. In
consequence, even without need for CON approval, once a decision is made
to construct a new hospital building, planning may require two to six years,
and construction may require an additional two to three years. 298 Thus, de
novo entry is unlikely to occur within the two years suggested by the DOJ
Guidelines as an indicator of the significance of new entry. Moreover, a new
hospital may be unable to achieve minimum efficient scale quickly, and thus
may be unwilling to enter even if colluding hospitals raise prices above
299
competitive levels.

These entry difficulties are less important to the extent it is easy to create
new institutions offering some medical services in competition with hospitals,
30 0
such as free standing emergency centers and ambulatory care centers.
Under such circumstances, the prospect of entry may significantly limit the
possibility of anticompetitive conduct in the market for some medical services,
while offering no restraint in other product markets.
In the current hospital environment, in which hospital occupancy rates
have fallen dramatically in response to the introduction of reimbursement
caps, 30 1 excess capacity may strongly deter new hospital entry in many
geographic markets even if incumbent hospitals raise price substantially.
Excess capacity will deter entry if it suggests to prospective entrants that the
marketplace will be very competitive following entry, with little profit
30 2
opportunity.
studies surveyed "ambiguous"). Evidence on the effect of CON laws in reducing health care costs is
discussed supra note 22.
Other evidence of the effect of CON laws in limiting new competition comes from the states
where CON barriers were recently removed. "In at least two states, a surge in notices of intent to
build [followed] . . . abolition of the entry program." M. NOETHER, supra note 25, at 37.
297. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
298. Howell, supra note 295, at 587, 601 n.22.
299. See generally Salop, MVIeasuring Ease of Entry, supra note 47. Government enforcers also
consider scale economies an entry barrier into hospital markets. Winslow, supra note 103; Rule, supra
note 115, at 128; see infra notes 346-47 and accompanying text (scale economies in the hospital
industry).
300. These institutions may need time to develop a reputation among patients (or doctors, acting
as patient agents) for reliable health care, however, and thus may not be able to expand output
quickly to compete away incumbent hospital market power. Further, they may not be able to achieve
minimum efficient scale quickly, and thus may be unwilling to enter unless colluding hospitals raise
price far above competitive levels. See generally Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, supra note 47.
301. See supra note 28.
302. Any credible threat of post-entry competition can deter entry. Salop, Strategic Entry
Deterrence, supra note 47.
Excess capacity is double-edged in antitrust analysis, however. Although it may deter new entry,
it may also make collusion difficult by encouraging cheating on a cartel. See infra note 319 and
accompanying text.
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In its recent hospital merger cases, the Federal Trade Commission readily
found high entry barriers based on state certificate-of-need processes. 30 3 It
was not required to investigate whether barriers would have been high in the
absence of certificates of need.3 0 4 Furthermore, because it defined product
markets based on a cluster analysis, the Commission did not investigate the
entry difficulties facing providers of some but not all services in the cluster.
These issues will likely be contested in future hospital merger litigation as
more states repeal certificate-of-need laws.
2.

Other Factors
In evaluating the significance of concentration as a predictor of
anticompetitive actions, the courts and the DOJ Guidelines take into account a
variety of factors in addition to concentration and entry that affect the ease
and profitability of collusion.3 0 5 Factors facilitating or frustrating collusion
generally influence cartel decisions through one or more of three
mechanisms. First, some factors alter the potential profits from collusion, by
affecting cartel revenues or by affecting the costs of cooperative action.
Second, some factors influence the ease of interfirm coordination, altering the
ability of potential cartel members to agree on the cartel price and the
allocation of cartel production among firms. Finally, some factors affect the
ability of cartel members to police their arrangement by monitoring rival
prices and outputs for compliance with the cartel agreement, and by
punishing rival deviations from that agreement. The remainder of this
section will discuss several such factors that might arise in antitrust litigation
in the hospital industry, but will not attempt to create an exhaustive list.306
303. See supra note 295; accord Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 77-80 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1989),
appealfiled.
304. Cf Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 80 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 23, 1989) (a shrinking market
would deter entrants from building new capacity even if CON regulation did not exist) (not analyzing
whether this deterrent would be overcome if incumbent firms colluded to raise price), appealfiled;
Carillon, 707 F. Supp. 840, 843-44, 845 (W.D. Va. 1989) (expansion of existing hospitals is not
difficult because of current excess capacity and the likely removal of state limitations on hospital
beds), appealfiled, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir. 1989).
305. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.4 (1986); B.F. Goodrich Co., 1988 Trade Reg.
Reports (CCH) 22,519 (F.T.C. 1988); see generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 169-227 (2d ed. 1980) (cataloguing factors facilitating and limiting
oligopolistic coordination); R. CLARKE, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 56-63 (1985) (same); HORIZONTAL
MERGERS, supra note 35, at 171-72 (collecting cases), 201-263 (cataloguing factors); Salop, Practices
that (Credibly) FacilitateOligopolistic Co-Ordination, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET
STRUCTURE (J. Stigliz & G. Mathewson eds. 1986) (price protection provisions as facilitating
practices).
306. Four structural factors facilitating or frustrating collusion that are not discussed in the
remainder of this section will be briefly mentioned here. First, if seller cost functions differ
substantially across firms, coordination of the colluding industry's output reduction may be difficult
because simple rules (such as holding constant market share) may mean that some disfavored firms
will gain little from the cooperative agreement. This factor might make it difficult for hospitals to
collude with outpatient clinics. Hospitals may have high fixed costs and low marginal costs, while
clinics may have low fixed costs but higher marginal costs for providing the same services. Under
these circumstances, a perfectly coordinated cartel would obtain a higher price by reducing clinic
output rather than hospital output, and the clinics would share in the anticompetitive gains through a
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a. Market demand elasticity. The incentives of firms to collude are small if
the market demand curve is elastic because the potential monopoly profits are
limited. Thus, hospitals are more likely to collude to raise the price of services
patients are unable to do without and less likely to collude to raise the price of
30 7
elective services.
b. Service homogeneity or heterogeneity. Collusion is generally more difficult
when sellers produce heterogeneous products than when they produce
undifferentiated goods, because coordination becomes more complex and
cheating is more difficult to police.3 0 8 In Hospital Corp. of America, the
defendant hospitals unsuccessfully argued that the need for hospital
administrators to coordinate prices across a large number of services made
collusion unlikely, regardless of concentration. 30 9 This argument is stronger
when the product market is defined as a cluster of services, as it was in Hospital
3 10
Corp. of America, than when individual services comprise relevant products.
Furthermore, the prospective payment system in operation for Medicare
provides hospitals with a well-defined classification of services over which to
collude. In consequence, product heterogeneity will be unlikely to rescue
defendant hospitals from the anticompetitive inferences created by high
concentration.
side payment from hospitals. However, a tacit cartel may find it difficult to work out such a complex
agreement.
Second, if transactions are open to the view of rival firms, collusion is more likely than if
transactions are secret, because rivals cannot easily monitor secret purchases. This factor is no
deterrent to hospital collusion. It would be prohibitively expensive for hospitals to undertake
numerous secret negotiations with patients and hospital negotiations with government owned or
regulated insurers cannot be kept from public knowledge.
Third, if hospitals in a region have a history of cooperation, future cartel coordination may be
facilitated. Finally, frequent and substantial instability in market prices and market output may
suggest that industry demand or supply is unstable. Collusion is less likely under this circumstance
because frequent recoordination among cartel members may be necessary and cheating may be
difficult to detect.
307. Cf 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.412 (significance of degree of difference
between the products and locations in the market and the next-best substitutes).
308. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.411. The DOJ Guidelines state that this factor
will rarely be taken into account because heterogeneity is difficult to measure. In practice, the
enforcement agencies appear to give this factor somewhat more weight than the DOJ Guidelines
suggest. But cf supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (profitability of pairwise collusion
increases with differentiation).
309. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 506-508 (1985), afftd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987).
310. Quality of care may differ across hospitals providing the same service, and thus form a basis
for product differentiation among hospitals. See Hospitals, 6 WASHINGTON CONSUMERS' CHECKBOOK
13 (1987) (large quality differentials among hospitals in one metropolitan area). A cartel recognizing
this must allow hospitals with a reputation for offering superior care to charge more for each service
than is charged by other cartel members, by an amount reflecting the quality differential, in order to
preserve identical prices in quality adjusted units. This will not unduly complicate the cartel
coordination task when pre-cartel prices reflect the necessary differential.
A cartel among sellers offering products of differing quality must also police cheating on the
collusive arrangement that takes the form of raising perceived service quality. See supra note 31
(quality competition). Although most ways of raising hospital service quality are time-consuming,
involving improved facilities and staff, hospital cartels presumably must agree to limit advertising, as
this activity could allow hospitals to increase consumer quality perceptions more rapidly.
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c. Role of nonprofits. Under some circumstances, the presence of
nonprofit sellers in a market may make collusion unlikely. For example, if a
seller cooperative maximizes sales rather than profits, it has no incentive to
participate in a collusive agreement. 3 1' Indeed, if it has excess capacity and
the product is homogeneous, such a cooperative will likely undercut any cartel
formed by its competitors. 31 2 In practice, however, the nonprofit hospitals
studied have behaved like for-profit hospitals. 3 13 Hence, the presence of
nonprofit hospitals in a market should rarely (if ever) mitigate an inference of
3 14
market power obtained from market shares.
d. Large buyers. Any seller wishing to cheat on a seller cartel can quickly
and secretly achieve a large increase in output by contracting with a large
buyer. As a result, the presence of large buyers can make a seller's cartel
impossible to police. In addition, a large buyer may be more likely to
recognize when sellers have colluded and act aggressively to encourage some
3 15
sellers to cheat.
In Hospital Corp. of America, the Federal Trade Commission found that the
presence of Blue Cross, a large buyer of hospital services in the Chattanooga
market, did not materially affect the FTC's inferences of collusion derived
from market shares.3 16 The FTC argued that Blue Cross had no particular
ability to detect seller collusion relative to any other insurer, and, most
tellingly, that the insurer had no ability to shift patients to non-colluding
hospitals in the event a hospital wished to cheat on the seller's cartel.3 17 In
other geographic markets, however, it is possible that a large HMO with the
ability to shift a great number of patients away from a colluding hospital
would be able to deter collusion among hospitals.
e. Excess capacity. Firms with excess capacity have strong incentives to
compete away high prices, because they are able to increase output at low
marginal cost. Hospital industry over capacity, presently common, 3 18 may
311. Proving that the cooperative would sacrifice profits for sales may be difficult. At a minimum,
it must be demonstrated that both the cooperative and its members would be incapable of
withholding goods from the marketplace. This may be the case for cooperatives selling agricultural
products likely to spoil.
Similarly, because public hospitals have missions of community service and charitable care, it is
possible although unlikely that they will be managed in ways that limit their incentive to collude.
312. However, a multiproduct seller cooperative may have an incentive to raise price above
marginal cost for inelastically demanded products in order to expand output of elastically demanded
products through below-cost pricing of these goods. Lynk, supra note 156, at 68.
313. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 502-04; Pauly, Nonprofit Firms in Medical Markets, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 257 (Papers & Proceedings 1987).
314. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 84-93 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1989), appeal filed; but see
Carilion, 707 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989) (nonprofit hospital's board of directors, composed of
business leaders, will ensure that cost savings are passed on to consumers), appealfiled, No. 89-2625
(4th Cir. 1989).
315. See Scheffman & Spiller, Buyers and Entry Barriers, working paper no. 154 (F.T.C. Aug. 1987).
316. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 508-10.
317. Cf Staten, Dunkelberg & Umbeck, Market Share and the Illusion of Power, 6J. HEALTH ECON. 43
(1987) (Blue Cross is unable to force hospitals to discount rates in Indiana).
318. See supra note 27.
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therefore operate to reduce the likelihood of collusion inferred from market
concentration. 31 9 Moreover, persistent excess capacity in a stagnant or
declining market may make plausible a claim of financial weakness of the
3 20
merging parties.
f
Product complementarity. Although a theoretical case can be made for
the effects of strong complementarity in frustrating some types of hospital
collusion, in most cases these effects will not be large. Therefore, antitrust
enforcers and courts should not give these effects much weight in the review
of hospital mergers absent a careful cost or demand study quantifying them.
A brief review of the relevant considerations relying on the earlier analysis of
the role of complementarity in product market definition is set forth below.
If several goods or services are strong supply complements, firms will
profit more by colluding over the provision of all than in the provision ofjust
one. But if collusion is difficult or impossible in the market for some joint
products, for example if another technology allows single product sellers to
compete successfully in that market, then the multiproduct producer of
supply complements likely has a reduced incentive to collude in the other
joint products. This qualification is unlikely to be significant, however, unless
the products are strong supply complements. Even if complementarity makes
a cartel concerning some but not all joint products less profitable, it is unlikely
to make collusion unprofitable. 3 2' Thus, if a cartel can be expected to cover
some but not all of the complementary goods or services, strong supply
complementarity should be treated as a factor slightly reducing the incentive
of firms to collude. In the hospital context, this issue may arise if outpatient
clinics compete with hospitals in markets for some types of primary care, so
long as inpatient hospital care has scope economies for the provision of those
322
types of primary care.

Strong complementarity in demand may complicate the coordination task
of a cartel among the sellers of some but not all such goods because the single
product sellers will desire a higher cartel price than the multiproduct
sellers. 323 This divergence of interest is the most difficult to reconcile when
the goods are strong complements and when multiproduct producers have
substantially more sales revenues coming from the complementary good than
from the cartelized product. 324 In such a case, demand complementarity
would provide a strong force frustrating collusion. However, with the
possible exception of simple surgery and inpatient care, health care services
that are demand complements are typically performed by the identical firms,
319. However, excess capacity may also operate as an entry barrier, making collusion more likely.
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
320. See infra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
322. But see supra note 175 (hospital scope economies may not exist).
323. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
324. This situation is the most likely to occur in the context of vertical integration. See supra note
195.
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namely hospitals. While demand complementarity may reduce a hospital's
incentive to collude with outpatient surgical clinics over the price of simple
surgical services, this force is unlikely to affect the hospital's incentive to
3 25
collude with rival hospitals in other product markets.
Finally, firms may need to collude over strong transactions complements
in order to reduce the ability of rivals to cheat.3 2 6 If collusion concerns some
but not all transactions complements, it may be frustrated. Although most
hospital services may be transactions complements, it is difficult to gauge the
strength of this complementarity. Furthermore, to the extent patient charges
are quoted based on diagnostic categories, as under Medicare reimbursement
schemes, 32 7 hospitals have no opportunity to cheat on a cartel concerning one
service, such as coronary bypass surgery, by lowering the price of another
service such as the room charge. Nevertheless, it is possible that transactions
complementarity may frustrate hospital collusion if the cartel is limited to a
small group of services excluding some complements.
g. Opposition of competitors. It is sometimes suggested that when
competitors of the merging firms oppose an acquisition, the transaction is
likely to be procompetitive. According to this theory, firms can be expected
to oppose acquisitions that lower their competitor's costs, and to favor
mergers likely to lead to higher prices through facilitating industry collusion.
Under this view, the fact of opposition by competitors should weigh against
finding an antitrust violation. 32 8 Indeed, this information has probative
weight in the merger enforcement decisions of the Antitrust Division and the
32 9
Federal Trade Commission.
There are two problems associated with making these inferences. First,
the raising rivals' costs literature demonstrates that some forms of
anticompetitive conduct harm rivals. 330 Because competitors may foresee
private harm from anticompetitive mergers, as well as from procompetitive
acquisitions, it is inappropriate to reason that an acquisition opposed by rivals
necessarily creates efficiencies. More importantly, this theory invites a court
or enforcement agency to avoid its responsibility to decide the case on the
evidence because it substitutes a third party's judgment as to competitive
consequences for the decisionmaker's own analysis. While the third party at
issue, a competing seller, is familiar with the industry, a court likely has at
least as much information about the relevant aspects of the industry and the
transaction in question when the record is complete. Similarly, the
325. Presumably, the major restraint on collusion in the provision of simple surgery is ease of
entry by new outpatient surgical clinics, and not this problem with demand complementarity.
326. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
328. Although not strictly speaking a factor facilitating collusion, this consideration is sometimes
treated as a factor tending to weigh against the influence of anticompetitive harm raised by market
concentration. Cf infra note 339 (inferences from the support of customers).
329. This theory has also been influential in shaping the procedural requirement that a private
plaintiff show antitrust injury.
330. See supra note 45.
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enforcement agencies likely know substantially more about both topics than
do rivals after reviewing party responses to a request for additional
information under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. For this reason, courts
reviewing hospital mergers have found no probative value in the identity of
third parties favoring or opposing the transaction.3 3i
3.

Applying FacilitatingFactors to Hospital Mergers
In its Hospital Corp. of America decision the Federal Trade Commission
recognized the influence of several factors facilitating or frustrating hospital
collusion, including some not discussed above. The FTC concluded that the
low elasticity of demand for hospital services raised the incentives of firms
within the relevant market to collude, making collusion more likely.3 3 2 The

Commission also noted that the inability of hospital patients to resell hospital
services could help hospitals collude to raise prices for readily identifiable
groups of consumers, such as the patients reimbursed by one insurance
company. 33 3 The Commission further relied upon hospital industry traditions
of limited price competition and cooperative problem solving through
voluntary health planning, as well as a past history of collusion and a pattern
of information exchange among the hospitals at issue, as factors facilitating
33 4
collusion.
The FTC rejected defendant's arguments that a variety of structural
factors which might frustrate hospital collusion were significant on the facts of
the case. These included a history of hospital competition; service
heterogeneity; the alleged likely procompetitive behavior of nonprofit
hospitals; the instability of demand and supply; and the presence of a larger
335
insurer as a major customer.
E.

Defenses

Two factors mitigating the possible competitive harm from an acquisition
are treated as defenses: the creation of efficiencies, and the acquired firm's
financial condition. 336 Both defenses are strictly construed, and thus are
rarely successful.
331. Hospital Coyp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1392 (competitor's opposition to acquisition is just one
firm's opinion not shared by the court); Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 93-94 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
1989) (rival may fear merged entity will act to raise rival's costs), appealfiled.
332. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 499 (1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987).
333. Id. at 500. This factor reduces coordination difficulties for cartel members.
334. Id. at 500-01.
335. Id. at 501-11.
336. Defendants have been unsuccessful in advancing the view that hospital acquisitions should
be given more relaxed antitrust scrutiny than acquisitions in other industries because of the unique
character and importance of health care. Id. at 512; cf supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text
(Congress did not impliedly repeal application of antitrust laws to health care).
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1. Efficiency Defense
Historically substantial efficiencies, such as a significant reduction in
production costs, would not save an acquisition with potential for collusion.
In three decisions in the 1960's, the Supreme Court refused to consider
possible efficiencies as a defense, on the ground that Congress had proscribed
3 37
increases in concentration regardless of whether consumers might benefit.
In accordance with the modern emphasis on construing antitrust rules to
promote economic efficiency, however, the DOJ Guidelines treat efficiencies
as a relevant consideration in merger enforcement.3 3 8 The DOJ Guidelines
recognize that efficiencies are often easy to allege and difficult to prove, and
therefore require "clear and convincing evidence" as a predicate for
considering them in deciding whether to challenge a merger.3 3 9 Similarly, the
Federal Trade Commission recognizes economic efficiencies as a relevant
factor in assessing the competitive impact of an acquisition, but requires that
they be established by substantial evidence and insists that defendant
demonstrate that the efficiencies could not be achieved within a comparable
period of time through a merger that threatens less competitive harm. 34 0 In
addition, the antitrust enforcement agencies will seek to find ways of
337. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). These
decisions attempted to harmonize political and social goals of antitrust law with economic efficiency
goals. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text (changing goals). As the dominant view of the
1980's emphasizes economic efficiency to the exclusion of other goals, these decisions will likely be
reconsidered by the Court in a future merger case along lines recently suggested by the FTC.
American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 215-20 (1984) (earlier Court statements are dicta; recent Court
emphasis on economic evidence allows consideration of efficiencies); see Muris, The Efficiency Defense
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 409-10 (1980) (Supreme Court has
reserved the question of whether an efficiency gain in the same market as the merger could offset an
anticompetitive outcome in that market). Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (production efficiency gain immunizes cooperative pricing policy
from Sherman Act challenge despite per se prohibition of horizontal price fixing).
338. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.5. However, "no court has yet found the
anticompetitive effects of a merger to be outweighed by countervailing public interest factors." ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 166 n. 146 (2d ed. 1982).
339. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.5.
Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better
integration of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and
similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations
of the merging firms. The Department may also consider claimed efficiencies resulting from
reductions in general selling, administrative, or overhead expenses, or that otherwise do not
relate to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms,
although as a practical matter, these types of efficiencies may be difficult to demonstrate.
Id. But cf. Rule, supra note 115, at 128 (The DOJ may exercise discretion "not to sue in a case where
the efficiency gains substantially outweigh the competitive harm.").
The enforcement agencies often consider support for an acquisition by customers of the merging
firms (such as health insurers in the case of hospital mergers) as evidence that the transaction
generates cost savings rather than market power. Winslow, supra note 103, at 4-5; Rule, supra note
115, at 128-29. This argument is subject to similar criticisms as were raised in the discussion of the
view that opposition by rivals implies that a transaction is socially beneficial. See supra notes 328-31
and accompanying text.
340. American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. at 218-20.
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structuring the transactions through curative divestitures to preserve
efficiencies while removing likely anticompetitive concerns. 3 4 1
In both of its recent hospital merger cases, the Federal Trade Commission
held that defendants failed to establish substantial efficiencies on the facts.
The merging hospitals in American Medical Internationalpresented a cost study,
but the Commission found the savings to be minimal. 34 2 The alleged
efficiency benefits in Hospital Corp. of America were quickly dismissed because
defendants made no attempt to quantify them. 34 3 Similarly, a recent federal

district court decision rejected allegations that a hospital merger would save
$41 million because the proposed savings were not established by clear and
convincing evidence, the reorganization costs of achieving those savings were
excluded from the calculation, and some of the proposed savings were
achievable by the firms unilaterally, without merger. 34 4 In contrast, another
district court upheld a challenged hospital merger in part because of evidence
that the acquisition would save $40 million through "capital avoidance and
other clinical and administrative efficiencies. ' ' 34 5 Merging hospitals seeking to
claim efficiencies must also overcome the economic literature questioning the
34 6
extent of scale and scope economies resulting from merger.
Government enforcers ignore efficiency claims arising from shared
support services (such as laundry, data processing, or laboratory operations)
or from lower capital costs on the view that these cost savings can be achieved
through joint ventures short of merger. However, the government will
341. For a Department of Justice description of the "fix-it-first" policy, see Remarks Before the
1987 National Institute of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (Oct. 9, 1987),
reprinted in Rule, supra note 289, at 745-46. An FTC description is found in Clark, Merger Investigations
at the Federal Trade Commission: An Insider's View, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 773-77 (1988).
342. The company alleged it would save at most 5.6% per year. Much of the estimated savings
could not be defended, and even if significant cost savings would have occurred, they would not have
been passed on to consumers through lower prices given the nature of industry regulation. American
Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. at 219-20. The merging hospitals also alleged that the acquisition would
improve quality of care, by permitting the acquirer to maintain one of its hospitals as a "first-rate
hospital." The FTC cited with approval the conclusion of its Administrative Law Judge finding this
claim implausible on the record evidence. Id. at 213-15. While an efficiency defense could in
principle be based on increases in quality as well as on reductions in cost, plaintiffs are unlikely to be
able to offer "clear and convincing evidence" that a merger will increase quality of care.
343. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 512-13 (1985), aft'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3746 (1987).
344. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 96, 98-103 (N.D. I11. Feb. 23, 1989), appealfiled.
345. Carilion, 707 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. Va. Feb. 13, 1989), appealfiled, No. 89-2625 (4th Cir.
1989).
346. Lave & Lave, Hospital Cost Functions, 5 AM. REV. PUB. HEALTH 193 (1984) (scale economies
absent); Eakin & Kniesner, Estimating a Non-Minimum Cost Function for Hospitals, 54 S. ECON. J. 583,
593-96 (1988) (typical hospital has overall diseconomies of scale, although many exhibit overall
economies of scale); F. SLOAN & B. STEINWALD, INSURANCE, REGULATION, AND HOSPITAL COSTS 196
(1980) (evidence on scale economies ambiguous); cf Grannemann, Brown, & Pauly, Estimating
Hospital Costs, 5 J. HEALTH EcON. 107 (1986) (finding scale economies in emergency room care but
not in other outpatient care); but see Vitaliano, On the Estimation of Hospital Cost Functions, 6J. HEALTH
ECON. 305 (1987) (scale economies present); Luft, Bunker & Enthoven, Should Operations be
Regionalized?, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1364 (1979) (same); Carr & Feldstein, The Relationship of Cost to
Hospital Size, 4 INQUIRY 45 (June 1967) (same); cf supra note 35 (efficiencies arising from
multihospital systems). Further, the limited literature on scope economies suggests they are not
prevalent. See supra note 175.
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investigate a claim that a merger will lower costs through improved use of
fixed assets or the elimination of duplicative services. 34 7 Thus, in two recent
cases the Department of Justice permitted hospital mergers to occur
likely to
unchallenged in concentrated markets when efficiencies appeared 34
8
result and when excess capacity made eventual exit likely otherwise.
Failing Firm Defense
An anticompetitive merger may be allowed if one of the firms is in poor
financial condition in order to preserve the failing firm's assets as a
competitive force and to limit the loss to company shareholders and to the
communities in which the failing firm operates. 3 49 To the extent competitive
pressures lead hospitals to exit from the industry, this defense may become
2.

3 50
important in hospital merger cases.

The failing firm defense is strictly construed to minimize the
anticompetitive danger: The firm must be on the verge of insolvency, the

acquiring company must be the least anticompetitive purchaser available, and
the acquired firm must have made unsuccessful efforts to seek alternative
buyers to preserve its assets in the marketplace while reducing the danger to
competition. 3 5 1 The Department of Justice has suggested that this defense
might apply to permit the merger of the only two hospitals in a market that, as
a result of the introduction of cost-based reimbursement, can only support
one hospital. If, however, an outsider is willing to acquire the purportedly
failing hospital at a price in excess of liquidation value, the outside purchaser
will be preferred. 35 2 The DOJ Guidelines allow a similar defense for a failing
division which might apply to the sale of an unsuccessful hospital from an
347. Rule, supra note 115, at 128; Winslow, supra note 103. The Justice Department apparently
presumes that scale economies are exhausted once a hospital reaches 300 to 600 beds, Rule, supra
note 115, at 128, although it is willing to treat efficiency claims based on scale economies more
generously in hospital merger cases than in most merger investigations for fear that competitive
pressures will lead a failing hospital to provide inadequate care. Id. at 129.
348. Rule, supra note 115, at 129. The influence of firm financial condition on merger analysis is
taken up infra at notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
349. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974); International Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
350. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (exit statistics and competitive pressures); supra text
accompanying note 320 (significance of excess capacity).
351. Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1969); 1984 MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 5.1. One district court rejected the application of the failing firm
defense to a "failing market" where future consolidation was said to be likely to occur but the
acquired firm was not presently unhealthy. Rockford, No. 88-C-20186, slip op. at 96-97 (N.D. I1. Feb.
23, 1989), appealfiled.
An alternative purchaser is less likely to be available in declining or stagnant markets with
persistent excess capacity than in growing markets, but even in the former case the assets may be
preserved in the industry by a purchaser who obtains them for a low liquidation price. It is unclear
whether the Justice Department requires that a seller actively pursue alternative purchases under
such circumstances. Felt & Brooks, Critique of Department ofJustice Review of Mlergers and Other Corporate
Combinations, 21 J. HEALTH AND Hosp. L. 131, 132 (1988).
352. Rule, supra note 115, at 129. The Department of Justice has approved mergers when exit
seems likely and efficiencies will arise. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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otherwise healthy chain. 35 3 Even when the failing firm defense is unavailable,
the enforcement agencies will discount the market shares of weakened
54
competitors in inferring competitive effects from concentration statistics.3

V
CONCLUSION

Antitrust law applies to hospital mergers just as to any other industry. In
the current environment created by changing regulatory mandates and the
resulting growth of competitive pressures, such mergers are occurring with
increasing frequency.
Antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts will likely give hospital
acquisitions careful scrutiny because of several structural characteristics of the
hospital industry. Most importantly, entry barriers are often high and market
concentration within metropolitan areas is likely substantial for many
individual hospital services. Under these circumstances, whether a merger is
enjoined will most likely turn on the extent to which hospitals not presently
offering procedures and services can quickly add them, and the distance
patients will likely travel in response to a hospital price rise. If supply
substitutability will expand the product markets for various concentrated
hospitals services sufficiently, or if urban geographic markets are found to be
significantly broader then metropolitan areas, then concentration may be
reduced to less troublesome levels and hospital mergers may generally avoid
antitrust challenge. In consequence, market definition is likely to remain an
important battleground in hospital merger litigation under the antitrust laws.

353. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 5.2; cf FTC, Statement Concerning Horizontal
Mergers § 5 (June 14, 1982) (failing division arguments will be taken into account, but bear a high
burden because of difficulties of proof).
354. 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 51, § 3.22.

